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Abstract 
The knowledge needed for nursing practice has long been a contested and divisive 
issue among nursing scholars and nurse practitioners. Professional knowledge in 
nursing is recognised as complex and multifaceted, drawing on many different 
sources. Throughout the history of modern nursing, as the profession attempted 
to establish itself as a discipline in its own right, various movements in the 
development of nursing knowledge may be identified. From an earlier era of grand 
theories to evidence-based practice in more recent times, the nature, origins and 
scope of nursing knowledge remains a source of on-going debate and discussion. 
Reflective practice has proved to be a very popular model of professional 
knowledge in nursing since it first appeared in the literature in the 1980s. Its 
appeal for nursing may be understood in its valuing of practice knowledge and the 
possibility of generating knowledge from practice. However, despite the appeal of 
reflection as an epistemology of practice in nursing education, the term is 
understood in many different and sometimes contradictory ways. 
This aim of this study is to examine the textual construction of reflective practice 
as a model of professional knowledge in nursing education. Since knowledge in 
many disciplines is textually mediated, a consideration of the language in which 
knowledge claims are made seems apposite when a concept is contested. 
Deconstruction consists in a close reading of texts, not with the aim of 
understanding the meaning of a text but with the aim of understanding how 
meaning is constructed, in particular, the resources of language that are used and 
the effects thereby created. 
This deconstructive reading reveals a concept that never fully coincides with itself. 
Reflective practice as a model of professional knowledge in nursing education is 
never punctually present in the texts that strive to construct its identity. The 
identity of reflective practice appears deeply saturated by its so-called binary 
opposite. Such a reading does not claim to be the "truth" of reflective practice. It 
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does, however, permit the concept to be considered and understood in a different 
way and that, I should contend, is what reflective practice is all about. 
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Chapter 1 Introduction 
Like many issues in nursing generally, nursing knowledge - its nature, origins, and 
scope - has been the subject of on-going debate and discussion within the 
profession for decades. As a relatively new discipline, nursing has attempted to 
assert an identity distinct from other healthcare disciplines, in particular medicine, 
to which it has, historically, been most closely allied. The assertion of a unique 
identity is intimately connected with the development of a unique knowledge base. 
In developing a body of unique disciplinary knowledge, nursing strives to balance 
its strong attachment to practice with the requirement for advancements in theory 
and research. Reflective practice, as a model of professional knowledge in nursing 
education, appears to offer a means of achieving the required balance. Reflective 
practice has proved a popular theory of professional knowledge over the past 
three decades, particularly in nursing education. However, it is not without 
controversy in that field. While reflective practice appears to validate the art or 
practice of nursing, the science or theory of nursing seems to be less accredited. 
This apparent opposition between art and science lies at the core of many of the 
debates and disagreements concerning nursing knowledge. Is nursing an art or a 
science? Is it more art than science? Or is it both in equal measure? And what 
kind of knowledge for nursing does reflective practice afford? This study is an 
attempt to address these recurrent questions from the perspective of 
deconstruction. In this chapter, the main outlines of the study will be presented. 
Beginning with an historical overview of developments in nursing knowledge 
through the lens of nursing education, the chapter will include an account of my 
position and interest in this area. The study has strong resonances with my own 
lengthy career as a registered nurse, registered midwife, and nurse educator in 
both the UK and Irish contexts. To a certain extent, the study parallels and mimics 
my professional biography. In this chapter, also, the phenomenon that is reflective 
practice in nursing will be introduced. An outline of deconstruction as a research 
methodology and how I came to choose this approach for my investigation of 
reflective practice as a model of professional knowledge in nursing education will 
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be included. I begin by outlining developments in nursing education and how such 
developments influenced conceptions of nursing knowledge 
1.1 Developments in nursing education 
As 'modern' nursing developed in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries 
with the establishment of hospital-based training schools and the drive for 
professional registration, nursing competence was taken to be a combination of 
personal qualities, practical skill, and biomedical knowledge (Fealy, 2006). 
Nursing was considered a vocation and only those with the appropriate disposition 
were selected for training. Close supervision and strict discipline, enforced by 
ward sisters and hospital matrons, ensured the development of a nurse's moral 
character and correct attitude (Abel-Smith, 1960; Maggs, 1983; Scanlan, 1991). 
Formal instruction was provided in basic scientific knowledge, progressing, as the 
nurse advanced in training, to knowledge of patients' medical and surgical 
conditions. Clinical procedures relevant to the treatment of such conditions were 
also taught. Examinations for entry onto the register of nurses were set by the 
body with statutory responsibility for the training and regulation of the profession. 
Examination content reflected the syllabus of training and the medical model of 
care, that is, care based on medical diagnosis and treatment (Aggleton & Chalmers, 
1986, 2000; Fealy, 2006). Practical skills were assessed in ward settings by senior 
nursing staff. Various formats were developed to assess practical skills; all were 
largely procedure-focused. Caring qualities and appropriate attitudes were not 
formally assessed. The knowledge base of nursing was derived from medical 
science coupled with practical knowledge of clinical tasks and procedures 
(Marriner Tomey & Alligood, 2006). Nursing knowledge served the needs of the 
hospital, and student nurses provided a workforce in return for a professional 
qualification (Baly, 1973; Scanlan, 1991). 
This model of nursing education persisted with minor adjustments until the 1980s 
in the United Kingdom and the 1990s in Ireland. Throughout that time, a higher 
educational level preparation for nurses was advocated by nurse leaders (Marriner 
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Tomey & Alligood, 2006; Scanlan, 1991). Resistance to such a move from varied 
quarters was based in part on the idea that higher education was in some way 
inimical to the development of appropriate personal caring qualities in the nursing 
student. This was coupled with a belief that nursing did not require the scientific 
knowledge and theory that it was the role of universities to provide (Scanlan, 
1991). 
Nursing education in Britain and Ireland was influenced by developments abroad, 
particularly in the United States which had a long established history of higher 
educational preparation for nurses (Marriner Tomey & Alligood, 2006). Part of the 
mandate of higher education was the development of a knowledge base for the 
profession through research, scholarship and publications (Ryan, 2008). Nurse 
academics sought to develop a unique identity for nursing which would distinguish 
it from medicine and the medical model of care. This led to the development of 
various models and theories of nursing, frequently modifications of models and 
theories borrowed from other disciplines, such as sociology and psychology 
(Aggleton & Chalmers, 1986; Kershaw & Salvage, 1986; McKenna, 1997). Early 
nursing research was modelled on the scientific method reflecting the dominance 
of this approach in higher education at that time. As alternative research 
approaches, such as grounded theory and action research, were developed, many 
nursing scholars identified an inherent compatibility between the underlying 
philosophical principles of qualitative research approaches and nursing itself. A 
fierce debate ensued regarding the methodologies appropriate for the 
development of nursing theory and research with some nurse researchers 
rejecting the scientific method outright while others argued for a mix of scientific 
and qualitative approaches (Fawcett, 2005). At the core of this debate was the 
identity of nursing as art or science, more art than science, or both equally. To 
validate nursing as art would require that those less visible, less measurable 
aspects of practice, such as personal qualities and practical knowledge, be 
identified and accredited. This was unlikely to occur, particularly in the early 
years following nursing's entry into the milieu of higher education, as nursing 
attempted to establish itself as a discipline with a strong scientific base (Risjord, 
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2010). A more detailed account of these perspectives on professional knowledge 
in nursing will be considered in Chapter 2. 
The latter decades of the twentieth century witnessed the most significant change 
in pre-registration nursing education in the United Kingdom and Ireland since its 
inception a century before, with the move from hospital-based, apprenticeship-
style training to a university-based academic model. Many factors contributed to 
this change: the aforementioned drive for recognition of nursing as a profession in 
its own right with its own body of professional knowledge; recognition of the 
increasing complexity of the nursing role; societal changes bringing greater 
educational and career opportunities for young people, in particular, young 
women; increasing diversity of populations and health care needs requiring a 
wider knowledge base; developments in medical science leading to greater 
complexity of treatments and procedures; the influence of the health promotion 
movement and a re-orientation of health services from a focus on treating illness 
to disease prevention and promotion of wellness; the growth in consumerism 
leading to a more discriminating service user; the ever-increasing cost of health 
care services and the need to find more flexible modes of health care service 
delivery; the increasing professionalization of allied healthcare professions, such 
as occupational therapy, dietetics, social work, and others; and growth of the 
multi- and inter-disciplinary health care team approach. All of these developments 
contributed, to varying extents and at varying degrees of remoteness, to the most 
radical change in entry level nursing education for more than a century (Abel-
Smith, 1960; Baly, 1973; Briggs, 1972; Fealy, 2005; Royal College of Nursing, 1985; 
Scanlan, 1991; United Kingdom Central Council for Nursing, Midwifery and Health 
Visiting, 1986). 
`Project 2000', as the new pre-registration nursing programme was known in the 
United Kingdom, proposed a decoupling of education and service (UKCC, 1986)). 
Student nurses would no longer be considered part of the hospital or health care 
workforce. In addition to achieving a professional qualification at the end of three 
years, they would also receive a Diploma award from a higher education 
institution. The new programme would prepare the nurse to work with 
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`uncertainty', recognising that a training programme based largely on rituals and 
routines was inadequate to meet the needs of a rapidly changing healthcare system 
(UKCC, 1986, 20). Opportunities to develop creativity, `thinking ability', and 
problem-solving skills in clinical situations would be provided via new approaches 
to teaching and learning (UKCC, 1986, 20). The knowledge-transmission model, 
that is, learners as passive recipients of knowledge delivered by experts, would be 
supplemented by student-centred approaches to teaching and learning, enabling 
the student `to question, as well as to obey, to discover as well as to be taught, to 
learn from those who have never been nurses as well as from those who have been 
excellent ones' (RCN, 1985, 12). Students would not only learn what they needed to 
function as a nurse, but also learn how to learn. Lifelong learning and continuing 
professional development were strongly emphasised in the new programme, 
acknowledging that professionals are required to update their knowledge and 
skills, and that formal educational programmes must equip the learner with the 
skills to do so. One of the key concerns in the proposed changes to nursing 
education was to retain a strong focus on practical knowledge and competence, so 
that what emerged from the educational experience was a "'knowledgeable doer"' 
(UKCC, 1986, 40). Clinical competence had been an acknowledged strength and a 
highly valued attribute of the apprenticeship model of nursing education. With the 
move to an academic model, there was a risk that nurses exiting the programme 
would not be as proficient in clinical skills as their traditionally prepared 
predecessors. Under the new programme, much of the student nurse's time would 
be spent in a university setting far removed from clinical experience. Exposure in 
that milieu to academics with expertise in a variety of social and biological sciences 
posed a dual risk. One was that the abstract nature of the knowledge taught in 
university would not easily transfer to a clinical setting. The second risk was that 
the student nurse, as a supernumerary member of the clinical staffing complement, 
would have less time and fewer opportunities to practice and acquire clinical skills 
than had the student prepared under the traditional training system (Simons et al., 
1998). So while the apprenticeship model was considered inadequate to meet the 
education needs of a nursing profession that would be required to practice in a 
rapidly evolving, complex healthcare system, potential weaknesses in the new 
model of nursing education were also recognised (RCN, 1985; UKCC, 1986). 
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1.2 Developments in nursing education in Ireland 
Similar developments to those initiated in nursing education in the UK occurred in 
Ireland in the mid-1990s. The body with statutory and regulatory responsibility 
for the nursing profession in Ireland, until very recently known as 'An Bord 
Altranais' (The Irish Nursing Board), published a framework document proposing 
changes to nursing education modelled along the lines of Project 2000 in the UK 
(An Bord Altranais, 1994). Around the same time, a local initiative was undertaken 
at one hospital site in response to EU Directive 89/595/EEC (EU Directive 
89/595/eec). Many of the changes in nursing education in Ireland were presaged 
by European Union legislation. An earlier Directive 77/453/EEC (EU Directive 
77/453/eec) required that student nurses gain clinical experience in a variety of 
specialist settings such as mental health and maternity care. Hospitals that could 
not provide experience for student nurses in specialist clinical areas had to endure 
the loss of the student from their service to other settings where the required 
experience was available. This development was the first example of the 
educational needs of nursing students taking precedence over service needs 
(Fealy, 2005). The later European Directive - 89/595/EEC - specified a 
rebalancing of the time allocated to theoretical and clinical instruction in the 
nursing education programme. Time allocated to theoretical instruction was 
increased from 26 weeks to 40 weeks with a concomitant reduction in time 
allocated to clinical instruction. Implementation of the European directive of 1989 
provided an opportunity to draft a new curriculum with a wider theoretical base 
and more focused clinical experience. This opportunity was taken by the School of 
Nursing in Galway in the West of Ireland. 'The Galway Model', as the new nursing 
education programme became known, represented formal collaboration between 
the nursing school, the local university, and the regulatory body, The Irish Nursing 
Board (Simons et al., 1998). University lecturers participated in drafting a new 
curriculum and also in teaching and assessing their subject areas on the new 
nursing studies programme. Department of Health and Nursing Board approval 
for the new programme was secured and the 'Galway Model' had its launch in 
1994, extending to all Schools of Nursing in the Republic of Ireland by 1998. 
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Students entering under the new nursing education programme had 
supernumerary status. As well as becoming registered nurses on successful 
completion of the programme, they were awarded a Diploma in Nursing from a 
relevant third level institution. The new model also allowed for existing 
Registered Nurses with a Diploma award to attain a Baccalaureate Degree in 
Nursing by completing a full-time fourth year of study based entirely within the 
university. 
The 'Galway Model' proved to be an interim measure in nursing education in 
Ireland. A major review of nursing, including pre-registration education, was 
undertaken in 1998 following industrial action by nursing unions (Commission on 
Nursing, 1998). The Commission on Nursing was charged with examining all 
aspects of nursing and with making recommendations for the future direction of 
the profession. 
	 Following a wide consultation process with a variety of 
stakeholders, the Commission recommended that pre-registration nursing 
education be fully integrated within higher education, with students gaining a 
professional qualification and a Bachelor of Science (Honours) degree at the end of 
four years (Commission on Nursing, 1998). While the changes proposed for pre-
registration nursing education were quite radical, the Commission on Nursing 
(1998, 50), was anxious that what is 'most cherished' in nurses be retained, 'namely 
enthusiasm, energy, commitment, integrity, responsiveness to change, sense of 
humour, and above all, a deep sense of caring'. In framing a new nursing 
curriculum, cognisance needed to be taken of the traditions of the apprenticeship 
model, in particular, the personal qualities of the nurse and the artistic element of 
nursing, as the practice became a discipline. 
1.3 Reflective practice in nursing education 
The changes in nursing education in the United Kingdom and Ireland that occurred 
in the late 1980s and throughout the 1990s coincided with the publication of a 
number of texts in the field of education, the most important of which from a 
nursing education perspective, was Donald Schon's 'The Reflective Practitioner', 
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published in 1983. Schon (1983) was critical of the educational model espoused 
by universities at that time for the preparation of practitioners of the professions. 
He described the dominant model of professional knowledge, which he called 'the 
model of Technical Rationality' (Schon, 1984, 21), as consisting in the application of 
rigorous, scientific, context-independent, value-free knowledge and techniques to 
the instrumental problems of practice. 
	 However, practice situations are 
characterised by uncertainty, uniqueness, complexity, and conflicting values, and, 
therefore, call for a different kind of knowledge, what Schon (1983, 49) termed 'an 
epistemology of practice'. An epistemology of practice would recognise the artistry 
and practical knowing that is central to the work of practitioners. This kind of 
knowing is embedded in practice and is ordinarily tacit, in the sense that 
practitioners are unable easily to articulate it. It sometimes, however, 'surfaces' in 
situations of surprise when practitioners are prompted to engage in 'reflection-in-
action' (Schon, 1983, 50). By investigating these situations and paying close 
attention to what practitioners actually do, knowledge can be constructed from 
practice and, subsequently, validated and shared. Schon's (1983) ideas appeared 
to strike a chord with those responsible for framing and guiding the new model of 
nursing education. The terms 'reflection', 'reflective practitioner', and 'reflective 
practice' became common currency in documents produced for the new nursing 
education programme. 
Outlining the standards of proficiency for pre-registration nursing education, the 
Nursing and Midwifery Council (NMC), which succeeded the United Kingdom 
Central Council for Nursing, Midwifery and Health Visiting (UKCC) as the 
regulatory body for nursing and midwifery in the United Kingdom, states that: 'The 
level of learning must be such as to facilitate...the development of critical thinking, 
problem-solving and reflective capacities essential to complex professional practice' 
(Nursing and Midwifery Council, 2004, 17). For registered nurses, a post-
registration education and practice handbook, published by the NMC, was 
designed to encourage nurses to 'think and reflect', and required them to maintain 
a 'personal professional profile' of learning activities to include 'a personal view 
(reflection) of the way in which the learning has informed or influenced' their 
practice (Nursing and Midwifery Council, 2006, 13). Clinical supervision was 
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identified as an integral part of nurses' lifelong learning. Among the aims of 
clinical supervision was `to bring practitioners and skilled supervisors together to 
reflect on practice' (Nursing and Midwifery Council, 2002, 7). Similarly, the Irish 
Nursing Board (An Bord Altranais), in formulating requirements and standards for 
pre-registration nursing education programmes, included the following learning 
outcome: 'Demonstrate development of skills of analysis, critical thinking, problem-
solving and reflective practice'(An Bord Altranais, 1999, 13). Guidelines published 
by the Irish Nursing Board on developing a quality clinical learning environment, 
state that 'Each registered nurse/midwife has a duty to provide students with clinical 
support to help them question, analyse, reflect upon their practice and develop 
autonomy in decision-making to enable them to become safe, caring competent 
nurses/midwives' (An Bord Altranais, 2003, 1). In terms of post-registration 
education, reflective practice is included among examples of activities that may 
contribute to professional development for registered nurses and midwives (An 
Bord Altranais, 2000). From the perspective of the regulatory bodies responsible 
for nursing and midwifery, reflective practice is one among a number of skills 
necessary to ensure that learning from practice and learning appropriate to 
professional practice occurs. 
1.4 A personal perspective 
As indicated in the introductory remarks above, my interest in reflective practice 
as a model of professional knowledge arises from a long professional career in 
nursing, midwifery, and nursing education. My initial training as a registered 
nurse occurred under the apprenticeship system in Ireland. Periods of study 
`blocks' were interspersed with working in a variety of clinical settings throughout 
a three year training period. A syllabus of training prepared by the regulatory 
body for nursing was followed. Didactic content was oriented to disease and 
illness. Very little content was devoted to social sciences. Clinical experience was 
random in response to the needs of the service. Placements within particular 
clinical areas were likely to be interrupted if a staff shortage occurred elsewhere. 
No formal learning structures were in place in the clinical setting. The focus was 
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very much on getting the daily tasks completed. I learned by following the 
example of other nursing students more senior than I and, to a lesser extent, 
qualified nursing staff. Lack of knowledge and mistakes, even minor ones, were 
poorly tolerated in a sometimes quite harsh, hierarchical learning environment. 
There seemed to be no time and little motivation to reflect upon, and learn from, 
experiences, even negative ones. 
At times, I had what I now recognise as knowledge deficits, particularly in the area 
of the psychological care of patients. I subsequently undertook midwifery and 
neonatal care training in the UK where an exemplary apprenticeship model 
applied. Learning was integrated and structured throughout the training period. 
Clinical experience was specific and focused and, while there was still an emphasis 
on tasks and routines, experienced nurses and midwives ensured that learners had 
exposure to the necessary experience so that required competencies could be 
achieved. Competencies were largely confined to the domain of clinical skills. 
Other areas of competence such as supporting bereaved patients and 
communicating in difficult situations were generally taken for granted in the sense 
that specific training in those areas was not provided. My idea of a competent 
nurse was someone with highly developed clinical skills, and good communication 
and organisational ability. On registration, I worked in a variety of clinical settings 
for a number of years, mainly in maternity and neonatal care. When my interest 
turned to nursing education, the route to qualification as a nurse tutor/teacher 
was a three-year Bachelor degree programme in university in Ireland. This was 
my first exposure to nursing in a higher education setting. The Bachelor of Nursing 
Studies programme followed the model of technical rationality as articulated by 
Schon (1983). Biological and social sciences were combined with educational 
theories and curriculum studies. Teaching practice followed in the final year of the 
programme when students were expected to apply the knowledge acquired in 
university to a classroom setting in nursing schools. 
As a qualified nurse teacher employed in a School of Nursing within the health 
service sector, I participated in developing the first Diploma/RN (Registered 
Nurse) programme in the Republic of Ireland in 1994. As outlined above, this 
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initiative was prompted by changes to nursing education at EU level. Working 
with academics from the higher education sector but not being part of that culture 
was at times an uneasy experience. A major concern among nurse teachers 
responsible for developing a new nursing curriculum was that the sciences, in 
particular the biological sciences, would dominate the curriculum at the expense of 
nursing subjects. This was, perhaps, a reaction to the dominance of the medical 
model in the traditional nursing education programme that I and my colleagues 
had experienced as student nurses. A decision was taken to 'frontload' the 
sciences in year one of the Diploma programme, with the remaining two years 
devoted to nursing studies. This was unpopular with both students and lecturers 
in the sciences, and was perceived as widening the so called 'theory-practice' gap. 
On the other hand, developing the nursing studies modules proved equally 
challenging. Articulating a philosophy of nursing and exploring nursing theories 
and models in depth was demanding, despite having had exposure to these ideas in 
university. The language in which nursing theory was framed was very often 
dense and it was difficult to imagine what relevance such content had to nursing 
practice. Supporting students in practice and my role in that arena was another 
source of confusion and unease. The role of the nurse teacher in the clinical setting 
and the issue of clinical credibility is something that has bedevilled nurse 
educators from the time they first deserted the real world of practice for the 
rarefied world of the classroom. A number of models have been tried, for example, 
joint appointments whereby a tutor divides their time between the clinical setting 
and the classroom, working as a clinician in the former and a lecturer in the latter 
(Kershaw & Salvage, 1986). No model has proved entirely satisfactory. With the 
integration of nursing education fully into the higher education setting and the 
transfer of nurse teachers to that setting also, the dilemma of a clinical role for the 
nurse lecturer continues. Nurse lecturers are now 'linked' to specific clinical areas 
but the nature of the link is open to a wide variety of interpretations. As part of the 
preparation for transferring to the higher education sector, nurse teachers were 
required to obtain a Master's degree in nursing or a cognate discipline. I chose to 
study for a Master's degree in Psychological Counselling in the UK. 
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My introduction to reflective practice as a concept and as a practice came when I 
studied for a Master's degree in Psychological Counselling. I had previously 
completed a Diploma in the Theory of Counselling which I found invaluable in 
teaching student nurses about therapeutic relationships and interpersonal skills. I 
was immediately attracted to reflective practice because I saw it as a formal 
method of capturing, analysing, validating, and learning from practical experience. 
I found the idea of knowledge derived from experience in a helping relationship 
which, in turn, enriched the repertoire of helping skills, compelling. I taught 
reflection and the reflective practice approach to many different groups of nursing 
students, always basing learning on real life clinical experiences and examples. 
The experiences students chose to reflect upon were always interesting, 
sometimes involving quite minor, seemingly insignificant incidents, while at other 
time, very moving or quite dramatic events were recounted. I found the 
experience of teaching reflective practice kept me very close to, and conversant 
with, the realities of the practice domain and I felt privileged to be able to facilitate 
learning in that way. Students' reactions to being asked to reflect on practice 
varied from bewilderment to scepticism, and, occasionally, enthusiasm. 
Registered nurses taking Higher Diploma awards in various clinical specialities, 
such as peri-operative and orthopaedic nursing, were required to write reflective 
essays, and, very often, they would ask my advice about the content and structure 
of their work. I tried to orient them to deeper levels of reflection, beyond technical 
problem solving, perhaps as a result of my training in counselling. Students were 
always concerned about using a 'model' of reflection in their writing as they were 
required to do. I frequently saw how the students' attempts to use a model led to 
quite rigid adherence with the result that the story of their experiences became 
distorted. I encouraged them to write freely initially, and later to think about how 
they could apply a model of reflection. I enjoyed reading the students' essays and 
commenting where I felt it was appropriate. It gave me great insight into the 
realities of practice. Occasionally, there would be something akin to an `aha' 
phenomenon as these experienced clinicians discovered something about 
themselves or their work that they didn't already know or see, or something they 
already knew but hadn't recognised as knowledge. That was very satisfying for 
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me. However, I sometimes conflicted with colleagues who had different ideas 
about reflection. Some took a more 'scientific' approach to reflective practice and 
expected a reflective essay to be formulated like any other piece of academic 
writing. Such events caused me to doubt my own understanding of reflective 
practice and I would go back to the literature to find reassurance for my point of 
view. 
More recently, my work has involved continuing professional education with 
registered nurses who are supporting student learning in practice. As preceptors, 
these nurses are required to facilitate reflective practice with students, and my job 
is to ensure that they feel prepared to do so. Time is generally limited and I 
sometimes vary my teaching strategy between using a didactic approach and using 
a clinical scenario from a book. These are not the most rewarding teaching 
experiences. It is clear, from participants' evaluations of the classes, that, in the 
time available, nurses want factual material such as knowledge of competency 
frameworks, which they are required to complete in the context of assessing 
students' progress in the clinical arena. Reflective practice is viewed as something 
optional. Indeed, one of the most frequent comments made to me by preceptors is: 
`Students go to the library to do reflection'. And when I explain that this is not the 
only, nor necessarily the optimum, way to `do reflection', some nurses are relieved 
to be given 'permission' to engage in reflection using material from students' diary 
entries in a dialogic mode while others are not so enthusiastic. 
My role also includes educating and training support staff whose job specification 
is rapidly changing and developing as they assume duties and responsibilities 
previously undertaken by nurses. The education programme for support staff 
requires reflective writing. To help them to begin to think reflectively, I ask them 
to record some experience from their work in the clinical setting using written 
guidelines which I devise for them. We then discuss the experience in small groups 
and I encourage them by my questioning to analyse their experiences and identify 
what they may have learned. Reactions vary. Some learners 'get it' straight away 
while others struggle. My enthusiasm for the subject and the practice remains but 
I am now aware that not everyone shares this feeling. What I find most challenging 
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and thought-provoking is the wide disparity of views and understandings of 
reflective practice held by relatively homogeneous groups, to the extent that it can 
seem as if the same term is referring to very different practices. However, when I 
examine the literature, I find such disparity not unreasonable. Reflective practice 
seems to signify in many different, and at times, contradictory, ways. There is also 
something of a paradox discernible in the way that reflective practice was first 
adopted by the nursing discipline. In examining this event, some clues to the 
complicated identity of reflective practice as a model of professional knowledge in 
nursing education may be detected. 
1.5 The paradox of reflective practice in nursing education 
As acknowledged earlier, Schon's (1983) argument for a new epistemology of 
practice may be understood as addressing the concerns of those who feared that 
the new nursing education programme would result in a diminution in clinical 
competence and professional artistry, and a widening of the gap between nursing 
theory and nursing practice. Schon (1983), through his writing, gave recognition 
and credibility to practice knowledge or knowledge derived from practice. He also, 
however, proposed that this kind of knowledge was not that taught in, or valued 
by, universities. The model of technical rationality that underpins the education of 
professionals in universities is considered of questionable relevance to the needs 
of practitioners of the professions in their everyday work situations. SchOn (1983) 
cites disillusionment with the professions by society in general at the time as part 
of the reason for his search for a new epistemology of practice. In the twenty or so 
years prior to the publication of his book, Schon (1983) argues that the professions 
had gone from being universally praised for their contribution to the advancement 
of all areas of society to being suspected of betraying the trust and regard vested in 
them by citizens. Schon (1983) attributes this shift in societal attitudes toward the 
professions as partly due to the model of professional education espoused by 
universities. The model of technical rationality is instrumental, focusing on finding 
the best means to achieving pre-established ends (Schon, 1983). However, this 
approach does not take account of the complexities obtaining in the real world of 
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practice where ends are not always clear and unambiguous. Schon (1983) cites 
engineering as one example to illustrate his argument. Engineers have knowledge 
of what kind of roads to build and they know how to build them, but in the process 
of building, they may create unexpected and unforeseen adverse effects on local 
communities. In medicine, to take another example, technological advancement, in 
the form of resuscitation techniques and equipment, allows people to survive who 
previously would have died. Survivorship may bring a poor quality of life and 
create many additional problems for the person concerned, the person's family and 
wider society that could not have been envisaged at the time of reanimation, and 
that medical expertise is unable subsequently to address. In other instances, 
technological advancements may outstrip healthcare budgets resulting in 
healthcare professionals being required to make difficult choices for which their 
formal education has left them ill-prepared. These situations occur, Schon (1983) 
argues, because the model of professional knowledge to which professional 
practitioners are exposed in tertiary education settings does not take the 
complexities, uncertainties and value conflicts that exist in the real world of 
practice into account. Reflective practice, on the other hand, recognises a kind of 
knowing that is inherent in the actions of competent practitioners which allows 
them to deal with the complexity and uncertainty of practice (Schon, 1983). 
Shortly following the publication of SchOn's (1983) text, nursing education in the 
UK was preparing to transfer to higher education settings where students would 
be educated according to the model of technical rationality. At the same time, 
reflective practice, which was developed because of the perceived limitations of 
the model of technical rationality, was included as a key component in the new 
nursing curriculum. Reflective practice thus entered the nursing lexicon at a time 
when nursing education was preparing to adopt the dominant technical rational 
model of professional knowledge with its move from apprenticeship style training 
to university based education. The changes in nursing education required 
knowledge derived from reflecting in, and on, practice to co-exist with rigorous, 
scientific, context-independent, value-free knowledge and techniques espoused by 
universities (Schon, 1983). A new nursing curriculum must, therefore, attempt 
successfully to contain and enact two apparently opposing epistemologies. 
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Reflective practice was posited as a challenge to the prevailing orthodoxy in higher 
education settings. Within that milieu, it might be difficult for reflective practice to 
remain heterogeneous to the model of technical rationality. As part of higher 
education, nursing aspired to become a research-based profession, developing its 
own unique body of knowledge (Ryan, 2008). Reflective practice knowledge might 
not be accredited as a legitimate kind of knowledge for nursing in a culture 
accustomed more to positivist and post-positivist approaches to knowledge 
generation. The tensions and paradoxes evident at the inception of reflective 
practice in nursing education may in part account for the variety of subsequent 
understandings and responses to reflective practice as a model of professional 
knowledge for nursing. 
Differences in understanding may also have contributed to the lack of any stable or 
agreed definition of reflective practice. Moon (1999, vii) comments on the 
problem of identity and reflection: 
The ramifications of the literature that refers to reflection and to what it 
seems to be could well lead you to doubt that it exists as a subject in its own 
right. You might well then doubt the case for the study of reflection. However, 
the rate ofgrowth of literature on this subject, particularly in the last 20 
years, and its apparent face value and broad practical application, provide 
due justification for its study, despite the difficulties that surround its 
identity... 
In the above quotation, reflection bears an identity as a textual construction. 
Although textual construction does not guarantee existence as a self-identical 
`subject', it does not prevent reflection from functioning. For instance, it does not 
prevent the study of reflection nor its application in practice. The existential 
problem is further signalled by the use of the term 'face value', generally used to 
indicate nominal as opposed to real value. The term is frequently used in the 
context of currency. The coin or note may be worth very little in real terms but it 
bears a value in economic terms. The metaphors of writing and face-value are very 
interesting in the context of deconstruction. Deconstruction recognises writing as 
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part of a binary opposition: speech/writing. Speech is privileged as natural and 
normal whereas writing is considered a deviation from, or corruption of, the norm, 
to be used only when speech is not possible. Writing is considered suspect as it 
can function in the absence of a speaker. With no speaker present to guarantee 
correct meaning, a text may generate effects unimagined and unintended by its 
author. In a similar way, the gold bars contained in bank vaults that guarantee the 
value of a monetary note or coin do not need to be present in order for currency to 
function in financial transactions. That something might not exist in the present 
and yet produce effects connects Moon's description of reflection above with the 
practice of deconstruction. Other similarities between reflective practice and 
deconstruction as a practice will be identified later in the chapter. A more detailed 
exposition of deconstruction will be presented in Chapter 4. 
The difficulties posed by words and what they might mean in the context of 
reflection are illustrated in the following quotation: 
While in general there may be too many words and meanings floating around 
the idea of reflection, in some areas of its study there are distinct deficiencies 
in vocabulary and this is particularly the case in the study of reflection in 
learning. When words are missing, concepts tend to be missing and the 
absence of concepts may distort understandings (Moon, 1999, viii). 
The use of the term 'floating' above suggests that the words and meanings used to 
give expression to the 'idea' of reflection never quite 'hit the mark', or coincide 
with the thing itself. This again is a deeply deconstructive point of view. Words or 
signifiers are all there is, with no final signified concept that would arrest meaning. 
It is also clear in the above extract that there can be no signified without a signifier 
- 'When words are missing, concepts tend to be missing'. The final line of the 
quotation suggests that if the missing words and concepts can be found or supplied 
then correct understandings of reflection in learning will follow. This is a deeply 
un-deconstructive point of view. And I hope to demonstrate, in the deconstructive 
readings which follow in later chapters, that univocal meaning is an impossible 
ideal. 
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1.6 Reflective practice and nursing knowledge 
The problem of identity recognised by Moon (1999) is replicated in the nursing 
literature on reflective practice. The lack of a clear definition and an agreed 
understanding of the concepts of reflection and reflective practice are recognised 
as problematic for nursing education. Atkins and Murphy (1993, 1188) describe 
`much of the literature on reflection as complex and abstract'. They add that 'the 
lack of clarity of the concept of reflection and the failure of many of the empirical 
studies to define it, has made the concept difficult to operationalize' (Atkins & 
Murphy, 1993, 1191). James & Clarke (1994, 84) agree that 'conceptualising 
reflective practice is problematic...and describing it adequately for all contexts 
presents difficulties'. Carroll et al. (2002, 15) claim that 'The lack of a clear 
definition of reflection and reflective practice, together with the plethora of terms 
used interchangeably in the literature, make this phenomenon difficult to utilise 
within nursing education'. Students' lives are affected by 'these multiple and tacit 
understandings of the concept' in the sense of exposure to diverse teaching and 
learning strategies that are designed to 'foster reflective development' (Pierson, 
1998, 165). Attempts are made in the literature to 'demystify' reflection and 
reflective practice (Cooney, 1999; Richardson, 1995), echoing Moon's suggestion of 
an ethereal, other-worldly quality characteristic of reflection. While the concept of 
reflection in nursing education may appear somewhat vague, and while a clear, 
agreed definition is lacking, there appears to be general agreement that reflection 
is capable of producing effects in nursing, namely, the generation of professional 
knowledge. Cooney (1999, 1531) asserts that 'The value of reflection is mainly 
identified as developing professional expertise, competency and valid knowledge for 
nursing practice'. Reflection is considered 'vital' if learning from practice is to 
occur (Atkins & Murphy, 1993, 1191). The development of reflective practitioners 
enables the process of critical analysis of practice thereby creating 'new knowledge' 
for practice (Carroll et al., 2002, 16). A similar consensus regarding the kind of 
knowledge for nursing made possible by reflective practice is not, however, 
evident in the nursing literature. Kinsella (2007) questions whether Schon (1983) 
has created or overcome a dichotomy between technical rationality and reflective 
practice. Some argue that reflective practice as a model of professional knowledge 
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is not compatible with the dominant technical rational model which regards 
professional knowledge as the application of scientific theory and technique to the 
problems of practice (Rolfe, 2002). As the following extract illustrates, reflective 
practice and technical rationality are regarded as two opposing epistemologies 
that cannot be reconciled: 
...a genuine reflective epistemology requires to substitute the concept of 
ready-made knowledge with the liberating and illimitable possibility of 
creating knowledge. The aspiring objective is not to fill the heads of every 
student with identical, replicable and factual' knowledge, but to provide the 
means and mechanisms for every student to produce their own individual and 
personal knowledge (Mantzoukas, 2007, 245). 
For others, reflective practice encompasses knowledge from many sources, 
including scientific theory and research (Johns, 2009; Rycroft-Malone et al., 2004). 
Reflective practice, although it challenges a model of professional knowledge based 
solely on technical rationality, may be used to address concerns at the level of 
technical problem-solving (Brookfield, 1995; James & Clarke, 1994), in which case 
it may be difficult to distinguish one model of professional knowledge from the 
other. Reflection may also be used in such a way that it becomes another 
technology (Boud & Walker, 1998; Rolfe, 2002). Reflective practice as a model of 
professional knowledge is challenged by the evidence-based practice movement in 
healthcare (Rolfe & Gardner, 2005). The knowledge derived from reflecting in and 
on practice is considered inferior as a source of evidence for practice when 
compared to the evidence derived from scientific research studies. Reflective 
practice is also criticised for not having evidence of its effectiveness in nursing 
education and practice (Atkins & Murphy, 1993; Carroll et al., 2002; Nicholl & 
Higgins, 2004). 
Many of the arguments and binary oppositions emanating from the nursing 
literature on reflective practice may be viewed as bearing on the identity of 
nursing as art or science, which was alluded to in the introductory comments of 
this chapter. Those who seek a clear, univocal definition of reflection and 
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reflective practice, who identify reflection as a cognitive skill relevant to the 
process of technical problem-solving, and as a competence that can be taught and 
assessed against measurable outcomes employing models and mechanisms, and 
researched using scientific method, may be considered advocates of nursing as 
science, interpreting reflective practice as a science of practice. They may be 
contrasted with those who reject this view of reflective practice, seeing it instead 
as representing the art of practice, indefinable, non-rational, non-linear, holistic, 
emancipatory, to be judged on its own merits and not against some pre-established 
criterion. In the case of reflective practice as a model of nursing knowledge, these 
`warring forces of significationlDerrida, 2004a, xv, Translator's introduction) may 
be indicative of nursing's uncertain and divided identity as a discipline. But can 
such binary oppositions be sustained by a close reading of the texts wherein such 
arguments are constructed? This question will be addressed in the analysis 
chapters of the thesis. 
1.7 Deconstruction 
A number of features of reflective practice as a model of professional knowledge in 
nursing education recommend a deconstructive reading, namely, the instability of 
meaning and the binary oppositions identified in the nursing literature. When 
meaning is unclear or contested in respect of any concept, it prompts a 
consideration of how meaning is constructed. Meaning is a function of the 
language system. Knowledge in any domain is linguistically mediated (Peters & 
Biesta, 2009). By examining the language in which a knowledge claim is 
constructed, the possibility of new insights arises. Because language is a system of 
arbitrary and conventional signs, it is never fully within the control of the 
individual speaker or writer (Bally, Sechehaye, & Riedlinger, 1986). When the 
same word or signifier is used to signify in many different and contrary ways, 
something important may be at stake (Culler, 2008). Western thought is 
structured by binary oppositions (Derrida, 1997), which, as indicated above, 
privilege one term over its opposite by regarding the first term as standard or 
normal while its opposite is considered a corruption of, or deviation from, the 
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standard. Thought structured in this way has a long tradition. Plato, for example, 
privileged knowledge (episteme) over opinion (doxa); the former was considered 
good while the latter was regarded as suspect. Saussure, however, demonstrated 
that, in language, there are no positive terms; there are only differences. Each 
term, therefore, requires its binary opposite in order to produce meaning. 
...signs signify not as independently meaningful units corresponding to 
external objects but as elements whose value is generated by their difference 
from neighbouring elements in the system. Saussure put forth a notion of 
difference (not identity) as the origin of meaning (Johnson, in Lentricchia & 
McLaughlin, 1995, 41). (Johnson's emphasis). 
How is reflective practice knowledge claimed as science or art or both in the texts 
that present such arguments? 
	 What resources of language - rhetorical, 
grammatical, syntactical, and so on - are deployed to construct the entity and 
persuade the reader of a particular meaning? To address such questions, a close 
reading of texts is required; a reading not for 'what' a text means in the sense of a 
single, univocal meaning discernible behind a surface structure, but for 'how' a text 
means (Johnson, 1980). Deconstruction is a strategy of close reading that 
facilitates this kind of analysis. Rather than look through or past language for and 
at meaning, deconstruction examines the language in which meaning is 
constructed and how meaning is thereby achieved. As Graff (in Lentricchia & 
McLaughlin, 1995, 171) remarks of literary texts: ' if the authority of the expressed 
"truths" depends not on their correspondence with some reality but only on the 
coercive power of language', then any claim to a truth that transcends language is 
rendered doubtful. 
Since all texts are constructions it is possible for them to be de-constructed. '...the 
word "de-construction" is closely related not to the word "destruction" but to the 
word "analysis", which etymologically means "to undo" - a virtual synonym for "to 
de-construct" (Derrida, 2004a, xv, Translator's introduction). It is also closely 
related to the word 'critique', not critique in the negative sense as criticism of a 
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text and suggestions as to how it could be improved, but critique as questioning 
the conditions of possibility for the existence of any system. 
Every theory starts somewhere; every critique exposes what that starting 
point conceals, and thereby displaces all the ideas that follow from it. The 
critique does not ask "what does this statement mean?" but "where is it being 
made from? What does it presuppose? Are its presuppositions compatible 
with, independent of and anterior to the statement that seems to follow from 
them, or do they already follow from it, contradict it, or stand in a relation of 
mutual dependence such that neither can exist without positing that the other 
is prior to it?" (Derrida, 2004a, xvi, Translator's introduction) (Translator's 
emphasis). 
To deconstruct is not to clear up the confusions and remove the paradoxes that a 
textual construction reveals. Rather, to deconstruct is to demonstrate the inability 
of an author to achieve their stated intentions within a text. A deconstructive 
reading illustrates how language used to convey meaning is, at least partially, 
beyond the ability of an author's intentions to control. Those who take a 
deconstructivist approach to text analysis focus upon `the instability of linguistic 
meaning and the contradictions of conceptual thought...' (McPheron, 1998, cited in 
Peters & Biesta, 2009, 50). 
Johnson (1995) suggests that re-reading texts that have made a difference to some 
aspect of our world, and doing so in a deconstructive way, may make it possible to 
recognise contradictions, repressions, uncertainties, and ambiguities, even in those 
texts that appear most lucid. To do so is not to dismiss the texts or the values 
reflected in them but ` rather to see them in a more complex, more constructed, less 
idealised light' (Johnson, 1987, xviii) (Johnson's emphasis). 
	 The inherent 
instability of language and meaning allows marginalised voices to enter a text at 
those points where the author tries to dominate and exclude, so that other claims 
can be made and other identities asserted (Johnson, in Lentricchia & McLaughlin, 
1995). Deconstruction is not a method that is applied to a text from the outside, as 
it were. Deconstruction is always and already at work in a text (Weber, 1995). 
31 
The aim of a deconstructive reading is to reveal that process. Derrida (1977, 141) 
states that 'Deconstruction does not exist somewhere, pure, proper, self-identical, 
outside of its inscriptions in conflictual and differentiated contexts; it "is" only what it 
does and what is done with it, there where it takes place'. Deconstruction may be 
described as a strategy of reading that produces rather than protects. The reader 
is not the passive decoder of an author's intention. Critical reading produces 
another text which contributes another perspective to the entity under 
consideration. 'The reader's task is to read what is written rather than simply 
attempt to intuit what might have been meant' (Johnson, in Lentricchia & 
McLaughlin, 1995, 46). 
1.8 Deconstruction and reflective practice 
As touched upon earlier in the chapter, some resemblances or similarities may be 
noted between deconstruction and reflective practice. Reflective practice searches 
out and subjects to scrutiny all assumptions and presuppositions (Brookfield, 
1995) that underpin any practice. At its most radical, reflective practice may 
precipitate a revolution in thinking and action, what Mezirow (1990, 7) denotes as 
perspective transformation or ` Transformative learning'. Transformative learning 
occurs as we become aware not only of what we think and of what we think of 
what we think, but also aware of how we think and how thinking in that way has 
been made possible by our particular culture and socialisation. Reflection, and 
what some authors refer to as critical reflection, is directed at such perspective 
transformation (Mezirow, 1990). Both deconstruction and reflective practice are 
characterised by uncertainty and movement. Both activities are concerned to find 
new ways of envisioning existing realities, working with what is given without 
accepting that any situation is closed (Caputo, 1997). Deconstruction also aims at 
developing something new, a new determination of a given concept (Caputo, 
1997). Deconstruction as critique shakes up or de-stabilises what we take for 
granted, thus making more things available to critical scrutiny (Peters & Biesta, 
2009), enabling us to look at things and understand concepts differently. Howells 
(1998, 70) maintains that 'constant reviewing of the most seemingly unquestionable 
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assumptions is vital to any healthy intellectual life'. Reflective practice, which 
demands that practitioners ask searching questions of themselves and their 
practice in pursuit of knowledge, cannot itself be exempted from the same kind of 
analysis. 
Both reflective practice and deconstruction share an ethical dimension. Of 
deconstruction, Caputo (1997, 123) states: 
The affirmation of "responsibility", "ethics", "decision" - ...- will never be a 
matter of knowledge (Refs), of a determinable program, a knowable plan, of 
planning ahead, but of a generosity, a gift that gives itself without return -
whenever it is called for, whenever the occasion calls for it. 
In providing individualised care to service users, nurses frequently have to 
respond to unique situations which could not have been foreseen. Appropriate 
responses must be constructed from the elements of the unique situation. These 
are the kinds of situations, Schon (1983) claims, that cannot be responded to with 
a rule or procedural technique, as would be the case if practice were underpinned 
by the model of technical rationality. There may be conflicting values at play. Such 
situations require the practitioner to reflect-in-action, drawing upon and 
integrating particular contextual features, self-knowledge, knowledge of the 
patient and the patient's value system, as well as the ethical codes and guidelines 
that govern the profession. At the same time, the nurse must be able to account for 
her actions to the service user, her colleagues, and her professional body. She 
must be seen to be acting in the best interests of the client. Sometimes, however, it 
is not easy for nurses to explain the rationale for their actions and responses, in 
particular, the knowledge upon which such actions and responses are based. 
An effort to know and understand reflective practice as a model of professional 
knowledge in nursing more fully, and to account for the variations in 
understanding and attitude that the concept appears to stimulate among nurses, 
and in the nursing literature, prompted me to consider a close reading of the texts 
in which meaning is constructed. Deconstruction is a method of close reading, 
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although the word "method" in the context of deconstruction requires some 
qualification. This issue will be explored more fully in Chapter 4. 
I was intrigued by the underlying similarities between reflective practice and 
deconstruction. Deconstructing reflective practice would not only assist me to 
understand reflective practice as a model of professional knowledge in nursing 
education more fully, but might also help me to reflect better. 
1.9 Conclusion 
Reflective practice has been widely adopted within nursing education as a model 
of professional knowledge. Its appeal lies in the challenge it poses to the 
traditional dominant model of professional knowledge which tends to exclude or 
disregard phenomena of importance in practice disciplines. In the context of 
nursing, such phenomena include caring and therapeutic relating. Reflective 
practice raises the possibility of developing a body of knowledge that develops 
from practice and is unique to nursing. At the same time, reflective practice is a 
fuzzy concept with many different meanings articulated within the nursing 
literature. As a practice, it shares many similarities with deconstruction. Both defy 
stable definition and conceptual clarity. Both are aimed at breaking open existing 
totalities and uncovering hidden assumptions, enabling new possibilities for 
action. Both are responsible, ethical practices. The aim of this study is to engage in 
a deconstructive reading of texts that articulate reflective practice as a model of 
professional knowledge in nursing education. 
The following chapter provides an account of the various movements in the 
development of professional knowledge in nursing education and how such 
knowledge has been conceptualised over time. 
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Chapter 2 Theoretical framework 
2.1 Introduction 
The knowledge needed for the practice of nursing has long been a contested and 
divisive issue in nursing education. Throughout its history, as nursing moved from 
an untrained occupation populated by women of dubious moral character 
(McKenna, 1997) through vocational training with a strong religious influence 
(Abel-Smith, 1960) to its current status as an all-graduate profession, the 
knowledge base appropriate to nursing practice has been a source of on-going 
debate and disagreement. As alluded to in the previous chapter, with the 
establishment of formal training for nurses in the mid to late nineteenth century, 
moral character and virtue were regarded as of equal, if not greater, importance as 
scientific knowledge and practical skills in the apprentice nurse. These elements 
still form the basis of the graduate nursing qualification, although scientific 
knowledge is arguably accorded greater significance and prominence in nursing 
curricula than moral character. However, debate still centres on the priority 
accorded to the various elements of professional knowledge, the methods 
appropriate to generating nursing knowledge, and what should constitute a 
knowledge base unique to nursing. The aim of this chapter is to explore the issue 
of professional knowledge in nursing and to examine the role and potential that 
has been attributed to reflective practice as a model of professional knowledge for 
the discipline. Professional knowledge in general is first outlined. This is followed 
by a discussion of professional knowledge in the context of nursing from a 
diachronic or historical perspective. Reflective practice as a model of professional 
knowledge is then addressed. The chapter concludes with a consideration of 
reflective practice as a model of professional knowledge in nursing education. 
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2.2 Professional knowledge 
Professional knowledge is recognised as a complex issue. Attempts to characterise 
the knowledge base required for professional practices in general have been made. 
Broadly, professional knowledge is categorised as consisting of two kinds: 
propositional and practical knowledge (Eraut, 1994, Heilbronn, 2008). The former 
is also referred to as theoretical knowledge and the latter as procedural 
knowledge. Propositional knowledge is further distinguished by Heilbronn (2008) 
as consisting of theoretical and technical knowledge. In highly skilled professional 
practices, technical knowledge is 'essential to practice in an immediate way, 
whereas theoretical knowledge is not' (Heilbronn, 2008, 71). Luntley (2010), 
however, argues that propositional and theoretical knowledge are not 
synonymous. 
	 Propositional knowledge consists not only of theoretical 
propositions which can be fully articulated in textbooks but also consists of 
propositions 'the content of which is intrinsically embedded in the knowing subject's 
engagement with her environment' (Luntley, 2010, 23). Whereas the meaning of a 
theoretical proposition may be captured completely in language, the meaning of 
other propositions depends not only on the words used but also on 'perceptual 
engagement by which you focus on what is picked out by a demonstrative phrase' 
(Luntley, 2010, 23). The conclusion drawn from Luntley's (2010, 22) theory of 
'epistemic conservatism' is that there is no need to posit different kinds of 
professional knowledge since all such knowledge may be understood as 
propositional. 
Eraut (1994) describes propositional knowledge as knowledge that enables 
professional action, and practical knowledge as inherent in and inseparable from 
the action itself. Whether and how practical knowledge relates to theoretical 
knowledge in professional practice is the subject of much debate within 
professional education. In the context of philosophical argumentation, Ryle (1949, 
28) draws a distinction between what he calls 'knowing how' and 'knowing that'. 
Arguing that skilful performances 'display qualities of mind yet are neither 
themselves intellectual operations nor yet effects of intellectual operations', Ryle 
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(1949, 27) asserts: 'Intelligent practice is not a step-child of theory'. One may have a 
great deal of propositional knowledge or 'knowing that' about any number of 
practice areas, yet be unable to perform intelligently in those areas. Equally, Ryle 
(1949) contends, the exercise of skilful action does not require the presence in the 
mind of propositional knowledge, whether the activity in question is physical or 
mental. Ryle (1949) does not deny that propositional knowledge is required in 
order to practice intelligently; what he does dispute is that intelligent, skilful 
performance is dependent upon appropriate theorising: 
A man knowing little or nothing of medical science could not be a good 
surgeon, but excellence at surgery is not the same thing as knowledge of 
medical science; nor is it a simple product of it. The surgeon must indeed have 
learned from instruction or by his own inductions and observations, a great 
number of truths; but he must also have learned by practice a great number 
of aptitudes. Even where efficient practice is the deliberate application of 
considered prescriptions, the intelligence involved in putting the prescriptions 
into practice is not identical with that involved in intellectually grasping the 
prescriptions (Ryle, 1949, 48-49). 
Ryle's (1949) thesis would suggest that, for practice disciplines, 'knowing how' is of 
equal, if not greater significance, than 'knowing that'. It also suggests that 
knowledge inherent in skilful action is of a different order to propositional 
knowledge; the former cannot simply be 'read off, nor is it reducible to, the latter. 
Given this difference in kind, it follows that the methods used to generate and 
acquire practical knowledge must also differ from methods used to generate and 
acquire propositional knowledge. Ryle's (1949) ideas lend support to the 
argument for the development of reflective practice as a model of professional 
knowledge which will be discussed later in this chapter. 
Professional education in practice disciplines consists, generally, in the 
communication of a body of theoretical and scientific knowledge and techniques 
coupled with periods of supervised work experience in the relevant domain of 
practice, during which time formal learning is applied and the norms of the 
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discipline are acquired. This model of professional education is referred to as a 
'technical rational' approach (Schon, 1983). It has given rise, in some professions, 
to what has become known as a theory-practice gap. A theory-practice gap refers 
to the disparity between the formal propositional knowledge of a discipline and 
the knowledge relevant to, and utilised in, practice. 
	 Heilbronn (2008) 
acknowledges that the relationship between these kinds of knowledge is complex. 
In terms of professional practice, it is recognised that theoretical ideas, even when 
they are relevant in practice, cannot simply be applied without considering their 
implications. Ideas, also, get reinterpreted in use, and may need to be used before 
they acquire meaning for the user (Eraut, 1994). This suggests that propositional 
knowledge is subject to some kind of transformation in practice and part of that 
transformation involves appropriation by the knowledge user. Referring to 
teacher knowledge, Heilbronn (2008, 73) states: 'In practice, how an individual 
teacher believes what she has read and is told is also influenced by her own personal 
experience, including her own observations and discussions with other teachers'. 
Even technical knowledge, a kind of propositional knowledge with a more 
immediate relationship to practice, does not necessarily imply successful action 
based on such knowledge (Heilbronn, 2008). 
Moon (1999), citing the work of Argyris and Schon (1974), suggests that 
propositional knowledge is bypassed in practice. Contrasting 'espoused theories', 
which describe the official theories that characterise a discipline publicly and are 
taught to aspiring practitioners, and 'theories-in-use', which refer to unofficial 
theories developed in practice, Moon (1999, 40) asserts that it is the latter 'that 
characterise the real behaviour of professionals'. 
	 Citing Brookfield (1987), 
'theories-in-use' are described "as guiding the 'intuitively based activities' that are 
privately developed, proven ways of performing that are contextually specific, 
idiosyncratic and unmentioned in textbooks of professional practice
— (Moon, 1999, 
40). 
	 The development of theories-in-use signals a gap between formal 
propositional knowledge and professional practice. It also indicates the existence 
of a body of theory originating in practice. 
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The theory-practice gap may be understood in terms of particular features of 
professional practice that render problematic the use of propositional knowledge. 
A certain degree of unpredictability and uncertainty characterise most 
professional occupations (Eraut, 1994). As the aim of scientific theory and 
research is to accrue abstract, objective knowledge that seeks to explain, predict 
and control the domain of interest, it is inevitable, perhaps, that propositional 
knowledge will not always appear relevant in particular practice situations. 
Practice problems do not present neatly packaged and instantly recognisable 
(SchOn, 1983; Eraut, 1994; King & Kitchener, 1994; Heilbronn, 2008). This 
indicates the limitations of purely applied scientific knowledge and techniques in 
making decisions about individual cases. Professional work is also characterised 
by the ability to handle cases quickly and effectively. Professional or practical 
judgement is acknowledged as important in these situations (Eraut, 1994; 
Heilbronn, 2008; King & Kitchener, 1994). Such judgement is assumed to be 
informed by personal experience of large numbers of cases. Much professional 
know-how is implicit in, and derives from, experience (Eraut, 1994; Heilbronn, 
2008). Eraut (1994) contends that there are important aspects of professional 
competence and expertise that cannot be represented in propositional form and 
made publicly accessible. This has implications for professional education and for 
the development of disciplinary knowledge. 
2.3 Professional knowledge in nursing 
The question of what kind of knowledge is needed for nursing practice is described 
by Marriner Tomey & Alligood (2006, 5) as 'the pervading question' that has 
occupied nursing theorists and scholars throughout the history of modern nursing. 
Nightingale, acknowledged as one of the earliest nursing theorists, emphasised the 
importance of the patient's environment in nursing practice (Carroll, 1992; van 
der Peet, 1995). Although she distinguished nursing from medical knowledge, 
asserting that the role of the physician is to cure disease while the role of nursing is 
to ensure that the patient's environment, in terms of cleanliness, lighting, 
ventilation, and so on, is such as to maximise the reparative powers of nature, she 
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also emphasised the importance of obedience to physicians' orders (Alligood & 
Marriner Tomey, 2006; Carroll, 1992; Maggs, 1983). 
Under the apprenticeship system of training, which dominated in the UK and 
Ireland until the final decades of the 20th century, nursing education was hospital-
based. As indicated in the introductory chapter, in hospitals, service needs took 
precedence over the education needs of nursing students. Nursing practice tended 
to follow a medical model of care which was oriented toward the diagnosis, 
treatment, and cure of bodily diseases (McKenna, 1997; Pearson, Vaughan, & 
FitzGerald, 2005). Student nurses acquired most of the knowledge that they 
needed to nurse from their experiences in practice. They were, therefore, 
equipped with considerable practical knowledge or 'know-how'. As nursing 
education progressed, practical experience was complemented by lectures in 
classroom settings frequently provided by medical practitioners. The goal was to 
ensure that nurses had the necessary knowledge to care for patients with 
medically diagnosed conditions. 
As nursing began the process of establishing itself as a discipline and as a 
profession, the question of nursing knowledge became central. A discipline is 
defined by its domain of knowledge (Meleis, 2012), and one of the defining 
characteristics of a profession is the possession of a body of specialised knowledge 
and skill. Marriner Tomey & Alligood (2006, 5) remark of this period: 
Although some nursing leaders aspired for nursing to develop as a profession 
and an academic discipline, nursing practice continued to reflect a vocational 
heritage more than a professional vision. The transition from vocation to 
profession included successive eras of history as nurses searched for a body of 
substantive knowledge on which to base nursing practice. 
The transition of nursing education from hospitals to tertiary education settings 
occurred in the United States of America in the early and middle decades of the 
20th century. Research became a feature of graduate and post-graduate nursing 
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programmes. However, the search for a substantive body of nursing knowledge 
required more than just research. 
With an increased understanding of research and knowledge development, it 
soon became obvious that research without theory produced isolated 
information, and it was research and theory together that produced nursing 
science (Marriner Tomey & Alligood, 2006, 4-5). 
The middle and later decades of the 20th century in the United States witnessed the 
growth of conceptual models in nursing education, with the aim of articulating the 
domain of nursing thus providing a focus for research and an overarching 
framework for knowledge development, and, ultimately, a guide to practice. This 
view of knowledge owes much to the traditional or 'received view' of science 
current at that time: 'unique high-level concepts (conceptual models) are necessary 
to distinguish scientific domains' (Risjord, 2010, 115). Four high-level concepts 
were identified as relevant in nursing science: person, environment, health, and 
nursing. These four concepts constituted the 'metaparadigm' of nursing (Fawcett, 
2005, 5), which Risjord (2010, 26) describes as 'the phenomena to be studied by any 
research and theory that was rightly considered part of the nursing discipline'. The 
conceptual models developed in nursing consisted of sets of statements or 
propositions regarding each of the four metaparadigm concepts and the 
relationships between them. Nursing was conceptualised as a domain much 
broader than that envisaged by the medical model of care. The person receiving 
care rather than the disease process became central in nursing theory. The 
concept of holism, which acknowledges that the recipient of nursing care is more 
than a biological being but also a social, psychological, and spiritual being, was also 
an important dimension of nursing theory (McKenna, 1997). Nursing practice was 
described in terms of an interpersonal process with the relationship between the 
nurse and the patient of particular significance (Marriner Tomey & Alligood, 2006; 
McKenna, 1997). 
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Conceptual models were highly abstract and considered to be at the level of 'grand 
theory'. Less abstract levels of theory from which testable hypotheses could be 
generated were developed. It was recognised that these so-called 'middle range 
theories' (Fawcett, 2005) should be derivable from grand theory so that nursing 
knowledge did not become fragmented. By testing mid-range theories, it was 
possible to develop a cumulative body of knowledge unique to the discipline of 
nursing which could form the basis for nursing practice. 
Mid-range theory tends to focus on concepts of interest to nurses. As well as 
pain, these include empathy, grief self-esteem, hope, comfort, dignity, quality 
of life (McKenna, 1997, 114). 
The discipline of nursing would thereby advance along scientific lines. Nursing 
science would contribute propositional knowledge or 'knowing-that'. 
Nurse scholars were encouraged to formulate their theories in terms distant 
from the contingencies of practice. There was no need to work directly with 
clinical concerns. Theory came first; application was left for the future. As a 
result, nurses at the bedside saw theory and research drift farther and farther 
apart from clinically accessible anchor points (Risjord, 2010, 27). 
By contrast, practice theory, which was oriented toward developing principles of 
practice or prescriptions for nursing action, was advocated by some nursing 
theorists at that time as an approach to knowledge development that would have 
its focus in the clinical concerns of nurses (McKenna, 1997). This approach was 
not widely accepted because of fears that developments in nursing knowledge 
would lack unity (Risjord, 2010). Borrowed theories, that is, theories borrowed 
from other disciplines such as, for instance, psychology, were considered for a time 
to be an appropriate knowledge base for nursing. Some borrowed theories proved 
helpful in understanding certain clinical phenomena (Chinn & Kramer, 2004). 
However, it was also recognised that theories developed in and for other 
disciplines, if adopted uncritically in nursing, could distort nursing's unique 
perspective. In terms of the development of a unique knowledge base, borrowed 
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theories were not adequate. Even though such theories could undergo some 
modifications to fit a nursing context, they could never provide a uniquely nursing 
focus (Fawcett, 2005). 
The advancements in nursing theory that occurred in the United States influenced 
nursing education in the UK and Ireland to the extent that nursing models became 
part of curriculum content in the 1970s and 1980s. At this time, nursing education 
was still, largely, a hospital-based apprenticeship system of training. However, the 
Briggs Report (Briggs, 1972) and the Report of the Commission on Nursing 
Education (RCN, 1985) recommended fundamental changes to nursing education, 
including a decoupling of education and service, the development of nursing as a 
research-based profession, and the establishment of nursing education fully within 
tertiary education settings. While these changes did not begin to take effect until 
the late 1980s and early 1990s with the implementation of Project 2000 (UKCC, 
1986), the deficiencies of the medical model as a framework for nursing 
knowledge and the inadequacy of task allocation as a model of care delivery to 
explain nursing practice were well recognised among nurse educators (Roper, 
Logan, & Tierney, 2003). However, theoretical developments in nursing in the 
United States did not transfer very successfully to the British system. The language 
in which theories were framed was frequently obscure and convoluted (McKenna, 
1997; Risjord, 2010), and seemed to have little relevance to nursing as it was 
practised in the UK at that time. Even 'home grown' theories did not find favour 
with the majority of nurse practitioners. The development of nursing models and 
frameworks occurred in academic settings and were undertaken by nurses 
engaged primarily in nursing education (Meleis, 2012; Roper et al., 2003). Such 
developments were frequently regarded with scepticism by practising nurses and 
as an additional task imposed upon them by those who had little understanding of 
busy practice settings and the realities of clinical work. 
For many nurses and students of nursing, nursing theory and the development 
of nursing models often seem to have little relevance to the complexities of the 
contemporary health system. 
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...Nursing is essentially a practice; it is primarily concerned with the frontline 
delivery of health care to individuals and communities. Because of this 
practical imperative of nursing, its theoretical base is frequently, at worst, 
denied or, at best, forgotten. At its simplest level 'nursing theory' used to 
mean those things about nursing work which were taught in the classroom, 
and this meaning is still commonly held by many in nursing today (Pearson et 
al., 2005, 2). 
Alluding to more recent times, Risjord (2010, 3) remarks: 
Working nurses do not seek out the most recent research results or use 
nursing theories to analyse their responses to the patient. Indeed, the mention 
of "theory" is likely to elicit groans from a practicing nurse. Nursing theory 
and research are not supporting the professional practice of nursing in the 
way that nurses expect it to. 
The above assertions testify to the long standing issue of a theory-practice gap in 
nursing. Developments in nursing knowledge, like all disciplines, are influenced by 
developments in philosophy of science. The challenge to the positivist view of 
science by philosophers such as Popper and Kuhn, and the development of 
alternative approaches to research affected how nursing as a discipline was 
viewed. Traditional scientific approaches to knowledge development - the 
methods appropriate to investigating the natural sciences - stressed objectivity 
and detachment on the part of the researcher. These methods were not 
considered appropriate for the study of the human sciences. Nursing, as a human 
science, was concerned with the individual person and with the nurse-patient 
relationship as the vehicle of nursing care. Qualitative research methodologies, in 
particular interpretivist approaches, in which theory was inductively developed 
and which enabled the investigation of phenomena considered central to nursing, 
seemed much more compatible with nursing than traditional scientific method. 
To many nursing researchers in the late 1970s and early 1980s, qualitative 
research seemed to be exactly the new form of science for which Watson 
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(nursing theorist) was calling. One of the earliest and most important 
inspirations for methodological reflection on qualitative methods was 
phenomenology (Bogdan & Taylor, 1975; Paterson and Zderad, 1976). 
Nursing discussions of this early twentieth-century school centred on the work 
of Edmund Husserl, Martin Heidegger, Jean-Paul Sartre, and Maurice 
Merleau-Ponty. They emphasized both the subjective character of experience 
and the importance of appreciating subjective experience when 
understanding other people. Qualitative research was thus said to be 
subjective, rather than objective, value-laden rather than value-free, engaged 
rather than detached, and so on. The nice fit between qualitative 
methodology and nursing practice promised a form of nursing theory that 
would be more congruent with the goals and practices of nursing than the 
previously dominant forms of research (Lenninger, 1985; Duffy, 1986, 1987b; 
Moccia, 1988) (Risjord, 2010, 190). 
Despite its congruence with nursing and the above assertion of qualitative 
research as a new science, it was not considered scientific in the sense of the 
cumulative development of a body of disciplinary knowledge. The so-called 
`paradigm wars' ensued in nursing between those who regarded nursing as a 
scientific enterprise and those who argued that scientific method was 
incommensurable with nursing as a unique discipline (Parahoo, 2006). 
The publication of a paper by Barbara Carper in the inaugural issue of a journal 
entitled 'Advances in Nursing Science' in 1978 is considered a seminal event in 
terms of clarifying the knowledge base of nursing. Carper (1978, 13) identified 
four 'fundamental patterns of knowing' in nursing. Introducing the four patterns, 
Carper (1978, 13) stated: 
It is the general conception of any field of inquiry that ultimately determines 
the kind of knowledge the field aims to develop as well as the manner in which 
that knowledge is to be organized, tested, and applied. The body of 
knowledge that serves as the rationale for nursing practice has patterns, 
forms and structure that serve as horizons of expectations and exemplify 
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characteristic ways of thinking about phenomena. Understanding these 
patterns is essential for the teaching and learning of nursing. Such an 
understanding does not extend the range of knowledge, but rather involves 
critical attention to the question of what it means to know and what kinds of 
knowledge are held to be of most value in the discipline of nursing. 
The four patterns identified by Carper (1978) were empirics, aesthetics, ethical, 
and personal knowing. Empirical knowing refers to the scientific basis of nursing, 
and included the conceptual models already developed and developing at that 
time. Carper (1978, 14) acknowledged that there was 'a critical need for 
knowledge about the empirical world, knowledge that is systematically organised 
into general laws and theories for the purpose of describing, explaining and 
predicting phenomena of special concern to the discipline of nursing'. For Carper 
(1978), the extant conceptual models and theories provided new ways of looking 
at phenomena of interest in nursing, and new perspectives from which to conduct 
research. The empirical pattern of knowing in nursing is summarised by Carper 
(1978, 15) as follows: 
...the first fundamental pattern of knowing in nursing is empirical, factual, 
descriptive and ultimately aimed at developing abstract and theoretical 
explanations. It is exemplary, discursively formulated and publicly verifiable. 
It might appear that the above extract could have described the sum total of 
nursing knowledge. Carper (1978, 16) acknowledges as much when she states: 
Few, if indeed any, familiar with the professional literature would deny that 
primary emphasis is placed on the development of the science of nursing. One 
is almost led to believe that the only valid and reliable knowledge is that 
which is empirical, factual, objectively descriptive and generalizable. There 
seems to be a self-conscious reluctance to extend the term knowledge to 
include those aspects of knowing in nursing that are not the result of 
empirical investigation. 
46 
Carper's (1978) identification of three other equally valid patterns of knowing 
marked her paper as ground-breaking and seminal for nursing. The aesthetic 
pattern of knowing describes the art of nursing which is not equivalent to technical 
and psychomotor skills. Indeed, Carper (1978) attributes the failure to articulate 
the art of nursing as a pattern of knowing to efforts to distance nursing from its 
origins in apprenticeship training, where practice consisted of rituals and routines 
not linked to any knowledge base. Unlike empirics, the art of nursing cannot easily 
be discursively formulated. The aesthetic pattern of knowing includes flexibility in 
the design of nursing care, creativity in the helping relationship, the ability to 
relate to the care recipient as a unique human being, and the perception and 
appreciation of wholeness. 
The esthetic (sic) pattern of knowing in nursing involves the perception of 
abstracted particulars as distinguished from the recognition of abstracted 
universals. It is the knowing of a unique particular rather than an exemplary 
class (Carper, 1978, 18). 
Personal knowing is the third pattern identified by Carper (1978, 17) and is, she 
maintains, 'the most problematic' to articulate and teach. It is concerned with self- 
knowledge and the development of therapeutic relationships. 
	 It involves 
commitment and risk on the part of the nurse, the risk of being fully human and 
authentic in the encounter with a patient. Personal knowing requires 'willingness 
to accept ambiguity, vagueness and discrepancy of oneself and others' (Carper, 1978, 
19). Reconciling the potential conflict between the empirical pattern of knowing, 
which deals in generalisations and predictions, and the personal pattern, which 
stresses authenticity and subjectivity, Carper (1978, 19-20) states: 
Certainly empirical knowledge is essential to the purposes of nursing. But 
nursing also requires that we be alert to the fact that models of human nature 
and their abstract and generalized categories refer to and describe 
behaviours and traits that groups have in common. However, none of these 
categories can ever encompass or express the uniqueness of the individual 
encountered as a person, as a "self'. These and many other similar 
considerations are involved in the realm of personal knowledge, which can be 
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broadly characterized as subjective, concrete and existential. It is concerned 
with the kind of knowing that promotes wholeness and integrity in the 
personal encounter, the achievement of engagement rather than detachment; 
and it denies the manipulative, impersonal orientation. 
Ethical knowing is the fourth and final pattern of knowing in nursing identified by 
Carper (1978). Ethical knowing encompasses more than knowledge of ethical 
theories and codes of professional conduct; it also includes matters of obligation 
and concern regarding the choice of morally appropriate action in particular 
situations, especially where a conflict of values may pertain. 
Although each pattern of knowing is separate, Carper (1978, 22) considers all four 
to be 'interrelated and interdependent'. For example, she maintains: 'Personal 
knowledge is essential for ethical choices in that moral action presupposes personal 
maturity and freedom'. Each pattern is 'necessary for achieving mastery in the 
discipline, but none of them alone should be considered sufficient', (Carper , 1978, 
21-22). It was recommended that each pattern of knowing 'should be taught and 
understood according to its distinctive logic, the restricted circumstances in which it 
is valid, the kinds of data it subsumes and the methods by which each particular kind 
of truth is distinguished and warranted' (Carper, 1978, 22). Carper did not 
elaborate any further on these matters. Although the logic, data and methods of 
empirical knowing were quite well established, there was less clarity regarding the 
logic, data and methods by which warrantable knowledge in the three other 
patterns of knowing might be generated. From the descriptions given of aesthetic, 
personal and ethical patterns of knowing, it is clear that experience is a 
prerequisite of knowledge generation. These patterns cannot be acquired and 
expressed apart from practice experience. Knowing in the personal domain, for 
example, is predicated on the notion of 'encounter', and interpersonal contact. 
Likewise, aesthetic knowing requires engagement in a specific clinical situation. 
Although Carper (1978) appears to use the terms 'knowing' and 'knowledge' 
interchangeably, Chinn & Kramer (2004, 2) later distinguished between these two 
terms: 
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The term knowing refers to ways of perceiving and understanding the self 
and the world. Knowing is an ontologic, dynamic, changing process. The term 
knowledge refers to knowing that is in a form that can be shared or 
communicated with others. (Chinn & Kramer's emphases). 
This way of distinguishing 'knowing' and 'knowledge' resonates with the 
differentiation Schon (1983) draws between 'knowing-in-action' and 'knowledge-
in-action', which will be discussed later in the thesis. The pursuit of knowledge 
using Carper's (1978) fundamental patterns 'leads nursing away from "a quest for 
structural truth and towards a search for dynamic meaning-  (White, 1995, 79, 
citing Jacobs-Kramer & Chinn). The 'being' of knowing is movement and change. 
'Knowing' and a perceiving, understanding self in the world are inextricable. 
Like SchOn's (1983) work in the following decade, Carper's (1978) patterns of 
knowing were highly influential in how nursing knowledge was conceptualised 
and understood. Her ideas have been widely developed and accepted by nursing 
scholars as illustrative of a comprehensive knowledge base necessary for holistic 
nursing practice (Bonis, 2009; Chinn & Kramer, 2004; Heath, 1998; Hunter, 2008; 
Johns, 1995a). Carper's (1978) original model has been expanded to include two 
new patterns. White (1995) considered that the wider context in which nursing is 
practiced constitutes an important pattern of knowing. While Carper's (1978) 
patterns focused on the interpersonal context of nursing - the relationship 
between the patient and the nurse, and the immediate context of care - socio-
political knowing: 
...lifts the gaze of the nurse from the introspective nurse-patient relationship 
and situates it within the broader context in which nursing and health care 
take place. It causes the nurse to question the taken-for-granted assumptions 
about practice, the profession, and health policies (White, 1995, 82). 
Knowledge in this domain requires that nurses become politically engaged, 
recognising and challenging health inequalities, and those social and economic 
structures that adversely affect the wellbeing of citizens. It also requires nurses to 
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become active and influential in policy formulation and strategic decision-making 
in health-related matters. Socio-political knowing enables a change in the public 
perception of nurses and nursing, so that the caring role is seen to encompass 
political activism as well as the more traditional view of nursing as caring in an 
interpersonal context (White, 1995). Knowledge in this pattern cannot be 
described or developed apart from a context. 
Unknowing is another pattern that extends Carper's (1978) original four 
fundamental patterns of knowing in nursing. Unknowing is described as 'a 
condition of openness' (Munhall, 1993, 125), meaning that a nurse retains a 
readiness to be continually surprised and informed. Knowledge is never 
considered final. The nurse is aware of and recognises that her perspective is but 
one way of seeing a situation and is willing to consider different views on the same 
situation. Balancing and integrating the various patterns of knowing in the context 
of care requires skill and judgement on the part of the nurse. It was recognised 
that such skill and judgment is deployed by nurses in their professional role (Chinn 
& Kramer, 2004; Risjord, 2010). It was also recognised that this kind of knowledge 
was not explicit nor was it acquired by the usual transmission methods. Practice 
once again became an area of interest in the context of professional knowledge in 
nursing. 
The next ground-breaking and seminal development in nursing knowledge came in 
1984 with the publication of Patricia Benner's textbook 'From Novice to Expert. 
Excellence and Power in Clinical Nursing Practice'. The book was the outcome of a 
substantial research study undertaken by Benner (1984) with the aim of 
investigating the perceived theory-practice gap in nursing. The study occurred at a 
time when the focus in nursing education in the United States and elsewhere was 
on technical competence which, it may be recalled from the earlier part of this 
chapter, is a kind of propositional knowledge applied to practice situations. 
Benner (2001, ix) describes the technical competence approach to nursing 
education as: 
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... designed to prespecify learning outcomes in well-defined behavioural 
objectives. The assumption was that both learning and nursing practice could 
be reduced to a collection of techniques. A technical understanding of nursing 
was rampant within both nursing education and practice. The phrase 
technical understanding refers to an assumption that all action can be 
determined through explicitly stated theories and directives. The original 
goal behind this research was to address the theory-practice gap. Instead, 
this research revealed many gaps between excellent practice and extant 
theoretical accounts of nursing practice. Nursing practice is far more 
complex than what most formal nursing theories predict. (Benner's 
emphasis). 
Benner (1984) made nursing practice the focus of her investigations, and the kinds 
of knowledge used by nurse practitioners at different stages of their professional 
development. In the foreword to the commemorative edition of her book 
published in 2001, Benner (2001, v) describes the aim and reception of her 
research as follows: 
The goals of the work were to study experiential learning in nursing practice, 
examine skill acquisition based on clinical learning, and articulate knowledge 
embedded in nursing practice...Readers comment that this work 'puts into 
words what they have always known but not been able to express about 
nursing practice' - a perfect compliment since this work seeks to give public, 
accessible language to a hidden or marginalised practice (i.e., articulation 
research). 
Using an interpretative hermeneutic approach with data drawn from nurses' 
detailed narrative accounts of actual experiences and events in practice situations 
and minimally-participant observations, Benner (1984) demonstrated that nursing 
knowledge is complex and multifaceted, evolving and transforming as nurses 
become more experienced in practice. She theorised that new learners, for 
example, first year student nurses, bring formal knowledge and theory to the 
clinical setting and they rely on this kind of knowledge as they gain practical 
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experience. As students or novice practitioners become more experienced, the 
knowledge they bring to situations, both formal knowledge and prior experience, 
is tested, challenged, and modified. Benner (1984, 8) gives the name "experience" 
to knowledge that has been so affected: 'As a nurse gains "experience", clinical 
knowledge that is a hybrid between naive practical knowledge and unrefined 
theoretical knowledge develops'. 
Benner (1984, 4) identified six areas of practical knowledge which she categorised 
as follows: 
1) graded qualitative distinctions; 
2) common meanings; 
3) assumptions, expectations, and sets; 
4) paradigm cases and personal knowledge; 
5) maxims; and 
6) unplanned practices. 
`Graded qualitative distinctions' refer to a nurse's ability to recognise subtle 
changes in a patient's condition before objective evidence emerges. This kind of 
knowledge is context dependent in that nurses' ability to recognise subtle changes 
occurs in the context of knowing the individual patient, his/her past history, and 
current status. 'Common meanings' is a second area of practical knowledge which 
refers to general understandings that nurses acquire about health, illness, coping, 
and so on. These develop as a result of interacting with a variety of individuals and 
families in a variety of health and illness contexts over time. Common meanings 
that are shared among nurses become part of nursing tradition. 'Assumptions, 
expectations, and sets' describe the knowledge that arises from observing the 
trajectory of illnesses and recovery in many patients. This kind of knowledge 
predisposes nurses to act in certain ways in certain situations. 'Paradigm cases' 
are learning experiences of such significance that they act as exemplars for future 
similar cases. Paradigm cases provide knowledge that allows the practitioner to 
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grasp similar situations as perceptual totalities, which, in turn, guide action and 
allow for rapid responses. Personal knowledge, which consists of prior knowledge 
and individual attributes and dispositions, may be implicated in paradigm cases, 
which renders the knowledge complex and not easily identifiable. Benner (1984, 
10) describes 'maxims' as 'cryptic instructions that make sense only if the person 
already has a deep understanding of the situation'. She also identifies maxims as 
clues to 'particularly perceptual knowledge' which, she claims, 'is cloaked in 
maxims'. 'Unplanned practices' constitute the final area of practical knowledge. 
This kind of knowledge accrues from interventions or treatments delegated to 
nurses by physicians or other members of the healthcare team. As nurses observe, 
monitor, or otherwise manage the patient's care and treatment, experiential 
knowledge is gained. 
Benner (1984) argued that much of the experiential knowledge outlined above is 
not recognised or publicly acknowledged. Consequently, it remains undervalued 
and under-researched with consequences for the development of nursing 
knowledge and theory. Part of the reason for its lack of visibility is that the nature 
and complexity of practical knowledge is difficult to formulate in terms of 
principles and procedures. 
	 Descriptions of subtle distinctions and holistic 
perceptual appreciations are more nuanced than any textbook account of illness or 
recovery can represent. Benner (2001, vi) also adds: 
(Nursing) Practices cannot be completely objectified or formalized because 
they must ever be worked out anew in particular relationships and in real 
time. 
Collecting and comparing detailed narrative accounts of nurses' caring practices is 
suggested as a means of capturing complex, localised, practical knowledge. 
In developing a narrative account of experiential learning, the storyteller 
learns from telling the story. Teaching reflection allows clinicians to identify 
concerns that organise the story; identify notions ofgood embedded in the 
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story; identify relational, communicative, and collaborative skills; and 
articulate newly developing clinical knowledge (Benner, 2001, vii-viii). 
Benner (2001) regarded her research as the basis of a movement in the direction 
of developing a body of practical knowledge in nursing. She encouraged nurses ` to 
collect their own exemplars and to pursue the lines of inquiry and research questions 
raised by their own clinical knowledge' (Benner, 2001, xxvi) (Benner's emphases), 
which very much exemplifies Schon's (1983) notion of practitioners as researchers 
in their own practice contexts. 
Benner's (1984) research identified the role of the nurse as consisting of seven 
domains of practice, and, in each domain, a variety of competencies were 
identifiable. Examples of the different domains of practice include 'The Helping 
Role'; 'The Teaching-Coaching Function'; and 'Effective Management of Rapidly 
Changing Situations' (Benner, 1984, 46). The complexity of the helping role is 
evident in the following description: 
Patients look to nurses for different kinds of help than they expect or receive 
from other helping professionals. Help seeking and help receiving are two 
different issues. A person can receive help without asking for it and can ask 
for it without being able to receive it. Even "help" sometimes does not help; 
some individuals with a strong need for personal control may not be able to 
acknowledge that they need help or even that they are being helped. 
Many of the nurses we interviewed seemed to be aware of the personal issues 
of receiving and seeking help. Sometimes they covered their help and concern 
for their patients with humor (sic) or an air of nonchalance (Benner, 1984, 
47). 
In terms of Carper's (1978) and others' patterns of knowing in nursing, fulfilment 
of the helping role as articulated above would require knowing in all patterns, 
with, perhaps, greater demand in the areas of personal knowing and unknowing. 
Competencies, identifiable within the helping role of the nurse, include 'Presencing: 
Being with a Patient', 'Maximising the Patient's Participation and Control in His or 
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Her Own Recovery', 'Interpreting Kinds of Pain and Selecting Appropriate Strategies 
for Pain Management and Control' (Benner. 1984, SO). 
	 These kinds of 
competencies cannot be adequately represented in technical terms nor fully 
specified in behavioural objectives. Benner (1984, 40) stresses the importance of 
`exemplars' in conveying the competencies of nursing practice. Exemplars are the 
narrative accounts of experienced nurses that serve to illustrate competencies. 
Practice knowledge cannot be adequately described without them. She urged 
nurses to record their practice, in particular those occasions where nurses believe 
their actions make a significant difference to patient outcomes. Scientific 
knowledge is not ignored in this process of knowledge generation. Benner (2001) 
argues that practical knowledge and 'know-how' is not reducible to acting on gut 
feeling or by trial and error. Nor is it reducible to psychomotor skills. Learning 
from experience is more effective and efficient when it is based on what Benner 
(2001, xxiii) calls 
	 sound educational base'. Her work attempts to demonstrate 
the limits of that base and to indicate a body of knowledge that lies beyond and 
transforms it. 
Attending to the particular contingencies of a situation does not warrant the 
conclusion that the general principles governing that situation can be 
generally ignored. My position is not a careless recommendation for the 
abandonment of rules. Instead, I am claiming that a more skilled, advanced 
understanding of the situation allows orderly behaviour without rigid rule 
following. 
Once the situation is described, the actions taken can be understood as 
orderly, reasonable behaviour that responds to the demands of a given 
situation rather than rigid principles and rules. More descriptive rules could 
be generated to allow for multiple exceptions, but the expert would still 
function flexibly in other new situations requiring new exceptions (Benner, 
2001, xxiii). 
The above quotation also indicates that while rules may be formulated for many 
diverse clinical situations, there will always be a requirement for knowledge and 
competence that exceeds such formulations. 
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Nursing, in general, was very receptive to Benner's ideas. Both she and Carper 
seem to have articulated a conceptualisation of nursing knowledge with which 
many nurses identified. As McFarlane (in Kershaw & Salvage, 1986, 1) observes: 
Nursing is a practice discipline and if its innovative ideas do not spring from 
practice then there will inevitably be an unreality about them and a lack of 
utility. By the same token, practice which is shorn of any theoretical basis and 
which does not allow its theoretical foundations to grow is not a practice 
discipline. It is a ritualised performance unrelated to the health care needs of 
individuals and society. 
2.4 Reflection and Reflective Practice 
Benner (2001) identified narrative and reflection on narrative accounts of practice 
as a method of uncovering practice knowledge in nursing. Narrative accounts 
capture the experience of nurses in clinical situations. Experience is recognised as 
integral to aesthetic, ethical, personal, socio-political, and unknowing patterns of 
knowing in nursing (Heath, 1998). These patterns, along with empirics, are 
considered to represent a comprehensive view of knowledge relevant to nursing 
practice. Chinn and Kramer (2004, 2-3) summarise this view of professional 
knowledge in nursing and how it might be developed: 
In a discipline, knowledge represents what is collectively taken to be a 
reasonably accurate understanding of the world as it is known by the 
members of the discipline. The "knowledge of the discipline" is that which has 
been collectively judged by standards and criteria shared by members of the 
disciplinary community...As nurses practice, they know more than they can 
communicate and use insights and understandings that they often take for 
granted. Much of what is known is expressed through actions, movements, or 
sounds. These are the everyday actions or nondiscursive expressions of 
knowing that reflect the whole. What is expressed in a nurse's actions conveys 
a simultaneous wholeness that textbooks and theories can never portray. 
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However, what happens in practice can only be shared in the moment and 
typically is not available to a broader audience. 
We believe that much of what nurses know has the potential to be more fully 
expressed and communicated than it has been in the past and that this can 
happen when all forms of knowing are integrated and valued. Language and 
other symbols that are used to convey empiric knowledge will only partially 
reflect the whole, but when we move beyond the traditional limits of empirics, 
it will be possible to convey a more complete picture of what is known within 
the discipline as a whole. 
Sharing knowledge is important because it creates a disciplinary community, 
beyond the isolation of individual experience. 
The possibility of articulating, sharing, and judging the knowing expressed in 
nursing actions and in the taken-for-granted understandings and insights that 
characterise nursing practice was given a fillip with the publication of Donald 
Schon's (1983) textbook 'The Reflective Practitioner. How Professionals Think in 
Action'. Schon (1983) was not the first philosopher in modern times to write about 
reflection. Some fifty years earlier, Dewey (1933) had published his ideas on 
reflection in the context of pedagogy. What made Schon's (1983) ideas interesting 
for nursing was that his research involved professionals in practice disciplines. 
Kinsella (2007, 106) suggests that: 
In a sense, Schein does for professional practice what Dewey did for education; 
he draws attention to the experiential world of the practitioner in the way 
that Dewey drew attention to the experiential world of the child, pointing to 
the relevance of such worlds for knowledge development. 
What was ground-breaking and seminal for nursing knowledge was Schon's (1983, 
21) questioning of the appropriateness of 'technical rationality' as a model of 
professional knowledge in practice disciplines. The model of technical rationality, 
which Schon (1983) described as the dominant model of professional knowledge, 
consists of a hierarchy, with scientific theory and knowledge occupying the highest 
level. Below that comes applied science which yields techniques and procedures 
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that are, in turn, applied to practice problems. Professional practice is viewed as a 
process of technical problem solving using specialised, preferably scientific, 
knowledge. 
The model of technical rationality also posits a hierarchical relationship between 
knowledge and practice: knowledge is generated by academics and consumed by 
practitioners. High status is accorded scientific knowledge and its producers. 
Professional education reflects the model of technical rationality: students first 
learn the basic and applied sciences followed by experience in practice when the 
relevant skills and attitudinal elements of the programme are acquired. 
Knowledge is unidirectional: problems of practice form the raw material for 
research within the academy; the academy, in turn, provides the knowledge 
needed to solve the problems of practice. SchOn (1983) asserts that those 
professions with a high degree of scientific and technical knowledge, such as 
medicine and engineering - the so-called major professions - are paradigm 
examples of the model of technical rationality both in their education and in their 
practice. Other professions with less well developed scientific knowledge bases, 
such as nursing, teaching, and social work - the so-called minor professions -
cannot operate in the same way and so the gap between theory and practice is 
quite substantial. The minor professions attempt to mimic the major ones so that 
the former may enjoy the prestige and rewards that accompany a strong base in 
scientific knowledge. 
The problem with technical rationality as a model of professional knowledge, and 
the reason why Schon (1983) is critical of it, is that, in practice, problems do not 
always present neatly circumscribed and yielding to solutions by the application of 
scientific theory and technique. 
	 Practice situations are characterised by 
uncertainty, instability, uniqueness, and value conflict (Scholl, 1983). The model of 
technical rationality is neither appropriate nor helpful in such circumstances. 
However, Schon (1983) observed that some practitioners do manage quite well to 
solve the complex, ill-defined problems they face every day. They do so by 
deploying another kind of knowledge, which Schon (1983, 50) calls 'knowing-in-
action'. Knowing-in-action, as the term suggests, is knowledge that is embedded 
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in, and which cannot be separated from, action, whether that action be a physical 
or a mental process. Knowing-in-action is tacit, intuitive, and expressed in skilful, 
spontaneous performance. 
	 It constitutes the 'art of practice' or practical 
knowledge (Schon, 1983, 69). Because practitioners have not learned this kind of 
knowledge in a formal manner, they are not conscious of having acquired it and 
may not even recognise it in themselves. Consequently, such knowledge is not 
recognised as legitimate either by professional schools or indeed by practitioners 
who use it. Schon (1983, 54) advances a new epistemology of practice which he 
calls 'reflection-in-action'. This model of professional knowledge permits knowing-
in-action to be surfaced, articulated and theorised. As practitioners practice, they 
sometimes experience surprise (Schon, 1983). Surprise is frequently a stimulus to 
reflect-in-action. The practitioner becomes consciously aware of the knowing that 
is implicit in their actions. Knowing that is articulated may be criticised and 
restructured via a process of 'on-the-spot' experimenting (Schon, 1983). It may 
then be tested in action in an on-going process of action and reflection. 
As well as reflection-in-action, Schon (1983) also described a process of reflection-
on-action. The latter occurs retrospectively and is concerned with reviewing and 
learning from experience. Kinsella (2009) regards reflective practice as an 
umbrella term that encompasses reflection-in-action and reflection-on-action. 
Many of the theories and models of experiential learning that were developed in 
the field of adult education in the 1980s are predicated on the notion of reflecting 
on experience (Boud, Keogh, & Walker, 1985; Boyd & Fales, 1983; Kolb, 1984). 
Experiential learning is defined as 'a process whereby knowledge is created through 
the transformation of experience' (Kolb, 1984, 38). Kolb (1984) represented 
experiential learning as a cycle which begins with concrete experience. Experience 
prompts observations and reflections. From reflection on experience, abstract 
concepts and generalisations form. These are then tested out in new situations 
which lead, in turn, to new experiences (Kolb, 1984). Experiential learning is 
understood as a holistic process, involving emotion as well as cognition. 
Experience is conceived broadly as the total response of a person to a situation. In 
experiential learning, scientific or 'subject-matter' knowledge is appropriated and 
integrated in a manner personal to the individual learner based on their prior 
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experiences and current motivations (Boud et al., 1985). Knowledge derived from 
reflecting on experience is personal knowledge. It is, in general, oriented towards 
action. In that sense, it may be described as personal practical knowledge (Ghaye 
& Lillyman, 2000; Johns, 2001). Personal practical knowledge is not simply 
knowledge for knowledge's sake but knowledge for the sake of doing something; 
changing an unsatisfactory situation into something more desirable. 
Reflection may be used to serve knowledge interests at many levels from 
instrumental changes to changing how individuals view themselves and their place 
in society. Mezirow (1990, 12) used the term 'critical reflection' to describe 
reflection that addresses broader societal issues. Reflection at this level serves 
emancipatory interests and involves becoming aware of and challenging 
established, habitual assumptions and patterns of expectation. Critical reflection 
has two functions: to understand the operation of power in social processes, such 
as, for example, in health and education, and to recognise and analyse hegemonic 
practices (Brookfield, 1995). The activity of critically reflecting on experience 
leads to the uncovering of paradigmatic assumptions, which challenge what 
appears to be the natural order of things. 
	 Critical reflection permits the 
transformation of an individual's meaning structures so that they become more 
inclusive, discriminating, and open. Such structures allow for better 
understanding and integration of experience which in turn guides further action 
(Mezirow, 1990). The resulting knowledge generates 'perspective transformation' 
and greater empowerment on the part of practitioners (Mezirow, 1981, 6). In the 
context of education, Brookfield (1995) identifies a number of reasons why 
learning from critical reflection is important, for example, actions are more 
informed; it helps to develop a rationale for practice; self-blame is avoided; 
emotions become grounded; the classroom is enlivened, and democratic trust is 
increased. Reflection is recognised as a key element in learning from experience. 
The process of reflection is the core difference between whether a person repeats 
the same experience several times or learns from experience in such a way that 
they are changed cognitively or affectively. Such changes involve change to a 
person's meaning structures (Boyd & Fales, 1983). Critical reflection affords a 
means of uncovering knowing in the socio-political domain (White, 1995). 
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Many of the ideas touched upon above were appealing in an era when nursing was 
attempting to develop a body of unique disciplinary knowledge. 
	 The 
epistemological assumptions underpinning reflective practice and experiential 
learning were consistent with the ethos of a discipline that valued individual 
experience and the meaning of experience for the individual (Moon, 1999). 
Reflective practice, as an epistemology, would ensure that knowledge development 
was oriented towards practice, and practice, in turn, would shape disciplinary 
knowledge. The historical gap between theory and practice would no longer 
obtrude. Moon (1999, 56) comments: 
A justification for the interest in reflective practice in nursing...concerns the 
rapid development of nursing theory to justify the new place of nursing in 
higher education. Those who have developed this theory are nurses, and not 
generally those who have moved into nursing from other disciplines, and they 
are nurses who have often recently been in practice. They are therefore 
keenly aware of the need to relate theory to practice. In this development 
there may also have been conscious or unconscious reasons for ensuring that 
nursing theory differs markedly from its partner, medicine, which has 
traditionally been male dominated and, until recently, has displayed a strong 
instrumental orientation. 
Referring to professional knowledge in disciplines such as teaching, nursing and 
social work, Moon (1999, 55) considers their 'subject matter' to be: 
...interpretive and not rooted in fact to the same extent that scientific 
disciplines are. The methods used in nursing and teaching, for example, 
involve review, interpretation and reconstruction of ideas and reflection is 
employed in these processes. 
Reflective practice is an appealing epistemology in such disciplines, Moon (1999, 
55) maintains, because '...practice in these professions is often based on rapid 
action... Because it is action that counts, these professions display a characteristic 
difficulty in relating theory to practice'. 
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2. 5 Reflective practice as a model of professional knowledge in 
nursing education 
Adopting reflective practice as a model of professional knowledge 'has the 
potential to alter paradigmatically the way professional groups consider what 
material and processes belong with conceptions of professional knowledge, and also 
within the curriculums of professional schools' (Kinsella, 2009, 7). Meleis (2012) 
describes nursing as a human science or science of caring, and, as such, it is 
concerned with humans as holistic beings, their life experiences, and the meanings 
that experience of health and illness has for them. As a practice-oriented 
discipline, the goal of knowledge development in nursing is to 'understand the 
nursing needs of people and to learn how to better care for them; therefore, the 
caring activities that nurses are involved in on a daily basis may be the focus for 
knowledge development' (Meleis, 2012, 90). The ontology of nursing has moved 
from a focus on 'empiricism' to a focus on 'subjective reality' (Bonis, 2009, 1329). 
Epistemology must move accordingly. 
	 Reflective practice challenges the 
dominance and appropriateness of scientific theory and technique as the basis for 
practice and knowledge development in practice disciplines. It recognises the 
validity and relevance of the personal practical knowledge of practitioners. 
Kinsella(2007, 105) claims that: 
Professional practitioners, caught in a gap between their lived experience of 
practice and the limitations of the discourse of scientism as the dominant way 
to grapple with problems, are perhaps relieved to discover the language of 
'reflective practice'. This discourse questions the dominant paradigm and re-
frames issues in a manner that is accessible, that acknowledges the 
complexity of practice, and considers the experiences of practitioners. 
Carper's (1978) four fundamental patterns of knowing, extended to six by White 
(1995) and Munhall (1993), identified the variety and scope of nursing knowledge. 
Benner (1984) contributed narrative as an approach to accessing the knowledge 
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The ethical 
Did I act for the 
best? 
embedded in nursing practice. Schon's (1983) reflection-in-action provided an 
epistemology of practice. These disparate strands formed a rich intertextual 
tapestry affording the potential to develop a unique body of nursing knowledge 
and to eliminate the so-called theory practice gap. 
Carper's (1978) patterns of knowing are integrated in a model of reflective inquiry 
developed by Johns (1995a). The model is reproduced in Figure 2.1 
The empirical 
Did I act in tune with best practice? 
Telling the story reveals the aesthetic 
response: the way the practitioner: 
1. grasped and interpreted the 
situation 
2. made judgements as to how 
best to respond 
3. responded with skilful action 
4. reflected and judged the 
efficacy of action in meeting 
desired outcomes 
The personal 
I What factors were 
influencing the way I 
perceived and 
responded to the 
situation? 
[values/assumptions) 
Significant issues 
Creative tension 
Reflexivity: given a similar situation how 
might I respond more effectively (to 
realise desirable practice)? 
What might constrain me? 
Figure 2.1: Model for Reflective Inquiry (Source: Johns, 2009, 61). 
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At the centre of the model is the aesthetic pattern of knowing in which the 
narrative of practice is revealed. The narrative represents the practitioner's 
holistic response to a clinical situation including their evaluation of actions taken. 
Influencing and helping to formulate the aesthetic response is knowledge from 
empirical, ethical and personal patterns of knowing. 'Reflexivity' in the model 
above is future or action oriented. Arising from reflection on experience, a tension 
may be identified between what actually happened in practice and the 
practitioner's sense of what should have happened if there were no impediments 
to realising 'desirable practice'. Any potential dissatisfaction drives the 
practitioner to identify those impediments and learn how they may be removed or 
overcome in future similar clinical situations. 
Johns (1995b, 25) describes the knowledge made possible by reflection, how it is 
constructed, how it relates to propositional knowledge, and its value for nursing 
practice as follows: 
...reflection is the method to access, make sense of and learn through 
experience. In this process of reflection, personal knowledge becomes visible 
and communicable...Unlike the universal, static, and context-free nature of 
positivist or instrumental knowledge, the knowledge that results from 
reflection - reflective knowledge - is particular, dynamic and context-bound. 
Although it is particular and context-bound it is also of immediate and 
valuable use to other practitioners. This assertion can be justified on two key 
points. 
• That although practice may be grounded in personal knowledge, many 
of the values, norms, and contexts of practice will be similar and hence 
enable sensible practitioners to make judgements about the value of 
one practitioner's experience in the context of their own experiences. 
• That the focus of reflection on everyday messy problems leads to the 
sort of knowledge that other practitioners would find most beneficial 
to use in their own practice. 
From an epistemology of professional practice viewpoint, it becomes evident 
that reflective personal knowledge is the most substantive form of knowledge 
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and should properly constitute the body of knowledge of a practice discipline. 
Basic and applied sciences are merely sources of information that reflective 
practitioners can draw upon to assimilate into their personal knowledge as 
appropriate. In doing so, such knowledge becomes particular and 
transformed through reflection on its appropriateness within the particular 
situation. 
Reflecting in and on practice, and sharing the knowledge gained from these 
processes, represents the most appropriate knowledge base for nursing. Basic and 
applied sciences, which form the foundation of the model of technical rationality, 
are but sources of information in the reflective model. Knowledge contributed by 
the sciences is not simply applied in practice but is mediated via the practitioner's 
personal pattern of knowing. 	 Johns (2009) distinguishes between 'doing' 
reflection and 'being' reflective. The former associates reflection with technique 
and the dominant model of professional knowledge whereas the latter denotes a 
way of being. The mode of being of a reflective practitioner is reflective. It is not 
something the practitioner does; it is something the practitioner is. Johns (2009, 
3) describes the reflective practitioner as 'someone who lives reflection as a way of 
being'. 
Rolfe, Freshwater, & Jasper (2001) develop and expand upon Benner's (1984) 
ideas to create a model of professional knowledge that is reproduced in Figure 2.2 
below. The model includes Ryle's (1948) distinction between 'knowing how' and 
'knowing that' alluded to earlier in the chapter, although the distinction is not 
conceptualised in the same way. 
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Scientific knowledge 	 Experiental knowledge 
Theoretical knowing that 	 scientific thoor0 ;r 	 experiental theolcItical 
knowledge 	 knowledge 
Practical knowing how 	 scientific practical 	 co.ipriental practical 
knowledge 	 krowledge 
Figure 2.2: A model of practitioner knowledge (Source: Rofle et al., 2001, 11) 
Rolfe et al. (2001) draw upon Benner's (1984) research into nursing expertise and 
Schon's (1983) concepts of reflection-in-action and reflection-on-action to chart a 
pathway towards the potential development of a body of knowledge for nursing 
which is grounded in practice. The model of practitioner knowledge above also 
indicates the relationship between theoretical and practical knowledge, and 
between scientific and experiential knowledge. Scientific theoretical knowledge is 
the starting point of knowledge acquisition. The model of technical rationality 
could be said to occupy the left hand column of the model above and reflective 
practice the right hand column. Rolfe et al. (2001, 11) acknowledge that in nursing 
and other health care disciplines allied to medicine: 
Both models of practice are important and have their place: the technical 
rationality model in which scientific theory determines research-based 
practice and the post-technical model in which the knowledge gained directly 
from practice informs and builds experiential theoretical knowledge. (Rolfe et 
al.'s emphasis). 
The novice nurse begins to practice using knowledge derived from scientific 
knowledge and theory. As scientific knowledge is implemented in practice in the 
form of procedures and techniques, scientific practical knowledge is acquired. 
There is an order of dependence between the latter and the former. The nurse's 
scientific practical 'knowing how' derives from scientific knowledge and theory. 
To quote Rolfe et al. (2001, 12) the nurse 'knows how because she knows that. 
(Rolfe et al.'s emphases). This suggests a relatively unproblematic application or 
translation of theoretical knowledge to practice. Following a lot of experience in 
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practice, knowledge begins to develop 'directly from experience' (Rolfe et al., 2001, 
12). Although this knowledge is a kind of practical 'knowing how', as indicated by 
its placement in the model above, it is distinguished from scientific practical 
knowledge. No arrow connects these two categories which might have suggested 
an order of dependence. In fact, the very experienced practitioner 'almost totally 
rejects' scientific practical knowledge as they acquire experiential 'know how' 
(Rolfe et al., 2001, 20). The kind of knowledge arising directly from practice 
experience is referred to as 'experiential practical knowledge' (Rolfe et al., 2001, 
12). It is tacit, intuitive, and 'organismic', that is, contained in muscles and reflexes 
of the body (Rolfe et al., 2001, 20). It manifests itself in skilful, fluid actions. This 
kind of knowledge does not, however, have to remain tacit. By reflecting in and on 
practice: 
...the expert nurse eventually begins to recognise, understand and articulate 
the processes underpinning her expertise. She realises that there is a rational 
process underpinning intuitive grasp. She eventually begins to build a body of 
experiential theoretical knowledge out of her experiential practical 
knowledge. This knowledge is not the abstract content-based knowledge of 
the novice or beginner, nor is it the concrete content-based knowledge of the 
expert. Rather, it is process-based knowledge, and is concerned with how she 
practices rather than what she practices. Furthermore, it can be shared 
between practitioners...(Rolfe et al., 2001, 20). (Rolfe et al.'s emphases). 
In this way, Benner's (1984) model is extended to include expertise that is 
articulated and shared. The nurse may now be said to 'know that' because she 
'knows how'. This is an important point as nurses are expected 'to be able to justify 
their clinical decisions according to some form of evidence' (Rolfe et al., 2001, 15). 
Unlike Benner's expert nurse, who is operating at an intuitive level and whose 
operations bypass rational processes, in the manner of Ryle's 'knowing how', the 
reflective practitioner is able to provide an account of their professional actions 
and decisions in theoretical terms. Experiential theoretical knowledge, which 
originates in practice and is developed by processes of reflection in, and 
particularly, on action, constitutes the evidence base for nursing practice. This 
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kind of theoretical knowledge seems to be not as concerned with 'the scientific 
ambition to master and define a conceptual field' (Selden, 1995, 1) as were the 
grand theories discussed earlier. 
2.6 Evidence-Based Practice 
The above conceptualisation of evidence-based practice was challenged by a 
movement in medicine which became known as Evidence-Based Medicine (EBM). 
Evidence-based medicine originated in the work of Dr. Archie Cochrane, a medical 
doctor and researcher, active in the post-World War II era in Britain. Cochrane 
was concerned that the results of research were not being applied in medical 
practice, with potentially deleterious consequences for patients. He called for the 
results of good quality research, in particular, randomised controlled trials (RCTs), 
to be systematically reviewed, synthesised, and made available to physicians to 
guide their clinical decision making (Melnyk & Fineout-Overholt, 2011). Dr. 
Cochrane inspired the evidence-based practice movement in medicine which 
developed in the early 1990s. The Cochrane Library, which publishes and 
disseminates the results of systematic reviews and meta-analyses, was named for 
him and is a key resource in the practice of evidence-based medicine. Porter 
(2010, 5) describes evidence-based practice as 'one of the most significant 
developments in healthcare in the last 2 decades'. The evidence-based practice 
movement in medicine recommended the integration of the best available external 
evidence with patient choice and clinician expertise when making decisions in 
medical practice. External evidence was to be derived from: 
...clinically relevant research, often from the basic sciences of medicine, but 
especially from patient-centred clinical research into the accuracy and 
precision of diagnostic tools (including the clinical examination), the power of 
prognostic markers, and the efficacy and safety of therapeutic, rehabilitative 
and preventive regimens (Sackett, Rosenberg, Muir Gray, Haynes, & 
Richardson, 1996, 71). 
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The type of research evidence to be used would depend on the presenting clinical 
problem, and could include findings from cross-sectional or longitudinal research 
design studies. Randomised trials and meta-analyses of the results of several 
clinical trials were deemed the most valid and reliable sources of evidence when 
prescribing therapy (Sackett et al., 1996). Use of evidence from research would be 
subject to the judgement of the medical practitioner: 
External clinical evidence can inform, but can never replace, individual 
clinical expertise, and it is this expertise that decides whether the external 
evidence applies to the individual patient at all, and if so, how it should be 
integrated in the clinical decision (Sackett et al., 1996, 72). 
In making decisions about medical care and treatment, clinical expertise would 
ensure that cognisance was taken of the individual patient's situation and the 
latter's preferred options (Sackett et al., 1996). Evidence-based medical practice 
was intended to preserve the concept of physician expertise and patient choice, 
with the latter two elements constituting forms of 'internal' evidence. However, in 
the so-called 'hierarchy of evidence' that developed subsequently, systematic 
research is accorded the highest value, with other sources of knowledge occupying 
lower levels (Cullum, Ciliska, Haynes, & Marks, 2008). Systematic research is 
synonymous with large scale randomised controlled trials, or large scale surveys. 
Systematic reviews and meta-analyses, such as those undertaken by the Cochrane 
Collaboration, collate and integrate results from numerous studies, and these 
results subsequently form the basis for the development of protocols and 
guidelines to be implemented in practice (Hyde, 2009). The farther away from 
systematic research the evidence is deemed to be, the lower down the hierarchy it 
appears. Evidence from qualitative research studies, which include grounded 
theory, phenomenology, hermeneutic inquiry, and action research, occupies a level 
below that of all scientific research on the hierarchy of evidence. These 
approaches are much favoured in nursing research, in particular, 
phenomenological approaches, as the aim of such studies is to gain an 
understanding of the meaning of the experience of health and illness for individual 
patients. Such understanding sensitises nurses to the patients' experiences and 
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assists them in providing individualised, holistic care. Expert opinion and clinical 
experience occupy the lowest level in the hierarchy of evidence. Knowledge 
generated from reflecting in and on practice is, thereby, devalued. 
Evidence-based practice, initiated in medicine, and not without its own debates 
within that field, extended to other healthcare disciplines, including nursing. This 
occurred at a time when nursing was: 
...attempting to register its difference as a caring endeavour with a separate 
knowledge base from biomedicine...reflective practice offered intellectual 
respectability to the 'softer' areas of healing and facilitated nursing in define 
(sic) itself as a discipline (Hyde, 2009, 118). 
Commenting on the risks for nursing of following medicine's lead, Smith, James, 
Lorentzon & Pope (2004, 68) warned: 
If nursing chooses to solely utilise RCTs (Randomised Controlled Trials) to 
examine the effectiveness of practice, questions which are concerned with the 
meaning events have for both patients and practitioners are more likely to be 
overlooked. 
...The RCT is limited in its ability to reveal the different dimensions of human 
experience and how patients and nurses relate to each other. The importance 
of emotions and ethical reasoning needs to be made apparent in the decision-
making process and valued as evidence alongside the use of systematic 
reviews of clinical trials. It is essential therefore that ways are sought to 
capture some of the missing elements of evidence such as emotional labour, 
practitioners' knowledge and lay knowledge in order to incorporate them into 
the debate about effective health care and what underpins it. 
As health service provision becomes increasingly policy-driven and demands ever 
greater accountability from healthcare professionals, evidence-based practice 
assumes ever greater significance. Referring to Carper's (1978) fundamental 
patterns of knowing in nursing, Porter (2010, 12) suggests that: 
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...claims that esthetic, (sic) ethical and personal knowing are, to greater or 
lesser degrees, unamenable to scrutiny, means that they fall foul of public 
expectations for transparent and accountable healthcare. This is an 
increasingly untenable position for nursing to adopt. 
Evidence-based practice, therefore, poses a dilemma for nursing knowledge, 
namely, to retain multiple ways of knowing and reflective practice as an 
epistemology while at the same time fulfil the demand for evidence and 
accountability in clinical decisions. Porter (2010, 5) asserts: 
With EBP (Evidence-based practice), not only does empirics enjoy a total 
hegemony, either displacing (as in the case of esthetics and personal 
knowledge) or incorporating (as in the case of ethics) alternative modes of 
knowing, it is also itself reduced to a very circumscribed and mechanistic 
interpretation of empirical knowledge. 
Porter (2010, 6) adds that 'EBP fails to pay even lip service to either the other 
patterns of knowing or the organizing function of theory'. Not only does evidence-
based practice diminish and devalue knowledge patterns considered fundamental 
in nursing, but its narrow interpretation of empirics deprives nursing of a 
theoretical base. Consequently, if evidence-based practice becomes dominant, the 
development of nursing as a discipline with its own unique body of knowledge is 
delayed or arrested. 
Nursing's response to the challenges posed by evidence-based practice is to argue 
for making non-empirical patterns of knowing visible and warrantable as evidence 
(Rycroft-Malone et al., 2004). Indeed, Avis & Freshwater (2006, 217) maintain 
that all sources of knowledge used in practice should be subject to critical 
reflection: 
...a misleading distinction between hard, external, scientific evidence and the 
softer, value-laden stuff of personal experience can obscure an underlying 
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logic which requires critical reflection on all the evidence in order to 
determine how we ought to practice. (Avis & Freshwater's emphasis). 
The above approach to basing practice on evidence appears to readjust the 
hierarchy of evidence to ensure greater equity between empirical and personal 
practical knowledge. The failure adequately to articulate experiential practical 
knowledge and the rational processes that underpin expert nursing actions, 
thereby creating a body of experiential theoretical knowledge, leaves nursing 
vulnerable to 'colonisation' by more powerful disciplines, namely, medicine 
(Porter & O'Halloran, 2009). The desire of nursing to register its difference as a 
discipline from medicine may have led to an undue emphasis on intuition as a basis 
for clinical decisions with a concomitant diminution of the relevance of empirical 
knowledge. Referring to 'the question of contested knowledge in nursing' Nelson 
(2012, 204) argues that 'Nursing knowledge includes biomedical knowledge, 
pharmacology, psychology, math, anthropology, and so forth'. The evidence-based 
practice movement in healthcare has perhaps required nursing to acknowledge 
more overtly the contribution of empirical research to its knowledge base while at 
the same time articulating and verifying other sources of knowledge, in recognition 
of the fact that the discipline and disciplinary knowledge is defined by more than 
empirics. 
2.7 Conclusion 
Professional knowledge generally comprises a mixture of theoretical and practical 
knowledge. The relationship between these two types of knowledge and how they 
blend is a matter of debate and disagreement. In nursing, efforts to formulate a 
unique knowledge base included recognition of the inadequacies of the medical 
model to represent nursing and a move toward a more holistic conceptualisation 
of care. The construction of conceptual models reflected a stage in the evolution of 
nursing theory. Problems of relevance and application of theory to practice 
bedevilled the widespread adoption of nursing models. The articulation of 
different patterns of knowing in nursing, and the recognition of expertise arising in 
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and from practice, oriented the search for a disciplinary knowledge base toward 
practice. Reflective practice formally acknowledged the limitations of scientific 
knowledge and the model of technical rationality for practice disciplines. It made 
possible the generation of knowledge from clinical experience. Its appeal as a 
model of professional knowledge for nursing was challenged by the evidence-
based practice movement in healthcare. Reflective practice, however, remains an 
important element in the conceptualisation of nursing knowledge. 
Many of the concepts that have formed the content of this chapter will be revisited 
in the context of a deconstructive reading in later chapters. Prior to that, an 
overview of the nursing literature as it relates to reflective practice and nursing 
knowledge will be presented. 
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Chapter 3 A diachronic perspective on reflective practice 
in nursing education 
3.1 Introduction 
An exploration of how reflective practice as a model of professional knowledge has 
been presented in the nursing literature over time is the focus of this chapter. 
Unlike the analysis chapters that follow later in the thesis and which consist of a 
close, fine-grained reading of a limited number of texts, the present chapter 
encompasses a broad sweep of literature on reflective practice in nursing 
education. Few of the papers included in this review have as their primary or sole 
theme the topic of professional knowledge per se. However, in the course of the 
discussions and debates articulated, a perspective on professional knowledge may 
be discerned. It is the purpose of the chapter to identify these various perspectives 
and the presuppositions upon which they rely. A temporal dimension also 
underpins the organisation of the material, beginning when reflective practice first 
entered the nursing literature in the late 1980s and continuing to more recent 
times. The years in question are divided into three periods. The first decade -
from the late 1980s to the late 1990s - witnessed a proliferation of publications on 
reflective practice in nursing education and, for that reason, is divided into an early 
and middle phase. The second decade - from 2000 onwards - constitutes the later 
period in the review which follows. An attempt is made to trace the trajectory of 
reflective practice as a model of professional knowledge in nursing education as it 
is represented in the literature and to capture the preoccupations obtaining amidst 
the temporal flux. 
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3.2 The Early Years 
The 1980s marks the first appearance of the terms 'reflection' and 'reflective 
practice' in the nursing literature. One of the earliest papers located in the 
literature search describes a research study. The researcher/author investigated 
clinical decision-making among a group of experienced nurses (Powell, 1989). The 
aim of the study was to identify if nurses used reflection-in-action as part of their 
decision-making process. Schon's (1983) theory was used as a framework for the 
study. Also used was a modified version of Mezirow's (1981, 12) seven 'levels of 
reflectivity'. The researcher wished to find out not only if reflection was used when 
making clinical decisions but also at what level it was occurring. As briefly alluded 
to in Chapter 2, Mezirow (1981) distinguished different levels of reflection or 
reflectivity. Critical reflection refers to the process of becoming aware of and 
challenging established and habitual patterns of expectation, patterns that have 
been assimilated uncritically by means of socialisation. Such a process accounts 
for 'perspective transformation' in learning and is referred to as 'psychic' and 
'theoretical reflectivity' in Mezirow's (1981, 13) framework. Powell's (1989) study 
appears to represent an optimistic take on reflective practice as a model of 
professional knowledge in nursing. Reflection-in-action is still a quite new concept 
in nursing at this time. The researcher acknowledges that the nurses who 
participated in the study did not know very much about reflective practice as a 
concept. Nor did they have any prior relevant instruction. It was, however, 
evident in their practice, which seems to bear out Schon's (1983) contention of a 
distinction between formal propositional knowledge and practice knowledge. 
Powell (1989) found that among the small group of nurses who participated in the 
research study, all used reflection, with those practicing in areas where there was 
greater autonomy engaging in critical reflection, that is, becoming aware of and 
challenging habitual patterns of expectation. As Powell's (1989) paper marks one 
of the earliest references to reflective practice in nursing and as it builds on 
Schon's (1983) epistemology of reflection-in-action in search of practice 
knowledge, it will be subjected to a closer reading in Chapter 8 of the thesis. 
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By the early 1990s, reflection is recognised as an important development in 
nursing education, and described as 'a cornerstone of nursing professionalism' 
(Newell, 1992, 1326). It is also claimed that reflection is 'essential for competency' 
(Saylor, 1990, 9); 'a learning tool' (Atkins & Murphy, 1993, 1188) that can facilitate 
the integration of theory and practice; 'a necessary process in professional 
education'; and 'vital' if learning from practice is to occur (Atkins & Murphy, 1993, 
1191). Reflection has become 'increasingly prominent in nursing and nurse 
education...promoted enthusiastically by practitioners and educators alike' (James & 
Clarke, 1994, 82); and 'a focus of educators aspiring to a better understanding of 
how a professional thinks and, therefore, how a professional should learn to think' 
(Saylor, 1990, 8). 
However, difficulties with reflection were also beginning to be recognised. The 
literature on reflection is described as 'complex and abstract' (Atkins & Murphy, 
1993, 1188). Reflective practice is poorly defined (Atkins & Murphy, 1993; Jarvis, 
1992), with a wide variety of terms used interchangeably (Carroll et al., 2002). It is 
'difficult to conceptualise' (Clarke, James, & Kelly, 1996, 171) which makes it 
'difficult to operationalise' (Atkins & Murphy, 1993, 1191). There is, also, 'little 
critical examination of either theoretical or practical problems of reflection about 
nursing', and descriptions of how to improve reflective practice are 'characterised 
by vagueness' (Newell, 1992, 1326). Reflection could even be described as 'a 
bandwagon upon which many professionals have jumped because it provides a 
rationale for their practice' but it has 'not really helped to solve the problem of the 
relationship between theory and practice' (Jarvis, 1992, 174). Describing reflection 
'adequately for all contexts presents difficulties' (James & Clarke, 1994, 82). 
Reid (1993) reports hostility among some nurses with whom she was facilitating 
reflection, with nurses believing that there was nothing new in the idea for them. 
Contrary to Powell's (1989) study, Reid's (1993) experience may be an indication 
that if reflective practice is made into an 'academic' subject and presented as such, 
it may provoke a negative reaction. I have experienced this kind of reaction also 
when presenting the 'theory' of reflective practice to experienced nurses. 
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Definitions of reflection began to appear in the nursing literature in the early 
1990s. Drawing on educational philosophy and theory, Dewey's (1933) definition 
is frequently cited as is the following definition by Boyd & Fales (1983, 100): 
Reflective learning is the process of internally examining and exploring an 
issue of concern, triggered by an experience, which creates and clarifies 
meaning in terms of self, and which results in a changed conceptual 
perspective. 
Definitions are appealing when the concept referred to is unclear, although, as 
Eraut (1994) remarks , definitions have a way of making things appear more 
certain than they, in fact, are. Boyd & Fales (1983) identified a key characteristic of 
reflective learning, and one that distinguishes it from other types of mental 
activity, such as for example, problem-solving, and that is that the problem or issue 
of concern is conceptualised in relation to the self (Boyd & Fales, 1983). The 
popularity of their definition in the nursing literature may be attributable to this 
personal dimension of reflective knowledge. 
A focus on 'doing' reflective practice becomes a dominant theme in the nursing 
literature in this early period. As well as adopting models from the education 
domain, nurses themselves begin to develop models and frameworks with a view 
to making the processes involved in reflection more tangible. Atkins and Murphy 
(1993) present a model distilled from a review of the literature on reflective 
practice. The authors identify a common 3-stage process which consists of the 
following: awareness of uncomfortable thoughts and feelings, critical analysis of 
feelings and knowledge, and new perspective (Atkins & Murphy, 1993). The skills 
needed to engage in reflection are also identified and enumerated as: self-
awareness, description, critical analysis, synthesis, and evaluation (Atkins & 
Murphy, 1993). Suggestions for improving the methods used to investigate 
reflection are proposed, for example, the use of reflective diaries in addition to 
observation and interview approaches. A better understanding of the process of 
reflection, it is argued, is likely to enhance the practice of reflection (Atkins & 
Murphy, 1993). 
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While understanding and implementing reflective practice is a dominant theme in 
the nursing literature at this time, concern is also expressed regarding the nature 
of the knowledge derived from reflecting in, and on, practice (James & Clarke, 
1994). The rituals and routines that characterised the knowledge base of nursing 
in earlier decades are not to be relied upon (James & Clarke, 1994). In a reflective 
curriculum, applied science no longer provides the sole source of knowledge for 
practitioners. However, reflective practice knowledge is regarded as an 
immensely complex, unstable, practical kind of knowledge (James & Clarke, 1994). 
This creates problems in the arena of nursing education as there is a lack of control 
over learning outcomes and consequent difficulties in the assessment of learning 
from reflection (James & Clarke, 1994). There is also little guidance on the 
teaching strategies that promote reflective practice (James & Clarke, 1994). The 
difficulties identified by James & Clarke (1994) appear to reflect a nursing 
curriculum that is oriented towards the dominant model of technical rationality, 
with the teacher as expert and the body of knowledge consisting of formal 
propositional knowledge. Their paper gives an indication of the degree of change 
required to move from a technical rational model to a reflective curriculum. 
Meerabeau (1992), on the other hand, takes a more optimistic view of the task of 
identifying the nature of reflective knowledge, asserting that, with appropriate 
research methods, practitioners' tacit knowledge may be captured. Meerabeau's 
(1992) argument will be considered in greater detail in Chapter 8. 
Greenwood (1993) is critical of reflective practice being removed from the practice 
setting and transferred to a classroom context. Drawing on theories in cognitive 
psychology, particularly, concept formation and utilisation, Greenwood (1993) 
argues that practice and feedback must occur in real-life clinical settings so that 
appropriate cues are triggered and activated in subsequent situations. If reflection 
occurs in a classroom setting, different concepts are activated, for example, what 
the teacher expects, assessment requirements, and so on (Greenwood, 1993). 
Reflection should precede action as well as follow it; otherwise inappropriate 
concepts may be activated and reinforced. Again the focus of Greenwood's (1993) 
paper is on 'doing' reflection, and the theory used to support the argument being 
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presented appears to reflect a rational, linear approach to learning more 
reminiscent of the model of technical rationality than reflection-in-action. 
3.3 The Middle Years 
'Doing' reflective practice remains a dominant theme in the nursing literature 
throughout the latter half of the 1990s. As an indication, perhaps, of the presence 
of reflective practice in new nursing curricula, and the presence of nursing 
education in tertiary education settings, reports of research studies that 
investigated reflective practice from a variety of perspectives begin to appear 
during this time (Durgahee, 1996; Platzer, Blake, & Snelling, 1997; Reece Jones, 
1995; Richardson & Maltby, 1995; Wong, Kember, Chung, & Yan, 1995). Reflective 
practice is by now an established part of nursing education programmes. The need 
for valid and reliable assessment methods prompted a study by Wong et al. (1995). 
The reflective assignments of 45 registered nurses undertaking a 30-hour unit of 
study as part of a BSc degree in nursing were analysed for evidence of reflection 
using Boud et al.'s (1985) framework. Like Boyd & Fales (1983), Boud et al.'s 
(1985) definition of reflection is frequently cited in the nursing literature. They 
define reflection as: 
...a generic term for those intellectual and affective activities in which individuals 
engage to explore their experiences in order to lead to new understandings and 
appreciations (Boud et al., 1985, 19). 
Experience is conceived holistically as the total response of the person to the 
situation. Reflection may be triggered by internal states, such as loss of confidence 
or disillusionment with an existing situation, or by external events. 
Acknowledging the difficulty of being precise about the nature of the reflective 
process, Boud et al. (1985) offer a model of reflection which consists of three 
elements: the experience itself, the reflective processes which include attending to 
feelings, and re-evaluating experience by means of association, integration, 
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validation, and appropriation. The final component of the model is the outcome of 
reflection. 
Wong et al. (1995) took great care when using Boud et al.'s (1985) model to ensure 
the validity and reliability of the tool with criteria established for each coding 
category, for example., attending to feelings, association, integration, and so on. 
Principles of coding were developed during a pilot study of the tool. Cases, that is, 
paragraphs of text, were coded separately by a number of coders and a 
mathematical formula used to test agreement (Wong et al., 1995). With the 
analytic procedures in place, the students' assignments were examined for 
evidence of reflection and assigned to one of six categories depending on to which 
element of the reflective process the case was deemed to belong. 100 reflective 
elements were coded from 45 scripts. Most of these belonged to the categories of 
attending to feelings, association, and integration, with fewer coded as belonging 
to the latter three categories: validation, appropriation and outcome of reflection. 
Examples of each category from the textual data are provided in the report of the 
study (Wong et al., 1995). Based on the initial analysis, students were then 
assigned to one of three categories: non-reflectors, reflectors, and critical reflectors 
(Mezirow, 1981). The unit of coding in this case was the student. A majority 
(n=34) were assigned to the middle category, that is, reflectors. An in-depth 
interview with one 'non-reflector' and one 'critical reflector' student followed with 
the aim of illuminating the thought processes of each. Analysis and findings of the 
interview data are not reported (Wong et al., 1995). The researchers acknowledge 
their difficulty in differentiating the fine distinctions between the elements of Boud 
et al.'s (1985) framework and the fact that the data being coded do not refer 
directly to reflective processes. They acknowledge also that assignment work may 
not be the most suitable medium for reflection. As part of an assessment, students 
may censor what they write (Wong et al., 1995). Wong et al.'s (1995) study may be 
considered another example of a technical rational curriculum in nursing 
education and the dominance of empirical methods in nursing research. Although 
the authors acknowledge the limitations of the approach for the subject matter of 
their investigation, they nevertheless adhere to recognised, accepted research 
methods. The study may also be seen as part of a process of legitimizing reflective 
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practice by the standards of the time and place: rigorous empirical inquiry in an 
academic setting. 
Other authors, during this period, express concern that reflective practice may be 
`colonised' by the dominant model of professional knowledge. In the absence of a 
shared understanding, Richardson(1995) warns that reflective practice could 
become identified with the methods and techniques of natural science and ignore 
the social context of nursing practice. Nursing requires many sources of 
knowledge, and theories will emerge from understanding experience gained in 
practice (Richardson, 1995). By adopting a broader perspective, reflection will not 
be limited to the technical level but will also include ethical and political 
considerations (Richardson, 1995). The outcome will be not simply better 
techniques and procedures but "the development of person-centred, 'morally 
appropriate' action" (Richardson, 1995, 1049). The latter is particularly pertinent 
in nursing practice as illustrated by Carper's (1978) fundamental patterns of 
knowing in nursing and the importance accorded to the concept of caring in 
nursing theory, as discussed in Chapter 2. 
Acknowledging that reflection is used differently depending on the perspective of 
the user, Boud & Walker (1998) register their concerns regarding the fate of 
reflective practice in professional education programmes in higher education 
settings. Misinterpretations of the reflection literature and examples of poor 
educational practice are reported (Boud & Walker, 1998). The authors re-assert 
the radical nature of reflection, for example, respect for uncertainty and doubt, the 
distrust of easy solutions, the influence of context, and questioning the notion of 
the teacher as 'the' authority (Boud & Walker, 1998). Practices which are 
incompatible with this view of reflective practice are identified; these include: 
recipe-following, reluctance to question experience, traditional assessment 
methods, misuse of teacher power, and non-recognition of, or mismanaging, 
context (Boud & Walker, 1998). 
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Clarke et al. (1996) recognise that nursing practice requires a broad knowledge 
base, and that reflection is important for the development of nurses' personal 
practical knowledge. Such knowledge is derived from many sources: it is created 
in practice situations; it is personal and shared; recent and long-standing; dynamic 
and living; and at odds with the notion of competence-based practice (Clarke et al., 
1996). Based on their experiences as reflective practitioners, Clarke et al. (1996) 
recommend broadening the scope of what they refer to as holistic reflection to 
include not just direct analysis of experience which can easily become a technical 
problem solving activity, but also other forms, such as art, sculpture, and so on. 
The setting in which reflective practice takes place is also recognised as important; 
it must, among other things, be open, collaborative, and not focused on outcomes 
(Clarke et al., 1996). Reflective practice as a model of professional knowledge 
appears quite distinct from the technical rational model in Clarke et al.'s (1996) 
account, although the latter is not excluded. According to Pierson (1998), 
deliberate attempts must be made to encourage reflective thinking. If appropriate 
teaching strategies are not developed and used, then rational thinking 
predominates (Pierson, 1998). In terms of generating a knowledge base for 
nursing, reflective approaches must be used alongside systematic and interpretive 
approaches Both Clarke et al's (1996) and Pierson's (1998) attempts to define 
reflective practice and to distinguish it from the model of technical rationality will 
be revisited and analysed in more detail later in the analysis chapters. 
`Reflexive practice' describes practice that generates new theory and is, in turn, 
modified by that theory (Rolfe, 1997, 96). Informal theories, which refer to 
personal theories about individual patients in specific situations, are constructed, 
tested, modified and retested in the process of reflection-in-action. Informal 
theory construction, Rolfe (1997, 96) argues, requires a comprehensive knowledge 
of the patient, 'mindful attention' or intense concentration on the task at hand, and 
the ability to combine knowledge from different sources in the practice situation. 
This middle phase in the nursing literature marks the appearance of early versions 
of Johns's (1995a) model of structured reflection. As illustrated in Chapter 2, 
Carper's (1978) four fundamental patterns of knowing in nursing - the personal, 
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aesthetic, empirical, and ethical - were incorporated into the model developed by 
Johns (1995a). In utilising this model of structured reflection, knowledge is 
developed in all four domains. Such knowledge is described as 'the most significant 
form of disciplinary knowledge' as it is the knowledge used to practice (Johns, 
1995a, 233). 'Reflexivity', as another pattern of knowing, is included in Johns' 
(1995a) model, acknowledging the assimilation of new with existing knowledge, 
and the on-going development of personal, practical knowledge (Johns, 1995a, 
1995b). Like Boud & Walker (1998), Johns (1999) recognises that models of 
structured reflection may be used inappropriately as a 'technology', telling the 
practitioner how to reflect and limiting reflection to a cognitive activity. To avoid 
this and the potential of traditional nursing culture to limit the emancipatory and 
empowering effects of reflective practice, guided reflection is recommended 
(Johns, 1999). The guide is non-judgemental, affirmative, highly challenging and 
supportive, and, preferably, not too closely associated with organisational values 
(Johns, 1999). 
By the mid to late 1990s, reflective practice as a model of professional knowledge 
is established in the nursing literature. The main emphasis at this time is on the 
practical issues involved in teaching, assessing, and researching reflection. While 
theories, definitions, and frameworks have been borrowed from the education 
domain, these have not been assimilated uncritically into nursing education. New 
models originating in nursing are also developed. The potential for reflective 
practice to become like the dominant model of technical rationality is recognised 
and ways of avoiding such an outcome are identified and explored. 
3.4 The Later Years 
A major preoccupation in the nursing literature of the early 2000s concerns the 
challenge to reflective practice posed by the evidence-based practice movement in 
health care. The impact and consequences upon nursing knowledge of this 
movement, and the response of nursing to the challenge, have been highlighted in 
Chapter 2. Texts in which the relationship between reflective practice and 
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evidence-based practice, as models of professional knowledge in nursing 
education, is explored and debated will be the subject of a deconstructive reading 
in Chapter 9. 
The influence of postmodernism on perceptions of reflective practice as a model of 
professional knowledge becomes evident in the nursing literature of the later 
years. Reflective knowledge is presented as marginalised by the dominance of 
evidence-based practice (Rolfe & Gardner, 2005). It is also presented as a 
dominant or hegemonic discourse in its own right (Cotton, 2001; Gilbert, 2001). If 
conceived of as the latter, reflective practice may be misused as a form of 
surveillance and 'thought control' (Cotton, 2001, 515). The micro-techniques of 
reflection commonly used in nursing education programmes, such as making 
previously private thoughts public and thus subject to control, is recognised as a 
particular risk in higher education settings where reflection forms part of 
assessment and nursing research (Cotton, 2001). If analysed from a micro-
sociological perspective, Taylor (2003) claims that reflective practice is a no more 
faithful or truthful representation of professional knowledge in nursing than is the 
model of technical rationality. Both approaches are textual constructions that 
create certain versions of 'reality'. The particular rhetorical devices employed in 
reflective accounts, such as the use of first person pronouns and narrative 
approaches appear to bring practice closer giving it a more authentic feel (Taylor, 
2003). 
Adopting a Foucauldian perspective, Nelson (2012, 204) argues that reflective 
practice as a model of professional knowledge has emphasised what she terms the 
`virtue script' at the expense of scientific knowledge needed for competence. 
...nursing discourse, and most particularly nursing pedagogy, is almost 
entirely focused on the subjective and relational dimensions of practice...(The 
virtue script) worked to overshadow the skilled and knowledgeable 
dimensions of nursing work, reinforcing nursing as good work undertaken by 
good, for the most part, women. 
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Calls for conceptual clarity and research into the nature of reflective thinking 
persist into the first decade of the new millennium. Clarity and research are 
needed if the debate on reflective practice as a model of professional knowledge 
for nursing is to 'resist degenerating into polemic' (Teekman, 2000, 1126). 
Research studies focusing on how nurses use reflection in practice found that 
reflection is used mainly for action, that is, to keep going in situations of doubt. It 
is used less often to evaluate or create understanding of the total situation, and 
rarely to question the wider context of practice. These findings seem to support 
Schon's (1983) theory of reflection-in-action as outlined in Chapter 2. In a 
qualitative research study by Gustafsson and Fagerberg (2004), nurses reported 
tending to reflect on situations of poor nursing care and on what they had said and 
done in such instances and if their actions were correct. Ethical issues and 
situations that require courage were also subject to reflection (Gustafsson & 
Fagerberg, 2004). These findings suggest that reflection functions in situations 
where, perhaps, knowledge is less certain. Again, this is consistent with Schon's 
(1983) theory. 
Nurses' ability to practice reflectively and to use reflective knowledge may be 
limited by the wider social context in which they work. An interpretive 
ethnographic methodology was used to capture 'daily ward reality' for four nurses 
from different wards in two hospitals (Mantzoukas & Jasper, 2004). Interviews 
followed observation of practice to explore the decision-making processes of the 
nurses involved and how they perceived reflection was used. Participants 
completed a written reflection of the practice situations. A second interview three 
weeks later followed up on issues arising from the first and any changes in 
perspective that had occurred (Mantzoukas & Jasper, 2004). Participants felt 
constrained in using reflective practice because ward culture was dominated by 
the hard scientific knowledge of doctors and managers (Mantzoukas & Jasper, 
2004). Linking knowledge and power, the researchers assert that using reflection 
and learning from practice was diminished due to power imbalances (Mantzoukas 
& Jasper, 2004). 
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Research studies in the later years also continue to investigate the development of 
reflective skills in nurses (Duke & Appleton, 2000; Glaze, 2001; Liimatainen, 
Poskiparta, Karhila, & Sjogren, 2001; Paget, 2001). In a qualitative study of 14 
Advanced Nurse Practitioner students from one cohort who had completed a pre-
entry degree level reflective practice module and a reflective component on a 
Master's degree practice module, Glaze (2001) found that the majority perceived 
themselves as having gone through a process of transformation. This included 
becoming more aware of how personal biography shaped actions, developing a 
greater appreciation of what nursing can be, and becoming more realistic, open 
and confident (Glaze, 2001). Whether this process is attributable solely to the 
reflective components of the programme or to the level of academic preparation 
and practice these students had experienced is not debated. The latter issue does 
form part of Paget's (2001) retrospective survey of 200 students who had 
undertaken a variety of pre- and post-registration courses at both undergraduate 
and post-graduate levels, all of which had included a formal and measurable 
preparation for reflective practice. A majority of the 35% who responded to the 
questionnaire reported that their practice had changed not only in the specific area 
reflected on for the course but also in other areas, and that these changes had 
persisted beyond the course and become integrated into their practice (Paget, 
2001). These changes were not associated with level of academic preparation. A 
telephone interview one year later with ten randomly selected respondents who 
had volunteered contact details re-enforced the results of the questionnaires 
(Paget, 2001). These studies point to the impact of reflective learning on the 
development of personal knowledge. 
Attempts to measure reflective skills using quantitative methodologies is also 
evident in the literature of the later period (Duke & Appleton, 2000). A research 
study reported similar problems with measuring reflective skills to those reported 
by Wong et al. (1995) in the previous decade. In the later study, a marking grid 
was developed from the theoretical literature with criteria to denote reflective 
skills, for example: an ability to describe practice, analyse feelings, action planning, 
and so on. As well as reflective skills, the grid used in the data analysis included 
traditional academic skills such as clarity of presentation, referencing, and so on. 
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Grades awarded included marks in the latter skills. The problem of markers being 
able to differentiate reliably between reflective skills, together with the artificial 
fragmentation of reflection using discrete skills are acknowledged as limitations of 
the study (Duke & Appleton, 2000). This research study could be considered 
illustrative of the tensions involved in trying to assimilate two quite different 
models of professional knowledge in a nursing curriculum. 
Teaching strategies and the effectiveness of different approaches to facilitating 
reflection are also investigated and reported in the nursing literature (Nicholl & 
Higgins, 2004; Platzer, Blake, & Ashford, 2000;Scanlan, Care, & Udod, 2002). The 
main theme to emerge from Scanlan et al.'s (2002, 140) study of teaching reflection 
was 'making connections'. This theme described the teachers' efforts to assist 
students in connecting taught content to personal and professional experience, 
their own and the students', in order to attain a deeper understanding of theory. 
Reflection was found to be more easily facilitated when the teacher had mastery of 
content as well as teaching expertise, and when the teacher was not emotionally 
drained (Scanlan et al., 2002). Personal and emotional investment is required not 
only on the part of the reflective practitioner but also on the part of those who 
facilitate reflection. 'Mastery of content' suggests a point of contact between 
reflective and technical models of professional knowledge, with technical 
knowledge subsumed, but none the less relevant, within reflective practice. 
Nicholl & Higgins's (2004) description of an investigation into how reflection is 
taught in Schools of Nursing that offer Diploma/Pre-registration nursing 
programmes is an interesting example of the dominance of a technical rational 
approach to researching reflective practice. A questionnaire was employed as the 
data-gathering instrument in the research study. Questions related to teachers' 
experience in terms of time teaching reflection, time allocated to the subject, 
learning outcomes, and teaching strategies employed. The researchers report that 
learning outcomes used by teachers related mainly to the cognitive domain 
(Nicholl & Higgins, 2004). In the examples provided in the report, learning 
outcomes were oriented towards the 'theory' of reflection rather than the practice 
of reflection. Learning outcomes in the cognitive domain included, for example, 
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`Define reflection', 'Describe a model of reflection', and so on. If these outcomes are 
achieved, the learner will know a lot about reflection but not necessarily very 
much about reflective practice. Teacher preparation for facilitating learning about 
reflective practice was reported as including reading about reflection or getting 
information as part of an academic course (Nicholl & Higgins, 2004). A distinct 
theory-practice gap appears evident in the teaching of a practice designed to 
overcome a gap between theory and practice. 
Assessing reflection is an issue explored in some detail by Hargreaves (2003). The 
influence of reflection on professional education coupled with the increasing 
emphasis in higher education on developing effective assessment strategies clearly 
linked to student learning creates problems with assessment (Hannigan, 2001). 
One of the problems is the lack of control over learning outcomes which is 
characteristic of reflective learning. Another is the requirement to mark reflective 
material, which may induce students to produce work that is acceptable to the 
teacher and the profession rather than an accurate account of experience 
(Hargreaves, 2004). The alignment of learning and formal assessment in the 
reflective practice model of professional education is therefore rendered 
questionable. 
Further signs of tension between two differing epistemologies of practice is 
evident in Carroll et al.'s (2002) demand for rigorous research evidence for the 
effectiveness of reflective practice in enhancing student learning and improving 
nursing practice. Working in an environment of evidence-based practice poses 
difficulties for the nurse educator, as research on teaching reflection is sparse as is 
research on how assessment of reflection via journals and diaries is to be carried 
out (Carroll et al., 2002). Carroll et al. (2002) echo James & Clarke's (1996) 
concern at the lack of clarity on specific teaching methods designed to facilitate 
reflective practice and the lack of a clear definition of reflection and reflective 
practice. An added concern for these authors is that an increased focus on 
reflection could lead to certain core skills that are essential to the development of a 
dynamic, responsive nurse, for example, critical thinking, problem-solving, and 
self-awareness, being lost (Carroll et al., 2002). 
	 The view of professional 
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knowledge presupposed in the concerns expressed above seems oriented towards 
a behavioural competence model and appears indicative of a more positivist than 
reflective view of nursing knowledge. 
Many of the issues first highlighted with the introduction of reflective practice into 
the nursing literature remain evident almost quarter of a century later. Efforts at 
clarifying and defining the concept continue (Duffy, 2007; Kinsella, 2007). New or 
refinements of existing models and frameworks are presented (Fowler, 2006; 
Nielsen, Stragnell, & Jester, 2007). Research studies are reported (O'Connor & 
Hyde, 2005). The debate regarding evidence-based practice as a model 
appropriate for the discipline of nursing endures. Approaches to integrating 
evidence-based practice and reflective practice are proposed. Describing recent 
changes in healthcare in the USA and the potential they offer for a sea change in 
nurse education and practice, Picard & Henneman (2007) advocate valuing theory-
guided, evidence-based, reflective practice in a Clinical Nurse Leader Masters-level 
curriculum (Picard & Henneman, 2007). Reflection and dialogue on disciplinary 
knowledge as it is 'lived out' in everyday nursing practice will be required. Nurses, 
Picard & Henneman (2007) claim, can shape conversations about choosing from 
evidence in practice, and ensure that evidence is not restricted to research-based 
findings but includes the patient and family experiences, as well as context and 
environment in clinical decision-making (Picard & Henneman, 2007). 
3.5 Conclusion 
This diachronic view of reflective practice as a model of professional knowledge in 
nursing education reveals it to be an enduring feature in the nursing literature. 
The problem of definition and consistency of understanding is evident and remains 
a focus of concern over time. Tension between reflective practice as a technology 
and reflective practice as an emancipatory process is revealed though not always 
declared. The influence of higher education is perceptible in the strong focus on 
researching reflective practice, although some of the methodologies chosen seem 
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more consonant with a technical rational model of professional knowledge than a 
reflective one. 
In the following chapter, deconstruction as the research methodology is presented 
and discussed. 
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Chapter 4 Methodology 
4.1 Introduction 
Deconstruction is often thought of as a dismantling, or undoing. Certainly, 
Derrida thought that an argument, an individual or an institution's account of 
itself was not necessarily the most reliable authority. The moment we are 
confronted with self-representations, Derrida thought we should hone our 
listening and critical faculties, a little like a highly attentive therapist or 
psychoanalyst. Deconstruction suggests that texts and arguments with which 
we are most familiar contain hidden and unexpected reserves, points of inner 
resistance, dialogues and alternatives. Attending to these, Derrida converted 
our understanding of the available resources of the familiar (Deutscher, 
2005, xii). 
The method of deconstruction is most closely associated with the French 
philosopher, Jacques Derrida. 
	 As indicated above, deconstruction is a critical 
approach to text analysis. In general, authoritative texts are consulted when one 
wishes to understand a particular issue or domain. When I want to know, for 
example, what reflective practice as a model of professional knowledge in nursing 
education is, I consult texts that refer to that subject. This I did in order to write 
much of the content contained in previous chapters of the thesis. I read the texts of 
those renowned in the field of reflective practice and nursing education with care 
and attention in order to understand and re-present their ideas using a 
combination of my own words and the authors' words. There is, however, as the 
above extract indicates, another way of reading those same texts; a reading that is 
alert to the 'hidden reserves', the 'points of inner resistance', and so on, that the texts 
contain. This reading 'otherwise' of texts that elaborate reflective practice as a 
model of professional knowledge in nursing education is the aim of the thesis. 
Presenting the arguments for why and how such a reading should be accomplished 
is the purpose of this chapter. Deconstruction has not always enjoyed a positive 
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response in the world of the academy. Derrida himself and his ideas have been 
subjected to quite vitriolic comment by fellow professional philosophers and other 
academics in his lifetime. He was not particularly enamoured of the word 
`deconstruction' and how it came to be used subsequently (Derrida, 2004b). 
However, I believe his ideas have value for research and scholarship and, in the 
following pages, I hope to make a case to that end that persuades the disinterested 
reader. Many of the introductory comments that follow are presented to counter 
some of the misconceptions that pertain regarding deconstruction. 
Deconstruction offers the researcher an approach to text analysis that opens the 
possibility of an alternative reading. As indicated in Chapter 1, re-reading texts 
that have made a difference to some aspect of our lives and reading them in a 
deconstructive way allows us '...to see them in a more complex, more constructed, 
less idealised light' (Johnson, 1987, xviii) (Johnson's emphasis). 
A deconstructive reading does not claim to be a better, truer, or more accurate 
reading of a text. The goal of analysis is not to arrive at a new set of themes or to 
generate a new theory. On the contrary, deconstruction is oriented towards 
loosening or unsettling any totalizing system (Caputo, 1997). Because part of the 
method of deconstruction is to question 'conceptuality', it is sometimes mistaken 
as attempting to do away with concepts with the result that either nothing has any 
meaning or, alternatively, the extreme relativist position, that any meaning is 
possible. Deconstruction does not sanction an 'anything goes' relativism in respect 
of the question of knowledge (Caputo, 1997). The possibility of meaning is not 
eliminated in a deconstructive reading. Without some sense of stable meaning, 
there would be no knowledge in many disciplines. Howells (1998, 154) contends 
that 'deconstruction is not in any way a nihilistic undermining of truth, but rather an 
exploration of the prejudices and preconceptions that underlie much of what we 
generally accept without question'. Deconstruction recognises the necessity of 
using concepts such as 'truth' and 'knowledge' while refusing them any particular 
privilege. At the same time, as Norris (2002, 220) makes clear: `no case can be 
argued, no proposition stated - however radical its intent - without falling back on 
the conceptual resources vested in natural language'. 
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As indicated in the introductory chapter, my reading of the texts of reflective 
practice in the context of nursing education prompted many questions. Teaching 
reflective practice and facilitating reflection also presented challenges of 
understanding and clarity. Discussions with colleagues revealed multiple 
perspectives on the same topic. One of my main questions was how so many 
interpretations and sometimes quite diverse interpretations of the same concept 
and activity are possible. I began to believe that the answer to that question must 
lie in the textual constructions of reflective practice. 
	 In my reading of 
deconstruction as a research methodology, I noted some similarities between 
reflective practice and deconstruction. Both begin from a stance of uncertainty. 
Reflection is prompted by practice situations where propositional knowledge is 
not entirely apposite or available, and the practitioner must draw on alternative 
forms of knowledge which are not readily recognisable. Deconstruction is oriented 
to finding new openings in entities that seem fixed and stable. Both reflective 
practice and deconstruction seek out and challenge taken-for-granted assumptions 
and presuppositions inherent in any knowledge claim. 'the defining attribute of the 
reflective practitioner is precisely the inquisitive attitude of taking nothing as given' 
(Rolfe et al., 2001, 1). Both are practices that respect the materials with which 
they work. A deconstructive reading and reflecting on practice in search of 
knowledge begin with an openness to what may be revealed. Caputo (1997, 73-
74) remarks of deconstruction in relation to scientific knowledge: 
The sneaking suspicions that something may be wrong with what we 
currently believe, while keeping a watchful eye that current paradigms not be 
taken dogmatically, that something else, something other, still to come, is 
being missed - that deeply deconstructive frame of mind goes to the heart of 
hardball science, if it has a heart! 
Similarly, reflecting in, and on, practice is a response to perplexity and doubt. 
Reflective practice requires that one steps outside the mainstream and questions 
dominant frames of reference. 
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Both reflective practice and deconstruction are concerned with changing existing 
actualities, seeing things in new ways, and generating new possibilities of action. 
In situations of uncertainty in nursing practice, where the application of a rule or 
procedure is inappropriate, the search for new knowledge and the envisioning of 
new possibilities is guided by certain ethical principles, chief of which are respect 
for persons and respect for individual autonomy. These principles are at the core 
of an ethic of caring which characterises the discipline of nursing (Meleis, 2012). 
As outlined in Chapter 2, reflective practice as a model of professional knowledge 
is frequently opposed to the dominant model of technical rationality (Schon, 
1983). The latter sets the standard for professional knowledge and anything 
different, such as reflective practice, is regarded as a corruption of that standard. 
This is especially evident in the so-called hierarchy of professional knowledge and 
the hierarchy of evidence in evidence-based practice. Scientific knowledge 
dominates over other sources of knowledge in professional practice. Promoting 
reflective practice as a more appropriate model of professional knowledge for 
nursing than the model of technical rationality could be read as an attempt to 
reverse the hierarchy, with reflective practice now dominant and technical 
rationality considered deviant. Deconstruction is very much concerned with 
analysing these sorts of hierarchized oppositions. The aim is to destabilise or 
dislodge the opposition revealing it to be a construct rather than anything 
necessary or inevitable. In so doing, other understandings are made possible. 
If each text is seen as presenting a major claim that attempts to dominate, 
erase, or distort various "other" claims (whose traces nevertheless remain 
detectable to a reader who goes against the grain of the dominant claim), 
then "reading" in its extended sense is deeply involved with questions of 
authority and power (Johnson, in Lentricchia and McLaughlin, 1995, 46). 
Just as reflective practice retains the right to question all knowledge claims, it 
surely follows, in the spirit of true reflexivity, that the knowledge claims attributed 
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to reflective practice must be analysed in the texts wherein such claims are 
constructed. 
4.2 Background to the methodology 
Deconstruction is part of the post-structuralist movement in philosophy and the 
social sciences which arose as a reaction to, and critique of, phenomenology with 
its privileging of the subject or consciousness as centre and source of knowledge 
and meaning. 	 Post-structuralism also critiqued structuralism, which had 
`decentred' the subject, and attributed meaning to systems as opposed to 
individuals (Sturrock, 2003). Systems are composed of elements. No single 
element in a system has meaning in and of itself, be it a word in a language system, 
an individual in an organisation, or an artefact within a culture (Sturrock, 1979). 
Meaning is a function of the relationship between elements that make up the 
system or structure. Stability is attributed to the structure (Sturrock, 2003), 
thereby presupposing the possibility of stable meaning. Post-structuralism 
challenges this presupposition. 
Structures for Derrida have no centre, because they are structures. It can 
make no sense to speak of the 'centre' of a language or of any other such 
system. These systems are in constant 'play'. Because this is a realization 
unpopular with many, who crave 'centres' and 'essences, it has been 
'neutralized' by a false centring of structures round a fixed point (Sturrock, 
2003, 132). 
There are varied approaches to text analysis within post-structuralism. As 
indicated in Chapter 3, reflective practice has been analysed using Foucauldian 
(Cotton, 2001; Gilbert, 2001; Nelson, 2012; Wellard & Bethune, 1996) and social 
constructionist methods (Taylor, 2003). While deconstruction shares with these 
approaches a general scepticism with respect to truth and knowledge, it does not 
dispense with these concepts. 
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...deconstruction in no way rejects or renounces the values of truth and 
falsehood, but "reinscribes" them - together with referential function of 
language - in a more complex differential "economy" which is there to be 
analysed in the texts of (among others) Marx and Engels. No doubt 
deconstruction entails a questioning of what Derrida calls "logocentrism", 
that is to say, the deep-laid metaphysical prejudice whereby the values of 
truth and reason are equated with a privileged epistemic access to thoughts 
"in the mind" of those presumed or authorised to know (Derrida, 2004b, xix) 
(Introduction second English edition, 2002). 
Structuralism made use of Saussure's theory of language as a framework for 
research in a wide range of disciplines, from psychoanalysis to anthropology. 
Deconstruction continued the interest in Saussure's theory of language and went 
further, identifying in it possibilities that Saussure himself had recognised but, 
perhaps unconsciously, suppressed. Since Saussure's theory of language is central 
to an understanding of deconstruction as a research methodology, it is necessary 
briefly to outline its main points. 
Saussure theorised that language is a system of signs. He referred to the sign 
system as 'langue' and the language event or instance of language use as 'parole'. 
The system is necessary for the event to occur, and the event in turn makes the 
system what it is. Saussure focused his attention on examining the system rather 
than the events of language use. The sign system is not a nomenclature; it does 
not name things: 'A linguistic sign is not a link between a thing and a name but 
between a concept and a sound pattern' (Bally et al., 1986, 66). A sign is therefore 
not unitary. It consists of a sensible or material aspect and an intelligible or 
conceptual aspect. The material aspect of the sign, that is, the sound pattern or 
graphic image, Saussure called the 'signifier' and the intelligible or conceptual 
aspect he called the 'signified'. Saussure also advanced the thesis of the 
arbitrariness of the sign, that is, that no natural connection or resemblance exists 
between the phonic or graphic pattern and the concept. There is nothing about the 
word 'cat', either written or spoken, that links it to a four legged furry domestic pet 
or a graceful fleet-footed panther. The word 'cat' signifies or conveys meaning 
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because it can be distinguished aurally and visually from the words 'bat', or 'cot'. 
Both signifiers and signifieds are arbitrary. The idea of a cat is distinguished in 'the 
mind's eye' from the idea of a dog or a baby. Meaning depends not on any thinking 
subject but on the sign system. 
No word has a value that can be identified independently of what else there is 
in its vicinity. 
... what we find, instead of ideas given in advance, are values emanating 
from a linguistic system. If we say that these values correspond to certain 
concepts, it must be understood that the concepts in question are purely 
differential. That is to say they are concepts defined not positively, in terms of 
their content, but negatively by contrast with other items in the same system. 
What characterises each most exactly is being whatever the others are not 
(Bally et al., 1986, 114-115) (Bally et al.'s emphases). 
The idea that there are no positive terms in language, that meaning is a function of 
difference, is very significant for deconstruction. No thing or entity exists in and of 
itself. 'No word can acquire meaning in the way in which philosophers from Aristotle 
to Bertrand Russell have hoped it might - by being the unmediated expression of 
something non-linguistic (e.g., an emotion, a sense-datum, a physical object, an idea, 
a Platonic form)' (Rorty, in Selden, 1995, 173). 
	 It is not possible, as 
phenomenology asserts, to return to 'the things themselves', that is, to things 
present to consciousness or 'intended' without the mediation of language. 'The 
thing itself is a sign' (Derrida, 1997, 49) (Derrida's emphasis). 
The sign is usually said to be put in the place of the thing itself the present 
thing, "thing" here standing equally for meaning or referent. The sign 
represents the present in its absence. It takes the place of the present. When 
we cannot grasp or show the thing, state the present, the being-present, when 
the present cannot be presented, we signify, we go through the detour of the 
sign. We take or give signs. We signal. The sign, in this sense, is deferred 
presence. Whether we are concerned with the verbal or the written sign, with 
the monetary sign, or with electoral delegation and political representation, 
the circulation of signs defers the moment in which we can encounter the 
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thing itself make it ours, consume or expend it, touch it, see it, intuit its 
presence (Derrida, 1982, 9). 
The identity of the sign is constituted by its difference from other signs. 'From the 
moment that there is meaning, there are nothing but signs. We think only in signs' 
(Derrida, 1997, 50) (Derrida's emphasis). But the sign itself is divided and takes its 
meaning from that which it is not. Derrida (1973, 129) coined the term ` differance' 
to illustrate how meaning is made possible in the language system. For Caputo 
(1997, 96), 'clifferance is what deconstruction is all about' (Caputo's emphasis). An 
elaboration of this term is therefore required for an understanding of 
deconstruction as a research methodology. 
4.3 Differance 
The French verb 'differer' combines two meanings: to differ and to defer. 
Differance combines the sense of difference as the state of being different from or 
other than, and also the sense of deferment or delay. It is, as Derrida notes, 'the 
condition for the possibility and functioning of every sign' (Derrida, 1982, 5). Signs 
only take their meaning from their differences from other signs. That difference 
(between two phonemes or graphemes) is not itself heard or seen. So the 
difference that makes meaning possible is nowhere ever 'punctually' present. 
Neither is it totally absent; otherwise there would be no meaning. Every sign 
contains the 'trace' of other signs, of what the sign is not, and that (the trace) is 
what makes the sign mean what it does. To mean, therefore, is not to be (present 
in the present). Meaning is different (not that) and deferred (not here, not now) 
(Caputo, 1997). Differance is neither a word nor a concept. It belongs neither to 
the realm of sensibility nor intelligibility. A word that conveys meaning is 
apprehended by the senses; it is either seen or heard. The word must also be 
distinguishable from other words in order to signify as it does. For example, a 
reader must be able to distinguish the letter 't' from the letter '1' and, similarly, the 
word 'tot' from the word 'lot' in order to grasp the meaning of a text which 
contains those signs. Similarly in speech, the sound `t' must be distinguished from 
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the sound 'd' and the word 'tot' distinguished from the word 'dot'. But the 
difference that allows such distinctions is not a third letter or word or sound. The 
difference is an interval or spacing between two letters or signs. Referring to 
speech, Glendinning (2001, 2-4) explains: 
4: The difference between two phonemes is not itself a sound - not some third 
sound, not an audible 'something'. 
5: Therefore the difference which establishes speech and lets it be heard is 
inaudible ('in every sense of the word'). 
6: But since meaningful speech is possible the difference between two 
phonemes must still be discriminable. 
7: Therefore one ought to reject the idea that such discrimination belongs to 
sensibility. 
According to this argument, what is discriminated when one hears an 
identifiable phoneme cannot be reduced to a sound which is simply present in 
the present. And that is because, as Derrida puts it...its 'identity can only 
determine or delimit itself through differential relations to other elements' 
Or again, as Saussure puts it, the basic elements of speech are not substantial 
positive terms or sound atoms, but only emerge out of or issue from, a system 
of phonic differences. (Glendinning's emphasis). 
Neither is the difference between two phonemes or two graphemes, and which 
permits meaning, present in the mind or to a consciousness. 
...this 'discrimination of differences' cannot belong to an 'order of 
intelligibility' either. We cannot conclude, as for example Descartes might 
have concluded, that the perception of phonemes entails that something is 
present not to the senses but is ('seen' or 'heard' by) the mind, or the mind's 
eye or ear (Glendinning, 2001, 4). 
Meaning is instituted or conventional; the speaker or author cannot choose what 
signs mean. Meaning therefore cannot arise in the mind of the thinking subject. It 
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is the language system rather than the mind that provides the concepts that make 
meaning possible (Stocker, 2006). 
Differance is the condition of possibility of meaning. A 'condition of possibility' is a 
necessary condition for the appearance of an entity to be possible. For example, 
space is a condition of possibility for the appearance of three dimensional objects. 
It does not cause the object to appear nor is it part of the appearing object's 
identity (Peters & Biesta, 2009). Meaning is not caused or made to appear because 
of an intention, that is, because of something present to the mind or to 
consciousness. Meaning or conceptuality may be described as an effect of the 
differential play of language, an effect without a cause, or both cause and effect 
(Peters & Biesta, 2009). Differance thus disrupts the notion of origin. Differance is 
prior to, in a nontemporal way, but cannot serve as, the source or origin of 
meaning because it is not itself a single point or a 'now' moment. While differance 
is the condition of possibility for the functioning of every sign, it is also the 
condition of impossibility of pure meaning, that is, a meaning identical with itself, 
fully present to itself. Every sign is inhabited or contaminated by a non-present 
element and that makes the idea of pure meaning impossible. Every sign bears 
within it the trace of what it is not. Differance, therefore, prevents conceptual 
closure (Norris, 2002). 
The role of difference/differance is to establish the conditions within which 
discourse functions. It founds (and un-founds, undermines) languages, 
vocabularies, showing how they are both possible and impossible, that is, 
incapable of a closure which would give them self-sufficiency and a feeling of 
success in nailing things down (Caputo, in Silverman, 1989, 28). (Caputo's 
emphasis). 
The sound that first signified 'food', for example, had to be distinguished from 
other sounds around it, so that when the sound signifying food was heard, it bore 
the trace of those other sounds which it was not. There is nothing intrinsic to the 
sound itself that makes it mean food. 'differences of sound and sense are the only 
markers of meaning' (Norris, 2002, 24). 
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Difference (radicalised by Derrida's neologism differance to bring out both 
spatial and temporal resonances, identity being an effect of differences from 
other elements and between events of repetition) is the milieu in which 
identities are sketched but never quite achieved (any element being defined 
only in terms of all the others and all its repetitions, the trace of which 
remains as a sort of constitutive contamination), but never quite lost 
(differance can be thought of as a dispersion, but never an absolute 
dispersion). Identities depend on traces of other identities: but the trace 
'itself, now the logically prior term, is not answerable to any metaphysical 
characterisation (it is, for example, neither present nor absent, and, as the 
condition of identity in general, is not itself identifiable) (Bennington, 2000, 
12). (Bennington's emphases). 
Bennington's reference to 'events of repetition' in the above citation signals the 
importance of context in the construction of meaning. Meaning is context bound, 
for example, the word 'food' will signify in different ways depending on the context 
in which the sign is deployed. 'Food for thought' will have a different meaning to 
food harvested in a tillage field and to food itemised on a shopping list. Reference 
to a 'tot' may signify a small child or a tot of whiskey or the addition of a set of 
numbers as in `to tot up the bill'. A 'lot' may signify quantity or items in an auction 
sale, or it may denote a biblical reference such as in the reference 'They drew lots 
for his clothes'. When a signifier with many different significations is used, one 
looks to context to determine its meaning. Whenever any sign is used, it is used in 
a context. There is no 'outside' context (Derrida, 2004b). Meaning is therefore 
context-dependent. At the same time, no context can ever be determined so 
completely that it arrests the 'play' of the signifier (Derrida, 1977). Using the word 
`food for thought' may signify food that enhances cognitive capacity, memory, and 
so on, rather than signifying something to think about. 
Language cannot be understood solely in terms of the transfer of a signified or 
semantic content without a consideration of the vehicle of transfer. `...the threat 
posed by writing is that the operations of what should be merely a means of 
expression might affect or infect the meaning it is supposed to represent' (Culler, 
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2008, 91). The same threat is also attributable to speech. Meaning that cannot be 
fixed, that is never anywhere punctually present is intolerable especially when 
clarity of concepts and perspicuity is required. Stocker (2006, 185) asserts: 
...if there is no totality with a centre to determine interpretation and meaning, 
then interpretation and meaning emerge from the equivocations and 
contextuality of signs within discourse. Discourse itself does not reflect a 
world of fixity and determinism; it emerges from the 'playful' equivocation 
and contextuality of the sign. Again this means that we are faced with 
madness, anxiety and unintelligibility. There is no way in which we can fix 
meanings absolutely, or find completely stable structures to contextualise 
them in a deterministic manner. 
The response to this anxiety has been to create a system of thought that attempts 
to nail things down. What cannot be logically determined as clear and precise will 
be rendered so by force. The construction of hierarchized oppositions is a way of 
achieving stability of concepts. Terms are arranged in binary oppositions with the 
first term of the opposition privileged as the normal, the standard, while its 
opposite is regarded as derivative, parasitic, a corruption. Binary oppositions rely 
on the principle of non-contradiction whereby something cannot be both A and not 
A at the same time. Johnson (1987, 14) claims that what is most radical in 
deconstruction is that it questions the basic logic of binary oppositions, and not in 
a simple way: 'While traditionalists say that a thing cannot be both A and not-A, 
deconstructors open up ways in which A is necessarily but unpredictably already 
different from A'. It is the repression of differences within, for example, a word or 
an individual, that creates unity and identity, and this allows binary oppositions to 
function (Johnson, 1994). A deconstructive reading will be alert to how reflective 
practice as a model of professional knowledge differs from itself in the texts that 
attempt to construct its identity. 
(Certain) theoretical constructs do not fit easily into the categories of 
conventional logic, which requires clear unambiguous definitions, consistency 
of argument and a commonsensical view of time and space, cause and effect 
(Britton, in Selden, 1995, 198). 
102 
4.4 Binary oppositions 
In an attempt to fix meaning, the tradition of Western thought has established 
binary oppositions. 
	 Examples of such oppositions include: nature/culture, 
good/evil, presence/absence, mind/body, male/female, true/false, original/copy, 
literal/metaphorical, theory/practice, ideal/empirical, essential/contingent, 
speech/writing. The first term is given priority both temporally and qualitatively 
(Derrida, 2004a, Translator's introduction). Plato's ideal world, for example, is the 
world of 'forms': timeless and immutable, present to the mind but not perceptible 
to the senses. The empirical, contingent world, the sensible world, on the other 
hand, represents a corruption of that ideal. An original painting, to take another 
example, is considered superior to a copy of the same painting. Derrida describes 
these oppositions as violent hierarchies (Derrida, 1997). The reason for the 
violence is that the second term threatens the purity and self-identical meaning of 
the first term. It must therefore be suppressed or excluded by force. What 
deconstruction demonstrates is that the so-called derivative term is a positive 
condition of possibility of the privileged term. For example, could Plato's ideal 
world be imagined were it not for the existence of the empirical world? Is the ideal 
world not a modification or abstraction of the empirical world? (Derrida, 1973, 
Translator's introduction). If an original painting could not be copied, how would 
its originality be determined? It is by way of a copy that original features may be 
identified (Culler, 2008). At the same time, the possibility of copying threatens the 
purity of the original. A copy may be mistaken for an original, and occupy the place 
of the original. Doubts may be expressed about the identity of the copy. It may not 
be possible to establish definitively that the copy is not, in fact, the original. It may 
be an `undecidable'. Whether there is any such thing as an 'original' painting is also 
questionable as artists are influenced by other artists, trained in certain 
techniques, and so on. Culler (2008, 88) claims that deconstruction destabilizes 
hierarchical oppositions `by producing an exchange of properties'. Two opposing 
forces playing against each other constitute the so-called identity of a phenomenon 
(Derrida, 1997). 
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The opposition presence/absence is particularly significant in deconstruction. 
Meaning as present in the mind, the subject present to her/his thought, the 
presence of the present moment, are all examples of what Derrida (1997, 49) 
terms 'the metaphysics of presence'. Presence is posited as the ultimate foundation 
and origin of meaning because there is nothing that divides it, no prior thing from 
which it could be constituted. To mean is to be, to exist in the 'now' moment. 
Bennington & Derrida (1993, 16-18) offer the following comment on the 
metaphysics of presence: 
The metaphysics of presence thinks in two (logical and often historical) 
moments: presence first, of the world to a gaze, of a consciousness to its own 
inspection, of a meaning to a mind, of life to itself of a breast to a mouth; 
absence next - the world veiled, consciousness astray, non-sense, death, 
debauchery, language, weaning. By thinking the second moment as derived 
with respect to the first, one returns, if only in thought, the complex to the 
simple, the secondary to the primary, the contingent to the necessary. This is 
the very order of reason and meaning, of the logos...(Bennington & Derrida's 
emphasis). 
However, as the discussion of differance illustrates, the present is constituted by 
that which it tries to exclude, that is, absence. When one refers to the present 
moment, it is already past. Without the concepts of past and future, it is difficult to 
imagine how the present moment could be constituted. It is not possible to 
recover the simple, the primary moment as that moment is already divided. The 
present is always and already inhabited by absence. While it does not appear as 
such, the trace of the non-present remains detectable. The system of hierarchized 
oppositions strives to suppress this difference 'within'. Referring to philosophical 
concepts, Gasche (1986, 128-129) contends: 
They exist precisely on a disregard for their own bipolar opposite, to which 
they deny a value similar to their own. Philosophical concepts would be 
entirely homogeneous if they possessed a nucleus of meaning that they owed 
exclusively to themselves - if they were, in other words, conceptual atoms. Yet 
since concepts are produced within a discursive network of differences, they 
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not only are what they are by virtue of other concepts, but they also, in a 
fundamental way inscribe that Otherness within themselves... 
No concept... can be thought rigorously without including the trace of its 
difference from its Other within itself 
A deconstructive analysis is alert to what is excluded or suppressed within the 
concept of interest to the researcher. 
	 Reflective practice, as a model of 
professional knowledge, is sometimes posited as the binary opposite of the model 
of technical rationality, with the latter occupying the dominant position. At other 
times, reflective practice is asserted as the normal or standard model of nursing 
knowledge, with technical rationality 'cast out', as it were. These oppositions will 
be examined in more detail in the texts analysed in later chapters. 
4.5. Deconstruction's other conceptual resources 
Differance and binary oppositions are described by Stocker (2006) as the 
conceptual resources of deconstructive practice. Other terms, such as 'iterability', 
`undecidable', 'supplement', and so on, function in the same way. Commenting on 
these so-called —key"' terms in Derrida's writing, Johnson (in Derrida, 2004, 
xvii)(Translator's introduction) argues that such terms must not be used as a 
'static lexicon' but rather, as in Derrida's text, 'as a moving chain or network, it (the 
text) constantly frustrates the desire to "get to the point-. 
As indicated above, deconstruction is sensitive to the contexts in which signs are 
used. No sign can function outside a context and yet no context can ever fully 
determine the meaning of any sign (Derrida, 1977). Although the same sign may 
be used, the meaning it conveys may be different depending on the context in 
which it is used. The term 'iterability' designates this sense of repetition 
(sameness) and alterity (otherness) (Derrida, 1977, 7), and this feature of 
language has significance for a deconstructive analysis. In order for a sign to 
function and convey meaning, it must be repeatable and reproducible. This is 
because of the arbitrary and conventional nature of the sign system. The system 
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exists and functions by virtue of agreement among a particular community of 
language users. Any sign must be recognisable as the same sign despite variations 
in speech and writing among individuals. 
A sign is never an event, if by event we mean an irreplaceable and irreversible 
empirical particular. A sign which would take place but "once" would not be a 
sign; a purely idiomatic sign would not be a sign. A signifier (in general) must 
be formally recognisable in spite of and through, the diversity of empirical 
characteristics which may modify it. It must remain the same, and be able to 
be repeated as such, despite and across the deformations which the empirical 
event necessarily makes it undergo. A phoneme or grapheme is necessarily 
always to some extent different each time that it is presented in an operation 
or a perception. But, it can function as a sign, and in general as language, 
only if a formal identity enables it to be issued again and to be recognized 
(Derrida, 1973, 50) (Derrida's emphasis). 
This feature of language, to be recognised as the same despite variation, also 
enables a sign or sequence of signs to be detached from any particular instance of 
use and cited in other contexts. The sign does not require a particular signifying 
intention or consciousness to animate it. It will function and convey meaning even 
if the person using the sign or sign sequence has 'nothing in mind' at the time of 
the utterance. To say, for example, 'Happy Birthday' to someone whose birthday it 
is does not guarantee that the speaker really means or has in mind a wish for 
happiness for the person on their birthday. 'Happy Birthday' means because it 
repeats, and is recognised as, a conventional form of words. The speaker may, in 
fact, have quite the opposite in mind at the time of the utterance. Because the sign 
can function independently of any signifying intention, because language has what 
Derrida calls 'this structural unconsciousness' (Derrida, 1977, 18), it can be cited in 
new and different contexts and still signify or convey meaning. 
Every sign, linguistic or nonlinguistic, spoken or written (in the current sense 
of this opposition), in a small or large unit, can be cited, put between 
quotation marks; in so doing it can break with every given context, 
engendering an infinity of new contexts in a manner which is absolutely 
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illimitable. This does not imply that the mark is valid outside of a context, but 
on the contrary that there are only contexts without any center or absolute 
anchoring (Derrida, 1977, 12) (Derrida's emphasis). 
This thesis is a series of citations. The citations signify differently in the context of 
this work than they do in the texts from which they were obtained. The academic 
conventions surrounding citations may be understood as an attempt to tie 
meaning to a source or origin and ensure that words are used in their correct 
sense, as their author intended. Copyright law has a similar goal (Derrida, 1977). 
The current debate concerning the writings of Shakespeare is an illustration of the 
influence of contextual factors on meaning. Would the meaning of the works 
attributed to the author William Shakespeare be the same if it could be established 
that he was not in fact the author? However, the attempt to fix context does not 
guarantee univocal meaning. While context is necessary for signs to function, no 
context can ever determine the meaning of a sign unequivocally. It is always 
possible for new contextual features to be identified which would allow for other 
possibilities of meaning. For example, the word `reflection' will have a different 
meaning when used in a physics classroom to the meaning it will have in the 
context of a spiritual retreat. Its meaning will be different still in the context of a 
fairy tale, such as in, for example, `Snow White'. SchOn (1983) identified at least 
two different meanings of the word `practice'. It may signify an occupation, such as 
nursing or medical practice. It may also refer to the process of developing a new 
skill, such as when one practices a musical instrument or a golf swing, with the aim 
of improving one's performance. The word may also signify a habit or custom, for 
example, `He has a practice of getting up early in the morning'. At the same time, 
the use of a word in a particular context does not exhaust its meaning. The physics 
teacher may be preparing for an assessment before a group of peers. The musical 
instrument may be being practiced by an actor for a film role. Iterability denies the 
sign univocal meaning. 'The' meaning of the word `reflection' or the word `practice' 
would necessarily have to include all of the above possibilities (Glendinning, 
2001). It would also have to include the meanings attributed to these terms 
throughout the history of their use. 
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But the sign possesses the characteristic of being readable even if the moment 
of its production is irrevocably lost and even if I do not know what its alleged 
author-scriptor consciously intended to say at the moment he wrote it, i.e. 
abandoned it to its essential drift...by virtue of its essential iterability, a 
written syntagma can always be detached from the chain in which it is 
inserted or given without causing it to lose all possibility of functioning, if not 
all possibility of "communicating", precisely (Derrida, 1977, 9). 
The essential instability and autonomy of language, and the dissemination of 
meaning that such characteristics enable, ensures that an author can never be fully 
in control of the language that they use. Nor can an author control how texts that 
bear their name will be interpreted. 'Language can fulfil the condition of self-
present meaning only if it offers a total and immediate access to the thoughts that 
occasioned its utterance. But this is an impossible requirement' (Norris, 2002, 45). 
(Norris's emphasis). It is not necessary, Derrida (1973) argues, for example, that 
one perceives in order to understand a statement about perception, just as: 
...the signifying function of the 1 does not depend on the life of the speaking 
subject. Whether or not perception accompanies the statement about 
perception, whether or not life as self-presence accompanies the uttering of 
the I, is quite indifferent with regard to the functioning of meaning (Derrida, 
1973, 96) (Derrida's emphases). 
Another term that forms part of the lexicon of deconstruction is `undecidable'. 
This refers to a word whose meaning is suspended between both poles of a binary 
opposition. A deconstructive analysis will be alert to terms that function in this 
way. The word 'reflective practice' may be used to signify in more than one way in 
the texts analysed. This may be an indication of the instability of the concept. 
Just as the meaning of a sign can vary in different contexts, the same sign can 
signify in more than one way in a so- called unified text or work. Derrida (1997, 
270) uses the terms 'supplement' to designate this characteristic of the sign. The 
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word supplement has two meanings in French: it can mean to 'add' and to 'replace'. 
In a text by Rousseau which Derrida (1997) deconstructs, the word supplement is 
used in the context of education, among other things. According to Rousseau's text, 
education is required to supplement nature. At the same time, Rousseau asserts 
that nature is complete and culture is a corruption of nature. Education is a 
cultural construct. So education is something that both improves and corrupts 
nature. It has therefore the status of an undecidable. If an entity is already 
complete, why does it require an addition? And if something is already complete, 
how is a deficiency recognised? Similarly, writing is considered by Plato as both a 
remedy and a poison for memory (Derrida, 2004a). It is a remedy because it 
makes up for the deficiencies of memory. But writing also makes memory less 
effective. It is both remedy and poison and makes both possible. Johnson (1980, 
8) remarks of undecidables: 'Undecidables set to work within a text that can no 
longer be included within binary oppositions, resisting and disorganising it without 
every constituting a third term'. 
The above terms - supplement, iterability, and so on, resist any settled or 
definitive meaning (Norris, 2002). The deconstructed or deconstructing text 
`...mimes the movement of desire rather than its fulfilment, refusing to stop and 
totalise itself (Johnson, 1980, 11 ). The researcher cannot therefore treat these 
resources as tools or techniques to be applied in a deconstructive analysis. Rather 
they help to orient the researcher towards a deconstructive way of thinking and 
understanding. It is impossible to indicate in advance of a deconstructive reading 
how the various conceptual resources described above will be used or indeed 
where in the text the openings that enable a reading otherwise occur. However, it 
is possible to provide some detail of deconstructive reading strategies which guide 
the reader engaging in analysis. 
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4.6 Strategies of deconstructive reading 
The "strategy" of deconstruction may be summarised as a slow, patient, close, fine-
grained reading of already existing texts. Caputo (in Silverman, 1989, 30) reminds 
the reader that: 
...deconstruction is a parasitic practice. For deconstruction can make a living 
only inasmuch as there is already someone who wants to say something about 
something to someone. Deconstruction requires a prior hermeneutics, the 
anterior work of addressing one another about the matter at hand. 
Deconstruction lies in wait for 'discourse' to stake its claims and then it 
pounces on it, showing how much trouble this discourse has bought for itself 
by its boldness. Were no one bold enough to launch the hermeneutic project, 
were no one willing to make such claims in the first place, then deconstruction 
would never get off the ground. This is another way of saying that 
deconstruction itself has nothing to say, or better that there is no 
deconstruction 'itself, that it is a parasitic practice, not a substantive position. 
In classical terms, the Being of deconstruction always exists in alio, by 
inhabiting the discourse of others, never in se, as something present in itself 
as some form of ousia. 
In short, deconstruction is first of all a practice - it is what is does - not a body 
of theories, and secondly a parasitic practice - what it does is to inhabit the 
discourse of those who have something to say... 
It is claimed that deconstruction is 'always and already' at work in texts; all texts 
are potentially self-deconstructing. The reader therefore brings nothing new to a 
deconstructive reading. Deconstruction is 'not characterised by any exteriority to 
its object' (Gasche, 1986, 121). It is not something that the researcher does to the 
text (Bennington, 2000). Everything that is needed for a reading otherwise is 
contained in the text precisely as the material signs appear to the reader. Derrida 
(1997, 141) states: ` it (deconstruction) "is" only what it does and what is done with 
it, there where it takes place'. A deconstructive reading is not a search for a unified 
meaning or an attempt to discern what the author of a text might have wished to 
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convey: 'deconstruction does not elucidate texts in the traditional sense of 
attempting to grasp a unifying content or theme' (Culler, 2008, 109). A 
deconstructive reading has been described as a reading `otherwise'. Bennington 
(2000, 11) remarks of texts that they: 
...already tend to read themselves, to offer up a preferred or 'official' reading 
(often the one assumed by subsequent readers to coincide with the author's 
intention): so Plato, Rousseau, Husserl, Saussure and many others 
(demonstrably) declare their preference for speech over writing; but they 
also manage (demonstrably) to say the very opposite too. Derrida's work 
consists essentially in bringing out the textual resources that question the 
'official' version. These resources are demonstrably put forward, however 
discreetly, by the texts being read, and are not imported...(Bennington's 
emphases). 
The textual resources used to construct an argument are noted and their signifying 
function analysed. Deconstruction holds that language as logic or logos is an 
impossible ideal. Language as rhetoric, therefore, becomes the focus of attention. 
The rhetorical structure and strategies of a text are examined: how an argument is 
constructed; how a reader is persuaded to a particular point of view. The words 
used, their sedimented meanings, where words are positioned in a sentence, 
figures of speech, linguistic redundancies, and so on, are examples of the resources 
that may be deployed in the construction of a text. Tropes or figures of speech, 
such as metaphor, metonymy, personification, simile, and so on, are of particular 
interest in a deconstructive reading. These linguistic resources bring out 
possibilities of meaning which pre-exist the text in language (McLaughlin, in 
Lentricchia & McLaughlin, 1995). Metaphorical meaning is often contrasted to 
literal meaning. Metaphorical language is associated with the literary genre 
whereas literal language tends to be associated with scientific and other more so-
called `serious' discourses. 
It is not difficult to see why a tradition ordered around the value of presence 
would be wary of metaphor, which speaks obliquely, exploits lateral 
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connotations, insinuates things without really saying them, suggests ideas 
without making them explicit (Bennington and Derrida, 1993, 119). 
Metaphorical language is accepted as part of literary texts where it may be 
considered as ornamentation which obscures meaning and makes several different 
readings possible. In non-literary texts, however,: 
...the literary qualities of style, tone and rhetoric tend to be regarded at best 
as decoration, at worst as encumbrances befuddling the purity of thought. 
Deconstruction, by contrast, insists that the meaning of these texts cannot be 
abstracted from the rhetorical ploys by which they both elicit and frustrate 
the wish for meaning (Ellmann, in Boyle, 2000, 213). 
Drawing attention to the presence and function of metaphor in non-literary texts 
generates complexity in terms of meaning. Already, in identifying a text as 
belonging to a particular genre, an expectation is created of how a text is to be read 
and understood. A reader is oriented toward a particular understanding, for 
instance, whether there will be a straightforward one-to-one connection between 
signifier and signified or whether meaning will be more ambiguous, more open to 
the reader's interpretation. It could be argued that all language, as an arbitrary 
and conventional sign system, is metaphorical. The signifier stands in place of the 
signified concept or the referent to which it has no natural relationship, just as 
metaphor involves 'the perception of a similarity between two otherwise strikingly 
distinct semantic attributes, such that the sense of distance is preserved in the act of 
imaginatively leaping across it' (Norris, 2002, 100-101). Indeed, a signifier is 
sometimes all there is; a signifier without a signified concept or a referent but not 
without meaning in some context, as Derrida demonstrates with his example of 
`agrammaticality' (Derrida, 1977, 12) in his book 'Limited Inc'. An argument 
presented in what appears to be the most lucid and straightforward language may 
strain to suppress metaphorical possibilities. 'The use of metaphor in theoretical 
texts may work to subvert the premises on which the text relies' (Culler, 2008, 23). 
At other times, metaphor may be used quite consciously and deliberately as a 
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detour from, or to, literal meaning, and it is in that space between literal and 
metaphorical that other possibilities of meaning may be disclosed. Norris (2002, 
100) claims that metaphor and metonymy are 'the two most pervasive and powerful 
devices of rhetorical language'. Metonymy substitutes part for whole, using a 
particular attribute of an entity to signify the entire entity, for example, `the top 
floor' or 'head office' standing for management in an organisation. 
The resources of a text that are used to construct an argument are also those that 
may be used to subvert what might be described as the official, orthodox or 
standard reading of the text in question. Using the text's resources in this way is 
`the very condition of finding a foothold in the discourse to be deconstructed' 
(Gasche, 1986, 168). A deconstructive reading attempts to demonstrate how a text 
achieves its effects. At the same time, it also demonstrates how the textual 
resources used to advance a claim or assert a position may also be used to 
undermine the argument being presented (Culler, 2008). A first reading aims at 
getting a sense of what a text is about, carefully following the text's logic. The 
reader is alert to those places in a text where a counter logic may be identified. 
Derrida uses the word 'aporia' to signify this sense of a text's difference from itself. 
Aporia literally means 'without passage'. In the context of deconstruction, an 
aporia refers to '...a seemingly insoluble logical difficulty' (Derrida, 2001, xviii, 
Translator's Introduction). An aporia is not an error that might have been avoided. 
When any claim is made or any authoritative position asserted, a writer draws on 
the system of binary logic and the inherited conceptual oppositions that 
characterise Western thought. 
Every totality... can be totally shaken, that is, can be shown to be founded on 
that which it excludes, that which would be in excess for a reductive analysis 
of any kind... 
This excess is often posed as an aporia, the Greek word for a seemingly 
insoluble logical difficulty: once a system has been "shaken" by following its 
totalising logic to its final consequences, one finds an excess which cannot be 
construed within the rules of logic, for the excess can only be conceived as 
neither this nor that, or both at the same time - a departure from all rules of 
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logic (Derrida, 2001, xviii, Translator's Introduction) (Translator's 
emphases). 
The same word used to signify in more than one way in a text that purports to 
present a unified meaning may signal the emergence of a counter logic, like, for 
example, the word 'supplement' in Rousseau. A reader is attentive to so-called 
'blind spots' in an argument where the text produces effects that undermine its 
manifest sense (Norris, 2002). Things may be going on in a text behind the 
author's back, so to speak (Caputo, 1997). The text may unconsciously present 
what the author appears expressly to wish to deny (Norris, 2002). An underlying 
incompatibility may be discerned between what an author asserts and what the 
text reveals. 
...the writer writes in a language and in a logic whose proper system, laws, 
and life his discourse by definition cannot dominate absolutely. He uses them 
only by letting himself after a fashion and up to a point, be governed by the 
system. And the reading must always aim at a certain relationship, 
unperceived by the writer, between what he commands and what he does not 
command of the patterns of the language that he uses. This relationship is not 
a certain quantitative distribution of shadow and light, of weakness or of 
force, but a signifying structure that critical reading should produce 
(Derrida, 1997, 158) (Derrida's emphases). 
It is not simply isolated incidences of paradox or ambiguity that are of interest in a 
deconstructive reading; rather it is the entire logic and coherence of a text. All 
texts consist of multiple layers, 'an ensemble' of theses, themes and claims which 
correspond to a dominant reproductive reading (Caputo, 1997, 83). 
Deconstruction is an attempt to unfold the various layers that make up a text's 
argumentation, to 'disentangle what has been conflated' (Howells, 1998, 2). It 
consists in 'the careful teasing out of warring forces of signification within the text 
itself (Derrida, 2004a, xv, Translator's introduction) (Translator's emphasis). The 
discrepancies, tensions, contradictions, inconsistencies, repetitions, digressions, 
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and discontinuities that inevitably inhabit a discourse are brought into view in a 
deconstructive reading (Gasche, 1986). . 
If in the process of deciphering a text in the traditional way, we come across a 
word that seems to harbour an unresolvable contradiction, and by virtue of 
being one word is made sometimes to work in one way and sometimes in 
another, and thus is made to point away from the absence of a unified 
meaning, we shall catch at that word. If a metaphor seems to suppress its 
implications, we shall catch at that metaphor. We shall follow its adventures 
through the text and see the text coming undone as a structure of 
concealment, revealing its self-transgression, its undecidability. It must be 
emphasised that I am not speaking simply of locating a moment of ambiguity 
or irony ultimately incorporated into the text's system of unified meaning but 
rather a moment that genuinely threatens to collapse that system (Derrida, 
1997, lxxv, Translator's Preface) (Translator's emphasis). 
Sometimes it is the small details in a text that may be very revealing in terms of 
striving for univocal meaning, for example, what has been put between brackets, 
what seems to have been passed over or waved aside quite casually, the blanks, the 
spacing, the marginalia (Caputo, 1997). It is often by way of such seemingly 
insignificant and frequently overlooked details that anything that runs counter to 
an orthodox interpretation of a text may be identified. The metaphysical tendency 
of language may be exposed ` by fixing on accidental features of the text to subvert its 
essential message and by playing off its rhetorical elements against its grammatical 
structure' (Peters & Biesta, 2009, 44). A deconstructive reading of theoretical texts 
often demonstrates the return in a disguised form of a procedure that the work 
claimed to criticise in others. In this way a text 'differs' from itself, and 
deconstruction is attentive to such practices. 
Whatever themes, arguments, or patterns are cited in defining the identity of 
a particular work, there will be ways in which it differs from the self so 
defined, systematically or obliquely putting in question the decisions at work 
in that definition (Culler, 2008, 214). 
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The fissures and fault lines that prevent conceptual closure are not sited in a text 
simply waiting to be discovered. Rather, they are 'produced ' by a deconstructive 
reading (Derrida, 1997). Two well-known examples of deconstruction will now be 
presented in order to provide an appreciation of the processes involved. The 
methodological approach developed and used to analyse selected texts in this 
study will then be outlined. . 
4.7 Speech/Writing 
Derrida's famous deconstruction of the speech/writing opposition provides an 
illustration of the approach and also the wider implications of deconstructive 
reading. Derrida, in his reading of the history of occidental philosophy, recognised 
the persistent privileging of speech over writing. Socrates used speech and oral 
dialogue to teach and promote secure foundations for knowledge. The ancient 
Greeks refused the gift of writing from the Egyptians. Rousseau regarded speech 
as natural and the use of speech as the correct approach to governing. He 
considered writing a corruption of natural presence. Husserl attempted to 'reduce' 
the sign, that is, to put it out of play, in his analysis of the structures of 
consciousness. Saussure described writing as a distortion of speech. Derrida 
recognised in each of these examples, where speech is opposed to writing in a 
violent hierarchy, 'the metaphysics of presence'. Speech is privileged because it 
appears closest to thought. The speaker is present to their thoughts and to the 
listener. If any misunderstanding arises, it may be corrected at once. The speaker 
is in control of the meaning of the message. The pervasiveness of this conception 
of language and meaning is identifiable in many practices and domains of activity 
to the present day. For example, in courts of law, oral evidence is required despite 
a book of evidence having been assembled. Oral examinations are considered 
necessary in some domains of learning in addition to written work. Reference to 
the contents of a book or letter is signalled frequently in terms of speech, as in, 'the 
book says...' or `the letter says...'. When information is exchanged in writing, it is 
often formulated as spoken language, for example, when responding to a missive, 
one writes: 'I was sorry to hear that you were ill'. Sturrock (2003, 129) remarks: 
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'...how often do we not read (or do I mean 'hear'?) of a writer writing for a particular 
'audience', instead of a readership...' It is as if only in speech is true meaning 
revealed: '...the voice is 'naturally' privileged over writing as the place where, to use 
the terminology of Saussure, the signifier seems most transparent or subservient to 
its signified, which it exists only to relay' (Bennington, 2000, 9). The primacy of 
concept over language, signified over signifier, is reflected in the privileging of 
speech. In speech, the signifier disappears as soon as it delivers up its meaning. 
Voice becomes a metaphor of truth and authenticity, a source of self-present 
'living' speech as opposed to the secondary lifeless emanations of writing. In 
speaking one is able to experience (supposedly) an intimate link between 
sound and sense, an inward and immediate realisation of meaning which 
yields itself up without reserve to perfect, transparent understanding. 
Writing, on the contrary, destroys this ideal of pure self-presence. It obtrudes 
an alien; depersonalized medium, a deceiving shadow which falls between 
intent and meaning, between utterance and understanding. It occupies a 
promiscuous public realm where authority is sacrificed to the vagaries and 
whims of textual 'dissemination'. Writing, in short, is a threat to the deeply 
traditional view that associates truth with self-presence and the 'natural' 
language wherein it finds expression (Norris, 2002, 28). (Norris's emphasis). 
Writing is condemned because it can function in the absence of a speaker or an 
author. Writing functions across space and time. It is distanced from its origin. No 
'voice' is required to animate the written sign. The danger of writing and the 
reason why it must be suppressed is that meaning is independent of any so-called 
source or origin. 'Writing is the endless displacement of meaning which both 
governs language and places it for ever beyond the reach of a stable, self-
authenticating knowledge' (Norris, 2002, 28). And, as Derrida demonstrates, 
writing cannot be merely a representation of speech, the so-called 'sign of a sign'. 
There are many features of writing such as spacing, punctuation, and so on, that 
are not part of speech. Spoken signs are subject to the same vagaries of meaning 
as written signs. At the moment of utterance, the presence of the speaker is not 
required in the sense of a signified content present in the mind. Derrida points to 
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the paradoxes inherent in the texts that privilege speech over writing, one of those 
being that the condemnation of writing is made in writing. Johnson (in Lentricchia 
and McLaughlin, 1995, 39) identifies the paradox of writing about writing which 
she describes as 'an attempt to comprehend that which it is comprehended by'. 
Rousseau identifies writing as the medium that allows him to express himself as he 
truly is, something he is unable to do in the company of others. 'Truth' for him 
requires that he be absent. Saussure uses the example of writing, which he 
denigrates as the corruption of speech, to demonstrate his theory of the sign. 
Derrida recognises that what is repressed along with writing in its common or 
restricted sense of graphic notation on a page is the idea of language as a signifying 
system which exceeds all bounds of individual presence and speech. 
Privileging speech by treating writing as a parasitic and imperfect 
representation of it is a way of setting aside certain features of language or 
aspects of its functioning. If distance, absence, misunderstanding, insincerity, 
and ambiguity are features of writing, then by distinguishing writing from 
speech one can construct a model of communication that takes as its norm an 
ideal associated with speech - where the words bear a meaning and the 
listener can in principle grasp precisely what the speaker has in mind (Culler, 
2008, 100-101). 
Derrida (1997, 56) gives the name 'arche-writing' to designate what precedes both 
speech and writing, in its narrow sense. In using this term, he is not arguing that 
writing should displace speech as the privileged term but that what is criticised in 
writing is also part of the structure of speech. Therefore, privileging speech is the 
outcome of an "...'ethico-theoretical decision'..." (Bennington, 2000, 8), rather than 
founded on any logical analysis of speech and writing. 
4.8 Serious/Non serious 
Derrida's deconstruction of Austin's speech act theory focused on the distinction 
Austin drew between serious speech acts and those same speech acts effectuated 
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in a non-serious context. Speech acts are those statements whereby something is 
accomplished by the utterance. Austin used the word `performatives' to designate 
such statements and included among his examples the conventions used to name a 
ship, open a meeting, make a bet or a promise, and perform a marriage ceremony. 
`It (the performative) does not describe something that exists outside of language 
and prior to it. It produces or transforms a situation; it effects' (Derrida, 1977, 13). 
In this way, the performative statement seems free from notions such as true or 
false. 'The performative is a "communication" which is not limited strictly to the 
transference of a semantic content that is already constituted and dominated by an 
orientation towards truth' (Derrida, 1977, 13-14). However, Derrida identifies, in 
Austin's analysis of speech acts, a return of the true/false opposition. Austin 
acknowledges that all acts of a ritual or conventional type can occur in a wide 
variety of circumstances and that some circumstances may result in the 'failure' of 
the performative. I may promise to do something for someone and use the 
appropriate form of words but I may not keep my promise. A bride may say 'I do' 
but she may, at that moment, be already married to someone else (Culler, 2008). 
Rather than acknowledge that failure or 'infelicity' is always a possibility and 
therefore a necessary or structural possibility of every speech act, and must be 
accounted for in a theory of speech acts (Derrida, 1977), Austin seeks to exclude 
such infelicities as accidental features. He attempts to fix the conditions or context 
of the performative in a way that allows for '...no "dissemination" escaping the 
horizon of the unity of meaning' (Derrida, 1977, 14). For example, in the case of a 
marriage, Austin lists the circumstances or conditions that must pertain in order 
for the speech act to be successfully accomplished, namely, it must be conducted 
by an authorised person in an authorised location; the couple marrying must be 
free and consenting adult individuals, and so on. Austin also excludes from his 
analysis of speech acts performatives not done in so-called `ordinary' 
circumstances. A bet that is made as a joke or a marriage ceremony that occurs as 
part of a rehearsal are examples of such exclusions as they do not occur in normal 
circumstances. The serious speech act, where the speaker intends the utterance, is 
posited as the normal, and the non serious - jokes, citations, and so on - is labelled 
as parasitic on the normal by Austin. 
	 Derrida challenges this distinction 
demonstrating that speech acts, because they adhere to a form of words that is 
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conventional and iterable (that is, as explained above, detachable from a particular 
context of use and cited in another context), are all examples of a general 
`citationality' (Derrida, 1977, 18). The serious speech act is but one citation among 
many others. If this were not the case, it would be difficult to imagine how a 
marriage ceremony that occurred in the context of a novel, for example, would be 
recognised as such. Derrida (1977, 18) poses the following question: 
Could a performative utterance succeed if its formulation did not repeat a 
"coded" or iterable utterance, or in other words, if the formula I pronounce in 
order to open a meeting, launch a ship or a marriage were not identifiable as 
conforming with an iterable model, if it were not then identifiable in some 
way as a "citation"? (Derrida's emphasis). 
Derrida is not arguing that serious speech acts are not possible. He acknowledges 
that meetings are opened, ships are named, and people marry in ordinary 
circumstances all the time (Derrida, 1977). However, what he does contest is the 
positing of such occurrences as the norm or standard without which their 
repetition in other (non serious) contexts would be impossible. In other words, if 
there were not meetings called to order, ships named, and marriages conducted in 
`real life', they could not occur in novels or as jokes (Culler, 2008). 
...it is assumed without question that meaning is logically prior, and 
ontologically superior, to its linguistic expression, or that serious literal 
speech is logically prior, and ontologically superior, to jokes or fiction 
(Bennington, 2000, 8). 
In the exclusion of infelicities and the non-serious from a theory of speech acts, 
Derrida (1977, 14) recognises the metaphysics of presence at work, that is, 
intention as the centre or organising principle: 
...the conscious presence of the intention of the speaking subject in the totality 
of his speech act. As a result, performative communication becomes once 
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more the communication of an intentional meaning, even if that meaning has 
no referent in the form of a thing or of a prior or exterior state of things. 
As the two examples of deconstruction illustrate, purity of origin and meaning in 
any domain is an impossible ideal (Deutscher, 2005). Reading like Derrida enables 
a deeper appreciation of the concept of interest which, in the case of this study, is 
reflective practice as a model of professional knowledge in nursing education. 
4.9 Methodological process developed for text analysis 
The general approach presented in the foregoing sections of this chapter guides 
the deconstructive reading of the texts selected for analysis. A number of non-
discrete, non-linear activities may be identified as constituting the analytic 
process. Depending on the particular text being analysed, some or all of the 
activities outlined below will be discernible in the readings which follow in 
Chapters 5-9. 
• The text in question is read and re-read to gain an appreciation of the main 
themes and arguments or what may be called 'authorial intention'. 
• The text is examined for the language used to construct the argument. All 
aspects of language are considered, including for example, the material 
structure of the text on a page, the words used, their size and placement, 
any emphases used, where it is deployed and with what effect, text that 
appears in brackets, diagrams and graphics, and their consistency or 
otherwise with the accompanying text. 
• Words that appear or may be seen to convey more than one meaning in a 
text - so-called 'undecidible' terms - are noted, and the implications of their 
use for the argument which contains them identified. 
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• Instances of simile, metaphor, metonymy, and personification, are identified 
and the meaning thereby created is analysed. 
• Binary oppositions that form the ground of the arguments presented are 
identified as well as those points where the opposition does not hold and 
the consequences for the thesis being advanced. 
• The logic of the argument presented is scrutinised. The reader is alert to 
any points of tension, paradox, irony, ambiguity, and so on that may 
undermine or destabilise the manifest argument or orthodox interpretation 
of the text in question. This requires re-reading the text many times, going 
back and forth to check one statement or set of statements against another. 
A sense of the whole is retained as the parts are analysed. 
• Any point of argument that appears to have been passed over, discontinued, 
a conclusion overlooked, or a statement not followed through in terms of its 
implications is identified along with the possible consequences of that 
omission or discontinuity for the matter under consideration. 
• An attempt is made to reveal the presuppositions that the text in question 
contains and if these are consistent with, contradict, or otherwise conflict 
with the overt theme. 
• The implications of the particular deconstructive reading for the issue of 
reflective practice as a model of professional knowledge in nursing 
education are drawn. 
4.10 Text selection 
As indicated in Chapters 2 and 3, there is an abundance of texts that refer to 
reflective practice in nursing education. Since deconstruction requires close 
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attention to even the most seemingly inconsequential textual detail, the amount of 
material selected for analysis is small relative to the quantity available. Schon's 
(1983) text 'The Reflective Practitioner' has been extremely influential in the 
domain of nursing knowledge. His work is considered seminal in the context of the 
debate regarding professional knowledge in nursing. Indeed, it could be argued 
that, had Schon's (1983) book not been published, reflective practice would not 
have become a recognisable feature in nursing education. Schon's (1983) text 
supplied the lexicon, the concepts, and the theoretical justification for the adoption 
of reflective practice as a model of professional knowledge in nursing education. 
Few texts that refer to reflective practice in nursing education fail to cite Schon's 
(1983) ideas and his arguments. The influence of his ideas on professional 
knowledge in nursing education has been profound and significant. Any 
consideration of reflective practice in nursing education, therefore, must include 
reference to Schon and his work. For these reasons, 'The Reflective Practitioner' 
forms part of the textual material that is subject to a deconstructive reading. 
Three chapters from Schon's (1983) text are analysed: the first one addresses the 
rationale for an epistemology of practice and provides an outline of a new 
epistemology. The second chapter gives an example of reflective practice applied 
in the domain of psychotherapy. Schon (1983) uses several examples of practice 
disciplines to illustrate a reflective practice approach. The example of 
psychotherapy is chosen as it is one of the health care disciplines and therefore 
shares some similarities with nursing. The final chapter from Schon (1983) 
selected for analysis is a detailed account of the structure of reflection-in-action. 
Since, as indicated in the earlier discussion of this methodology, isolated 
incidences of irony and paradox are not the main concern of a deconstructive 
reading, the full text of each chapter is examined. This permits the more long-
range logico-semantic arguments to be analysed (Derrida, 2004b). 
4.10.1 Justification for the selection of nursing texts 
Six full nursing papers and two fragments are included in the sample of texts for 
analysis. Several criteria guided the selection of the particular papers and they are 
enumerated as follows: 
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Firstly, the aim of the study, which is to engage in a deconstructive reading of texts 
that have something to say regarding the issue of reflective practice as a model of 
professional knowledge in nursing education; 
Secondly, the debates identified in the theoretical framework chapter of the thesis, 
in particular, the problem of defining reflective practice and distinguishing it from 
the model of technical rationality, the arguments advanced concerning the scope 
and kinds of knowledge relevant to nursing practice, the role of the universities in 
the production of nursing knowledge, and the challenge of evidence-based 
practice; 
Thirdly, the desire to retain a diachronic perspective - to include material from the 
early, middle and later years similar to the organizing principle adopted in Chapter 
3; 
Fourthly, each full paper selected had to have as its sole theme a detailed, specific 
and focused argument on the issue reflective practice as a model of professional 
knowledge in nursing education; 
Finally, only texts that expressed a positive view of reflective practice as a model of 
professional knowledge were considered for inclusion. 
The following papers were chosen as they approximated most closely the above 
inclusion criteria: 
• The Reflective Practitioner in Nursing by Powell, 1989 - the first full paper 
located in the search of the literature, it describes a research study aimed at 
identifying reflection-in-action in nursing practice among a group of 
experienced nurses undertaking further study. 
• Tacit nursing knowledge: an untapped resource of a methodological 
headache? by Meerabeau,1992 - the paper describes how tacit knowledge 
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or knowing-in-action may be identified among nurses and the role of the 
university in that regard. 
• Critical reflective inquiry for knowledge development in nursing practice by 
Kim, 1999 - discusses the kinds of knowledge needed in nursing and how 
reflective knowledge may be generated. The role of the academic nurse 
researcher is also explored in this paper. 
• Reflective Practice: where now? by Rolfe, 2002 - charts the fate of reflective 
practice as a model of professional knowledge in nursing education over 
time and debates its difference from, but possible colonisation by, the 
model of technical rationality. 
• What counts as evidence in evidence-based practice? by Rycroft-Malone et al., 
2004 - identifies the kinds and sources of knowledge needed in nursing and 
the role of reflective practice in creating evidence based knowledge for 
practice. 
• Towards a nursing science of the unique. Evidence, reflexivity and the study of 
persons by Rolfe & Gardner, 2005 - describes how a nursing science based 
on reflective practice can be developed and debates the misunderstanding 
of the meaning of true evidence-based practice. 
The journal fragments selected were drawn from the following two papers: 
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• Reflective Practice: reviewing the issues and refocusing the debate by Clarke 
et al., 1996 - a short extract illustrates the attempt to distinguish reflective 
practice from technical rationality 
• Reflection and nursing education by Pierson, 1998- offers another take on 
the distinction between reflective practice and technical rationality in 
nursing education. 
Full reference details of all of the above papers are included at the beginning of 
Chapters 8 and 9. 
4.11 Rigour 
As indicated in the introduction to this chapter, one of the dangers with a 
deconstructive approach is that it might be seen to authorise an 'anything goes' 
approach in terms of meaning. Since there is no 'outside text' in the sense of a non-
linguistic referent or final signified that the analysed text may be compared with, 
and since deconstruction contests the notion of unified meaning, exploiting the 
resources of language in order to read otherwise, it might be assumed that one 
reading is as valid as another. However, Bennington (2000, 36) cautions the 
researcher embarking on a deconstructive approach to text analysis: 
No text can make any particular reading of itself necessary..., but equally no 
text can open itself up to just any reading (no text is absolutely 
indeterminate with respect to its reading). Texts appeal to reading, cry out 
for reading, and not just for any reading, but leave open an essential latitude 
or freedom which just is what constitutes reading as reading rather than as 
passive decipherment...It follows that reading has a duty to respect not only 
the text's 'wishes' (the reading of itself most obviously programmed into itself) 
but also the opening that opens a margin of freedom with respect to any such 
wishes, and without which those wishes could not even be registered or 
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recognised. It (a text) can always be read differently with respect to the way 
it would wish to be read. (Bennington's emphases). 
The text's wishes in terms of a preferred reading are conveyed in the rhetorical 
features and other textual resources alluded to in the strategies of deconstructive 
reading outlined earlier in the chapter. Deconstruction is a careful balancing of 
freedom and responsibility: responsibility to the preferred or manifest meaning of 
a text and freedom to depart from that meaning in search of other possibilities 
inscribed within the text itself. 
The absence of a unitary horizon of meaning for the process of reading does 
not commit Derrida to the recommendation of meaninglessness, nor does it 
entail the equivalence in value of all different readings (rather the singularity 
of each), and indeed demands the most rigorous textual evidence for the 
readings proposed: but it does argue that no one reading will ever be able to 
claim to have exhausted the textual resources available in the text being read 
(Bennington, 2000, 11). (Bennington's emphasis). 
To meet the demand for 'the most rigorous textual evidence' for the readings 
proposed, extensive quotations are used in the deconstructive analyses which 
follow. Reproducing verbatim extracts from the original text should enable an 
appreciation both of the authorised reading as well as provide evidence for the 
proposed deconstructive reading. The material presented from the original text 
should make it possible for the reader to verify a reading otherwise. As Norris 
(2002, 150-151) asserts of deconstruction in the context of literary criticism: 
...an approach that may indeed produce many instances of heterodox or 
counter intuitive argument... but which none the less refers back at every 
point to specific details of the text in hand, and which never takes refuge in a 
generalised appeal to the non-availability of truth values in criticism, the 
bankruptcy of classical reason, or the idea of rhetoric as an omnipresent 
dimension of language that makes it simply futile to invoke standards of 
argumentative rigour and consistency. (Norris's emphasis). 
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Although deconstruction does not accept the dominant or orthodox interpretation 
as the meaning of a text, at the same time, the orthodox or dominant interpretation 
remains an 'indispensable guardrail' (Derrida, 1997, 158) to which the 
deconstructive reading remains closely tied. It provides an anchor in the horizon 
of unstable meaning (Derrida, 1997, Translator's preface). It is only by observing 
the dominant reading that an alternative reading or a 'reading otherwise' becomes 
possible. 'A deconstructive reading is meticulously faithful to the details of the text' 
(Norris, 2002, 149). 
4.12 Conclusion 
This chapter has presented an account of deconstruction as a research approach 
together with an argument for its deployment in the context of the study of 
reflective practice as a model of professional knowledge in nursing education. The 
particular strategies that guide the deconstructive readings that follow have been 
outlined together with the rationale for text selection. The reader is reminded that 
to deconstruct a discourse is to show how it undermines the philosophy it asserts 
or the hierarchical oppositions on which it relies. By identifying in the text the 
supposed ground of argument, the key concept or premise, does not mean, 
however, that the principle or premise is illegitimate or should be scrapped. To 
deconstruct a concept one must operate with the concept, asserting its 
indispensability while denying it any rigorous justification (Culler, 2008). In no 
case is deconstruction a discourse against truth or science. 
A deconstructive reading is never final or definitive. It remains always possible to 
reread a deconstructed text and find some unexamined assumption or logical 
contradiction. Each reading is itself another writing with all of the contradictions 
and instabilities that inhere in a linguistic system of meaning. To re-iterate 
Bennington's (2000, 11) remark above: 'no one reading will ever be able to claim to 
have exhausted the textual resources available in the text being read'. Caputo (in 
Silverman, 1989, 29) adds that difference, or deconstruction, "is": 
...not aimed at locking us inside a play of signs but at making us think twice 
about claiming that our discourse has accomplished what it sets out to do. It 
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throws a scare into our discourse, destroys a bit of the prestige and self-
importance of 'reference, and ends up creating a salutary distrust in the 
power of language to do what it sets out to do (along with providing an 
account of how language accomplishes what it does manage to do) . 
Deconstruction is not an opening into an inexhaustible wealth of meaning or the 
transcendence of semantic excess. It is rather 'a question of following through those 
repeated moments of "indetermination" or "undecidability" that signal the 
emergence of a counter logic, a logic of logical anomalies, whose effect it to subvert 
or greatly complicate the manifest meaning of the text' (Derrida, 2004b, xxvii-
xxviii). Undecidable terms radically unsettle a text, making a decision as to final 
meaning or a 'transcendental signified' impossible (Derrida, 1997, 49). A 
deconstructive reading demonstrates that a text may mean both one thing and its 
opposite, and also, neither one thing nor its opposite. Deconstruction projects no 
unifying goal, but rather sketches a dispersive, pluralizing, scattering movement 
(Bennington, 2000). 
Dissemination...foils the attempt to progress in an orderly way toward 
meaning or knowledge... (Derrida, 2004a, xxxiii, Translator's Introduction) 
The following chapters 5-9 present a deconstructive reading of the texts selected 
for analysis. Chapters 5-7 focus on Schon's (1983) text. Details of the chapters 
chosen are provided at the outset. 
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Chapter 5 Deconstructing Schon's text 1 
Donald SchOn's book 'The Reflective Practitioner' published in 1983 is a very 
influential text in the context of reflective practice as a model of professional 
knowledge in nursing education. His work is cited in almost every text that refers 
to reflective practice in the nursing literature. Schein (1983) supplied the language, 
the concepts, the logic, and the theoretical justification for the adoption of 
reflective practice in nursing education. As references to Schein (1983) are so 
pervasive in the nursing literature that treats of reflective practice as a model of 
professional knowledge, it seems appropriate and necessary to begin a 
deconstructive analysis of this subject with his writings. This chapter presents a 
close reading of the central thesis of Schon's (1983) original text. How he 
constructs the argument for reflective practice as a new epistemology is examined. 
The structure of that epistemology and its application in practice are also analysed 
from a deconstructive perspective. In order to provide my reader with a general 
orientation to what Schon's book is about, extracts from the preface are presented 
below. Schein (1983, vii-ix) describes his purpose in writing the text as follows: 
This exploration of professional knowledge stems directly from my working 
life as an industrial consultant, technology manager, urban planner, policy 
analyst, and teacher in a professional school. Because of these experiences, 
the question of the relationship between the kinds of knowledge honored (sic) 
in academia and the kinds of competence valued in professional practice has 
emerged for me not only as an intellectual puzzle but as the object of a 
personal quest. I have become convinced that universities are not devoted to 
the production and distribution of fundamental knowledge in general. They 
are institutions committed, for the most part, to a particular epistemology, a 
view of knowledge that fosters selective inattention to practical competence 
and professional artistry. 
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...In this book I offer an approach to epistemology of practice based on a close 
examination of what some practitioners - architects, psychotherapists, 
engineers, planners, and managers - actually do. 
...The heart of this study is an analysis of the distinctive structure of reflection-
in-action (Schon's emphasis). 
The first paragraph of the above extracts could be read as a metaphor for reflective 
practice. Experience in the real world of practice serves as the starting point for 
Schon's (1983) inquiry. Something puzzling occurred in the course of Schon's 
experiences in diverse work situations. The puzzle stimulated reflection. 
Knowledge derived from reflecting on the puzzling experience of practice is the 
book itself. The knowledge thus created is both personal and shared. A number of 
rhetorical features may be noted in the extracts quoted above. The preface begins 
with a personal account of experience. The list of occupations included at the 
outset warrants Schon's authority to address the subject matter of the book. His 
use of the term 'working life' and his preference for referring to himself in the first 
person singular create a sense that the book is about ordinary real life experience 
as opposed to an esoteric academic text, which again reflects the central argument 
of the book. Scholl (1983) assures the reader that the new epistemology he 
presents will be derived solely from the world of practice. The use of the word 
`heart' to refer to the essential message of the book could be read as a metaphor for 
the text as a living, dynamic entity which contrasts with the lifeless emanations 
from universities. A dichotomy between academia and professional practice is 
created in the introductory paragraph with the use of different signifiers to 
designate the kinds of knowledge relevant in each setting: 'knowledge' in academia 
and 'competence' in practice. The verbs used to describe how the different kinds of 
knowledge are regarded in each setting give an indication of the purpose which 
these kinds of knowledge serve. Knowledge is 'honored' in academia which 
suggests that it is produced for its own sake to be admired and revered. 
Competence, on the other hand, is 'valued' in practice, an indication that it is the 
kind of knowledge that enables the knower to do something useful and important. 
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Scholl (1983) sets out his argument for a new epistemology of practice in Chapter 
2 of his book. The chapter is entitled: 'From Technical Rationality to Reflection-in-
Action' (SchOn, 1983, 21). The rhetorical structure of the chapter will first be 
considered followed by a detailed analysis of the logic of the argument advanced. 
Chapter 2 of Schon's text is structured in roughly three parts. The first part 
explains what is meant by technical rationality, and how it became the dominant 
epistemology in professional schools. The middle third of the chapter sets out the 
problem with technical rationality as the dominant model of professional 
knowledge, and the final third articulates an alternative epistemology of practice, 
which Schon (1983, 49) names 'reflection-in-action'. Schon's Chapter 2 may be 
viewed an enactment of the message it conveys. That message, from the 
perspective of a conventional reading, may be summarised as follows: professional 
knowledge is dominated by a particular epistemology, which Schon (1983, 21) 
calls 'the model of Technical Rationality'. This model consists in the application of 
scientific knowledge and techniques to the problems of professional practice and is 
based on a positivist epistemology. The greater the degree of scientific knowledge 
possessed by the profession, the higher the status of that profession in society. 
Medicine is cited as a paradigm example of the model of technical rationality both 
in terms of its scientific knowledge base and its prestige in society. Practical 
knowledge is introduced as 'a puzzling anomaly' (Schon, 1983, 33) in the context of 
the origins of the model of technical rationality. How this anomaly was dealt with 
by the positivist tradition in such a way as to preserve the model is explained. The 
success of the model and its adoption by various occupations aspiring to be 
classified as professions is outlined. 
A problem is then identified which is described as 'the flaws and limitations of the 
professions...a crisis of legitimacy rooted both in their perceived failure to live up to 
their own norms and in their perceived incapacity to help society achieve its 
objectives and solve its problems' (SchOn, 1983, 39). This is followed by the 
statement: 'Increasingly we have become aware of the importance to actual practice 
of phenomena - complexity, uncertainty, instability, uniqueness, and value-conflict -
which do not fit the model of Technical Rationality. Now, in the light of the Positivist 
origins of Technical Rationality, we can more readily see why these phenomena are 
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so troublesome' (Schon, 1983, 39). The text goes on to explain why this is so, 
arguing that the model views professional practice as a process that emphasises 
problem 'solving' whilst ignoring problem 'setting' (Scholl, 1983, 40). Problem 
setting and its non-technical nature is then elaborated. 
	 Professionals are 
presented with a choice: do they continue to adhere to technical expertise and 
ignore important problems that do not fit the model of technical rationality or do 
they set aside the model and address problems of significance that fall outside it? 
(Schein, 1983). 
How various professional groups have addressed the dilemma of either adhering 
to the model, and ignoring important problems, or setting aside the model in order 
to address significant problems of practice is debated. All approaches, Schein 
(1983) claims, remain attached to the model of technical rationality. Brief 
reference is made to the discrediting of the positivist epistemology in philosophy 
of science. A distinction is drawn between 'science per se' and the 'Positivist view of 
science' (Schon, 1983, 48). Science per se may be viewed as a process that is 
similar in many respects to the process of problem-solving in practice while the 
Positivist view of science cannot be regarded in the same light. Schein (1983, 49) 
concludes that the model of technical rationality is incomplete because it does not 
'account for practical competence in "divergent" situations'. The reader is then 
invited by Schon (1983, 49) to join him in a search 'for an epistemology of practice 
implicit in the artistic, intuitive processes which some practitioners do bring to 
situations of uncertainty, instability, uniqueness, and value conflict'. A new 
epistemology of practice - 'Reflection-in-action'- is described; its processes and 
constituents presented by way of examples from a wide variety of activities and 
occupational practices. If investigated carefully, this new epistemology will 
become 'a legitimate form of professional knowing' (Schein, 1983, 69). 
In terms of the textual construction of the argument, the title of the chapter 'From 
Technical Rationality to Reflection-in-Action' (Schein, 1983, 21) dominates the page 
spatially, and in terms of font size and colour. Below the title, the first subheading 
reads 'The Dominant Epistemology of Practice' (Schein, 1983, 21). The reader is 
thus oriented immediately to the main point of the first part of the chapter. 
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Dominance is asserted in the open sentence of the first paragraph. The model of 
technical rationality is said to be 'the view of professional knowledge which has 
most powerfully shaped both our thinking about the professions and the 
institutional relations of research, education, and practice' (Schon, 1983, 21). (My 
emphasis). Force is conveyed in the language used. Freedom of thought regarding 
professional knowledge is impossible. The model determines how we think in this 
regard. It is not only individual thinking that is thus constrained. The model also 
exerts power over how institutions engaged in research, education, and practice 
relate to one another. Its influence pervades the literature on the professions, both 
positive reports and those that are critical of the professions: 'The model of 
Technical Rationality has exerted as great an influence on scholarly writing about 
the professions as on critical exposés of the role of the professions in the larger 
society' (Schon, 1983, 22). Even those who exercise academic freedom and assert 
the right to question any construct must, it appears, do so within the frame of 
reference of the dominant model. The scope of the model extends to the 
curriculum of professional schools where it has created a 'dominant curricular 
pattern' (Schon, 1983, 27) and 'an unquestioned belief (Schon, 1983, 30) in its 
appropriateness by senior academics. 
Dominance is also reflected in the kind of language used to describe the model of 
technical rationality. Terms such as —disciplined by an unambiguous end...", 'stable 
institutional contexts, 'grounded in systematic, fundamental knowledge', 
'instrumental activity' firmly bounded' (Schon, 1983, 23) connote strength and 
endurance. No doubt or equivocation is admitted. Structural metaphors such as 
'knowledge base'; 'substantive field'; 'hierarchy'; —concrete problem solving";• 
'embedded in the institutional context of professional life' (Schon, 1983, 22-26); 
'built into the very tissue of the universities' (Schon, 1983, 36) (My emphases) 
create the effect of an edifice or physical structure. Objective language is used to 
describe the model conveying a sense of distance between author and entity in the 
text, which accentuates the notion of the model as a structure that may be 
independently observed and inspected. 
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Dominance also derives from the scope and variety of references deployed to 
certify the model's hegemony. References to philosophers, scientists, lawyers, and 
prestigious universities are interwoven with the description of the model. Direct 
quotations are used liberally and placed strategically throughout the section of the 
chapter that explicates the model of technical rationality. They serve to reiterate 
the main claims for the model's dominance. 
The dominance of the view of professional knowledge in the form of the model of 
technical rationality is not confined to individual minds, texts, professional 
institutions and schools, and how they operate. It extends to other occupations 
and to society as a whole. Those professions that adhere to and reflect most 
accurately the model of technical rationality dominate in terms of the status, 
prestige and authority they command within wider society (Schon, 1983). Other 
occupations adopt the model in their own spheres as they strive for similar 
advancement. Any doubts that might remain regarding the power of the model are 
mitigated as 'three hundred years of the history of Western ideas and institutions' 
(Schon, 1983, 31) is cited, contributing temporal dominance to the already 
established spatial dominance. 
A subheading titled 'The Origins of Technical Rationality' (Schon, 1983, 30) marks 
the significance of history in the dominance of the model. A variety of events, 
movements, individuals, and institutions, all powerful in their own right, are 
presented to account for the model's dominance through time. 'Technical 
Rationality is the heritage of Positivism, the powerful philosophical doctrine that 
grew up in the nineteenth century...' (Schon, 1983, 31). The evolution of science 
and technology, the industrial movement, the rise of the professions, the 
philosophical theory of logical positivism, World War II, the development of the 
modern university and research institutions, the successes of medicine and 
engineering, and the space race, are cited as progenitors of the model of technical 
rationality (Schon, 1983). Such lineage serves to warrant the model's power and 
continuity. It is also made to account for the 'unquestioned belief (Schon, 1983, 30) 
in the model by its adherents and as an explanation for the fact that 'the dominant 
model of professional knowledge seems to its proponents to require very little 
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justification' (Schon, 1983, 30). The message of power continues to be reflected in 
powerful language and structural metaphors with the use of such terms as, 'firmly 
established as a pillar of conventional wisdom'; 'harnessing science to create 
technology' (Schon, 1983, 31) (My emphases). A nature metaphor is introduced in 
the concluding sentence of the section of the chapter that addresses the origins of 
the model of technical rationality: 'Thus were planted the seeds of the Positivist 
curriculum...and the roots of the now-familiar split between research and practice' 
(Schon, 1983, 37) (My emphases). Dominance is thereby doubly guaranteed as the 
model is represented as both a constructed and a natural entity. 
How is the movement indicated in the title of the chapter: 'From Technical 
Rationality to Reflection-in-Action' (Schon, 1983, 21) (My emphases) to be 
accomplished given the model's hegemony reinforced over the centuries and 
pervading so many aspects of society? There are few indicators to suggest any 
weaknesses in the model of technical rationality as the dominant view of 
professional knowledge and the dominant epistemology of practice. Any 
difficulties with the model seem insufficiently powerful to challenge its dominance. 
For example, Schon (1983, 33) refers to the recognition of the existence of 
'Practical knowledge' which was considered 'a puzzling anomaly' from the 
perspective of the technical rational model of professional knowledge. This 
anomaly was quickly resolved by categorising practical knowledge as 'knowledge 
of the relationship of means to ends' (Scholl, 1983, 33). There is also reference to 
'critical exposés of the role of the professions' in society (Schon, 1983, 22). 
Professional expertise has also been criticised as 'a..." preoccupation with a 
specialized skill premised on an underlying theory"' (Schon, 1983, 22). Those who 
question the dominant model include 'practitioners, educators, and researchers' 
(Schon, 1983, 26). Despite the criticism, they remain 'party to institutions that 
perpetuate it' (Schon, 1983, 26). So although the model has its critics, they have 
not been sufficiently powerful in challenging or changing it. 
Movement 'From Technical Rationality to Reflection-in-Action' (Schon, 1983, 21) is 
signalled in a subheading that follows the account of the origins of technical 
rationality. Entitled: 'Emerging Awareness of the Limits of Technical Rationality' 
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(Schon, 1083, 37), the language of the subheading indicates that the transition 
from technical rationality to reflection-in-action will be gradually accomplished. It 
will not be a direct challenge from an equally powerful alternative but rather an 
inevitable occurrence borne of the model's own inherent shortcomings. But first 
there is a reiteration of the model's dominance and how it came to dominate the 
professions. From the great successes of the use of scientific research and 
technology during World War II came the following 'lesson': 
If a great social objective could be clearly defined, if a national commitment to 
it could be mustered, if unlimited resources could be poured into the necessary 
research and development, then any such objective could be achieved (Scholl, 
1983, 37-38). 
Research and development institutions were to benefit most substantially from 
such thinking (Schon, 1983). 'But as a side-effect, there was also a reinforcement of 
the idea of scientific research as a basis for professional practice' (Scholl, 1983, 38). 
The 'But' at the beginning of the previous sentence introduces a contrast, the first 
small sign of cleavage in the monolith that is the dominant model of professional 
knowledge. The word ` side-effect' is generally understood as an unwanted effect of 
a drug that is otherwise therapeutic. What was beneficial for research institutions 
was harmful to professional practice. Medicine, not surprisingly perhaps, is cited 
as the paradigm example of the model of technical rationality. 
Nowhere was the rate of increase in research spending more dramatic, and 
nowhere were the results of that spending more visible, than in the field of 
medicine. The great centers (sic) of medical research and teaching were 
expanded, and new ones were created. The medical research center, with its 
medical school and its teaching hospital, became the institutional model to 
which other professions aspired. 
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Here was a solid base of fundamental science, an equally solid body of applied 
clinical science, and a profession which had geared itself to implement the 
ever-changing products of research. Other professions, hoping to achieve 
some of medicine's effectiveness and prestige, sought to emulate its linkage of 
research and teaching institutions, its hierarchy of research and clinical roles, 
and its system for connecting basic and applied research to practice (Schon, 
1983, 38). 
The above extract could be read as an endorsement of the model of technical 
rationality: great centres, great science, great effectiveness, so impressive that 
others aspire to be like it. Such a reading, however, would not advance the thesis 
of the chapter which is constructing an argument for replacing the model of 
technical rationality as the dominant model of professional knowledge. There are 
some clues in the above quotation, however, to indicate an alternative reading. In 
what, for example, does medicine's effectiveness consist? Does it consist in 
attracting large sums of money that are then spent on impressive buildings? The 
`solid base of fundamental science' and the 'equally solid body of applied clinical 
science' contrast with the 'ever-changing products of research'. Serious knowledge, 
one imagines, should be deployed in serious situations, and human illness would 
generally be regarded as constituting a serious situation. Tver-changing' suggests 
a quite superficial approach to research, and the word `products' is associated 
more with the world of manufacturing than human health and wellbeing. The 
profession of medicine is represented as passively playing its part in this 
commercial enterprise. And, in imitating medicine, is the effectiveness that other 
professions hope to achieve that of commercial success and social recognition? 
The side-effect of taking the model's medicine has been to contaminate the 
profession of medicine. Like a drug that is harmful yet highly addictive: 
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The prestige and apparent success of the medical and engineering models 
exerted a great attraction for the social sciences. In such fields as 
education, social work, planning, and policy making, social scientists 
attempted to do research, to apply it, and to educate practitioners, all 
according to their perceptions of the models of medicine and engineering. 
Indeed, the very language of social scientists, rich in references to 
measurement, controlled experiment, applied science, laboratories, and 
clinics, was striking in its reverence for these models (Schon, 1983, 38-39) 
(My emphases). 
Again the above extract could be read as a positive account of the model of 
technical rationality and its appeal to other occupations beyond medicine and 
engineering. A struggle appears to be in play between the dominance of the model 
and the need to demonstrate its limits. The word 'apparent' in the first sentence of 
the above quotation connotes something that, while manifest may not be real. And 
in the word 'reverence', there is a religious metaphor, suggesting an adherence 
born of blind faith. At the same time, the religious metaphor also attests to the 
model's dominance: science as the new religion. An irony is detectable in the use 
of the words 'sciences' and 'scientists' given the argument being advanced. That 
these terms could be used in such an apparently easeful manner in this context is 
an indication that the language of science dominates not only the social scientists, 
but also those who wish to argue against its power. Exposing the limits of 
technical rationality will require other resources. 
A temporal element is introduced into the argument which creates a sense of the 
gradual awareness of the model's limits: 'both the general public and the 
professionals,' over a period of almost twenty years, 'have become increasingly 
aware of flaws and limitations of the professions' (Schon, 1983, 39). It may be 
assumed that if lay people as well as professionals begin to recognise a problem, 
then the problem must be of a quite serious and obvious nature. The problem is 
stated as the professions' perceived failure to live up to their own norms and 
...perceived incapacity to help society achieve its objectives and solve its problems' 
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(Schon, 1983, 39). But how do these major concerns bear on the dominant model 
of professional knowledge? The link is made in the following way: 
Increasingly we have become aware of the importance to actual practice of 
phenomena - complexity, uncertainty, instability, uniqueness, and value-
conflict - which do not fit the model of Technical Rationality. Now, in the 
light of the Positivist origins of Technical Rationality, we can more readily see 
why these phenomena are so troublesome (Schon, 1983, 39). 
The challenge to the model comes not from eminent individuals or institutions, nor 
from major events or national programmes. It comes from the 'bottom-up', so to 
speak; from the localised, real-world, sphere of practice. It is recognised by 
individual practitioners with whom the writer/author identifies as indicated by his 
use of the first person plural pronoun. With a change in language comes a change 
in perspective. The phenomena of importance to practice are identified as 
'complexity, instability, uniqueness, and value-conflict' (SchOn, 1983, 39), all 
signifying quite vague entities in contrast to the definite language of 'pillar', 'base', 
'hierarchy', and so on, that characterised the model of technical rationality. 
Problems of practice are described as 'puzzling, troubling, and uncertain' (SchOn, 
1983, 40). Such problems 'may escape the categories of applied science' or 'an 
unstable situation slips out from under them' (Schon, 1983, 41). This description of 
practice contrasts with the strong, enduring edifice that is the model of technical 
rationality. The structural metaphor is continued but in place of a stable structure 
are 'problems' in 'real-world practice' that 'must be constructed from the materials of 
problematic situations which are puzzling, troubling, and uncertain' (Schon, 1983, 
40). No plan or map is available to guide the construction: 'when ends are confused 
and conflicting, there is as yet no "problem" to solve' (SchOn, 1983, 41). This does 
not mean, however, that the model of technical rationality has been replaced. 
Reverting again to a spatial and geographical metaphor, the model of technical 
rationality is said to occupy 'a high, hard ground' in what is termed 'the varied 
topography of professional practice' (SchOn, 1983, 42), while its implied alternative, 
still vague, diffuse, and unnamed, occupies 'a swampy lowland.' (SchOn, 1983, 42). 
The contrast could not be more starkly drawn: a high hard ground from where the 
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model can dominate the landscape and where one can move about quite sure-
footedly, with a swamp whose depth is indeterminable and where one risks 
disappearing into murky waters should one venture onto its surface. But does this 
metaphorical description not reassert rather than undermine the dominance of the 
model? How can anything be constructed on a swamp? Nothing can, of course, so 
another way must be found to challenge the model's dominance. If the structures 
cannot be modified, then a distinction must be created between what they contain. 
...the problems of the high ground, however great their technical interest, are 
often relatively unimportant to clients or to the larger society, while in the 
swamp are the problems ofgreatest human concern (Schon, 1983, 42). 
Although the model of technical rationality remains dominant, its power is 
spurious, limited as it is to solving relatively trivial problems. The unlikely setting 
of the swamp is where the problems of greatest significance for humanity are 
located and, presumably, where their solutions are to be found. 
Schon (1983, 42) provides an account of how professionals respond to what he 
calls 'This dilemma of "rigor or relevance"...', that is, choosing between the high 
hard ground and the swampy lowland. Some professionals, he claims, opt for 
rigour and some choose relevance. Those who choose rigour will notice only what 
fits the model of technical rationality. Failures in practice will be attributed to 
external factors. Problem situations may therefore be misread or manipulated 
with serious consequences particularly if the recipients of professional services are 
human beings (Schon, 1983). Such a response, Schon (1983) claims, is motivated 
by fear or pride on the part of the practitioner. The power of the dominant model 
is such that not only does it determine what counts as professional knowledge but 
it may also be seen to influence the character of the practitioner, and not in a 
positive way, as Schon's (1983) observations above attest. 
'Some students of the professions' are cited as having recognised a 'gap' between 
professional knowledge and professional practice (Schon, 1983, 45). Although 
each explains the gap and how it might be addressed in different ways, their 
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accounts are identified as preserving the model of technical rationality (Schon, 
1983). This indicates that even those at a remove from professional practice and 
whose role requires critical and objective analysis of the professions, appear to be 
as bound by the model's dominance as are professional practitioners themselves. 
Despite attempts from various quarters - professionals, the general public, 
assigning to it insignificant problems, and so on - the model still seems to dominate 
thinking. In fact, Schon (1983) himself appears to have difficulty escaping the 
model's dominance even as he attempts to criticise it. If the model cannot be 
removed or displaced, the only option that remains seems to be abandonment. 
This comes about first in a rejection of it by its parentage: the model 'has fallen into 
disrepute in its original home, the philosophy of science' (Scholl, 1983, 48). Finally, 
the author attempts to abandon it, urging his readers to do likewise. 
Let us then reconsider the question of professional knowledge; let us stand the 
question on its head. If the model of Technical Rationality is incomplete, in 
that it fails to account for practical competence in "divergent" situations, so 
much the worse for the model. Let us search, instead, for an epistemology of 
practice implicit in the artistic, intuitive processes which some practitioners 
do bring to situations of uncertainty, instability, uniqueness, and value conflict 
(Schon, 1983, 49) (My emphasis). 
Some ambiguity attaches to the process of abandonment as it is described above. 
The word 'instead' suggests that 'practical competence' cannot be accommodated 
within the dominant model and therefore a new epistemology is required. On the 
other hand, the model of technical rationality is not described as irrelevant or 
outmoded, merely 'incomplete'. Will a new epistemology produce effects similar to 
Rousseau's 'supplement' referred to earlier in the methodology chapter? Will it 
complete or replace the dominant model of professional knowledge? A possibility 
is created, within SchOn's text, that reflection-in-action may do both at the same 
time. 
A break is signalled in the blank space preceding the next subheading of the 
chapter, and in the title of the subheading itself: 'Reflection-in-Action' (Schon, 
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1983, 49). Even before the search referred to in the last paragraph of the 
preceding section gets underway, a new destination has been identified. It is a 
very different terrain to the one occupied by the model of technical rationality. 
Quite abruptly the reader leaves behind the world of philosophy and history, 
science and computing, and enters a much smaller and more local domain. The 
first signpost is a familiar one that everyone may recognise. 
When we go about the spontaneous, intuitive performance of the actions of 
everyday life, we show ourselves to be knowledgeable in a special way. Often 
we cannot say what it is that we know. When we try to describe it we find 
ourselves at a loss, or we produce descriptions that are obviously 
inappropriate. Our knowing is ordinarily tacit, implicit in our patterns of 
action and in our feel for the stuff with which we are dealing. It seems right to 
say that our knowing is in our action (Schon, 1983, 49) (Schon's emphasis). 
The kind of knowledge described in the above extract requires no elaborate 
structures, language or antecedents. It is ordinary, familiar, and near-at-hand. 
From the 'everyday life' of the average person, it is but a short step to 'the workaday 
life' (Schon, 1983, 49) of the professional practitioner, who, Schon (1983) claims, 
depends upon this kind of knowledge. The 'hierarchy of kinds of knowledge', 
characteristic of the model of technical rationality with scientific theory occupying 
the highest level, had earlier been described as 'also a ladder of status' (Schon, 
1983, 37). That is now removed and both lay person and professional are on an 
equal footing. And the professional practitioner is no more adept at articulating 
tacit knowing than the average person which serves to nullify any notion of 
superiority on the practitioner's part. 
Every competent practitioner can recognise phenomena - families of 
symptoms associated with a particular disease, peculiarities of a certain kind 
of building site, irregularities of materials or structures - for which he cannot 
give a reasonably accurate or complete description (Schon, 1983, 49). 
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Despite its ubiquity, and unlike the model of technical rationality whose contours 
are vivid and easily identifiable, this new epistemology is occulted and elusive. 
The difficulty of articulating this kind of knowledge is evident in the following 
descriptions of it: 'we cannot say what it is that we know; 'cannot give a reasonably 
accurate or complete description' (Schon, 1983, 49); 'cannot state the rules and 
procedures' (Schon, 1983, 50); 'not capable of being expressed in words or as 
reasoning' (Schon, 1983, 51); 'need not suppose that they (jazz musicians) reflect-in-
action in the medium of words' (Schon, 1983, 56). The remainder of the chapter is 
devoted to elucidating reflection-in-action. Unlike earlier sections of Schon's 
(1983) Chapter 2, no subheadings mark divisions or breaks in the part that deals 
with reflection-in-action. Any heading that is used forms part of a sentence and is 
distinguished only by the use of italics. Like knowing-in-action, such headings are 
easily overlooked. While references to the model of technical rationality attract 
capital letters wherever the term appears in the text, reflection-in-action is 
represented in lower case letters. Throughout the section that describes 
reflection-in-action, personal pronouns are used quite frequently, and illustrative 
examples are drawn from varied yet unremarkable spheres of activity. This 
maintains the theme of ordinariness which characterises the new epistemology. 
No scientific knowledge or techniques are required to validate this kind of 
knowledge. Rather, 'common sense' is called upon to warrant its authenticity and, 
at the same time, common sense attests to its ordinariness. 
Once we put aside the model of Technical Rationality, which leads us to think 
of intelligent practice as an application of knowledge to instrumental 
decisions, there is nothing strange about the idea that a kind of knowing is 
inherent in intelligent action. Common sense admits the category of know-
how, and it does not stretch common sense very much to say that the know-
how is in the action... 
There is nothing in common sense to make us say that know-how consists in 
rules or plans which we entertain in the mind prior to action (Schon, 1983, 
50-51) (Schon's emphasis). 
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Despite, or perhaps because of, its familiarity, it will take much patience and 
painstaking explication to articulate this new epistemology of practice. A brief 
summary of the 'entire process of reflection-in-action' (Schon, 1983, 50) is provided 
initially. All of us - author, reader, and practitioner - have a kind of knowing that is 
'tacit', 'implicit', but reveals itself in our actions (Schon, 1983, 49). If our actions 
cause surprise, we are prompted to think about the knowing that is implicit in the 
action. Reflection brings this knowing to light. It becomes accessible and thus 
manageable in various ways (Schon, 1983). As knowing-in-action is key to the 
process of reflection-in-action, and as it is that which cannot be described in 
words, its identity must be carefully worked out. First, however, as indicated in 
the extract above, the reader is reminded to 'put aside the model of Technical 
Rationality' (Schon, 1983, 50). Otherwise, the idea of knowing-in-action will 
appear 'strange' (Schon, 1983, 50). To ensure that 'knowing' is not separated from 
'action', the words are joined together by hyphens. Examples are provided that 
illustrate the idea of a knowing that is in an action as opposed to a knowing that 
occurs prior to action (Schon, 1983). Tightrope walking, baseball pitching, solving 
maths problems, and learning to use a tool are some of the examples offered to 
illustrate this kind of knowing (Schon, 1983). What characterises each of the 
examples is the fact that they are spontaneous, skilful actions and the knowing that 
is in the actions cannot be described in words. The average person is not excluded 
from the examples of knowing-in-action: skilful use of language and skills in social 
interactions are both actions which ordinary people know how to do but are 
unable to explain how they do them. Schon (1983, 53) comments on these 
examples: 
Psycholinguists have noted that we speak in conformity with rules of 
phonology and syntax which most of us cannot describe. (Ref) Alfred Schultz 
and his intellectual descendants have analyzed the tacit, everyday know-how 
that we bring to social interactions such as the rituals ofgreeting, ending a 
meeting, or standing in a crowded elevator. 
SchOn (1983) appears to overlook any irony in the above comments: 
scientist/researchers, such as psycholinguists and ethnomethodologists and their 
145 
methods of investigation, are needed to describe, explain and predict the knowing-
in-action of ordinary people engaged in everyday activities. Without those kinds of 
methods and investigations applied by others from outside, it may be assumed that 
the knowing-in-action of ordinary folk would remain tacit. 
The properties of knowing-in-action are identified and may be summarised as 
follows: spontaneous and ineffable. Knowing-in-action is described as 'the 
characteristic mode of ordinary practical knowledge' (Schein, 1983, 54). Reflecting-
in-action, which is described as to 'think about doing something while doing it' 
(SchOn, 1983, 54), is explored in a manner similar to knowing-in-action. SchOn 
(1983) provides examples of the process of reflecting-in-action as engaged in by 
baseball players and jazz musicians, among others. Schein (1983, 59) also refers to 
a research experiment involving children balancing blocks as 'a beautiful example 
of reflection-in-action'. Use of these ordinary, everyday examples, could be 
understood as creating a reassuring effect on the reader. Although reflection-in-
action is difficult to put into words, it is not difficult to recognise. What is lacking 
in explicit definition and description is compensated for by a sense of familiarity 
and omnipresence. 
The search in which SchOn (1983) is engaged, however, is for an epistemology of 
practice (my emphasis) and, therefore, the processes of knowing-in-action and 
reflecting-in-action must be capable of transferring from the ordinary, everyday 
world to the world of practice. 'Reflecting-in-practice' (Schein, 1983, 59), appearing 
in italics at the beginning of a sentence, signposts a move in that direction. 
`Knowing-in-action' and 'reflecting-in-action' become 'knowing-in-practice' and 
`reflecting-in-practice', minimising any rupture with the sense of the familiar 
already established. Again Schein (1983) begins simply by exploring two different 
meanings of the word 'practice' and notes how different understandings may have 
the effect of either enhancing or limiting a practitioner's knowing-in-action. The 
value of reflection as a way of addressing the limitations of knowing-in-action is 
then explored, although the reference to limitations is not treated with the same 
sense of concern as were the limits of the model of technical rationality. How and 
when a practitioner may reflect-in-action is outlined, and examples provided range 
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from banking to medicine to education. An argument for the potential of 
reflection-in-action, as a research methodology and as a solution to the previously 
identified dilemma of rigour or relevance in professional practice, concludes 
Schon's (1983) Chapter 2. 
Some commonalities may be discerned between the model of technical rationality 
and what is intended to replace or supplement it. Just as the model of technical 
rationality has an impact on the emotions and behaviour of professional 
practitioners, so also does reflection-in-action. Again, the impact is not a positive 
one. Practitioners who reflect-in-action 'feel profoundly uneasy because they cannot 
say what they know how to do, cannot justify its quality or rigor' (Schon, 1983, 69). 
Although 'for some reflective practitioners it is the core of practice...reflection-in-
action is not generally accepted - even by those who do it - as a legitimate form of 
professional knowing' (Schon, 1983, 69). The 'crisis of legitimacy' (Schon, 1983, 39) 
suffered by the professions and attributed to the model of technical rationality is 
also, it seems, an issue for the reflective practitioner. There is another 
characteristic shared by both followers of the dominant model and reflective 
practitioners, and that is exclusivity. Greatest social prestige and authority 
attaches to a few top professions whose practice reflects most closely the model of 
technical rationality. 	 Reflective practitioners are a rare group also. Once 
reflection-in-action migrates to the world of the professional practitioner, it 
appears to become scarcer: 'reflection-in-action...is central to the "art" by which 
practitioners sometimes deal well with situations of uncertainty, instability, 
uniqueness, and value conflict' (Schon, 1983, 50); 'he (the practitioner) may 
respond by reflecting on the appreciations which he and others have brought to the 
situation' (Schon, 1983, 63); 'for some reflective practitioners it (reflection-in-
action) is the core of their practice' (Scholl, 1983, 69) (My emphases). The 
dominant model brings social acknowledgement to the few while its alternative, 
practiced by the few, cannot be acknowledged. 
Schon (1983, 69) concludes his argument with the following appeal: 
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...the study of reflection-in-action is critically important. The dilemma of 
rigor or relevance may be dissolved if we can develop an epistemology of 
practice which places technical problem solving within a broader context of 
reflective inquiry, shows how reflection-in-action may be rigorous in its own 
right, and links the art of practice in uncertainty and uniqueness to the 
scientist's art of research. We may thereby increase the legitimacy of 
reflection-in-action and encourage its broader, deeper, and more rigorous use. 
It might have appeared that Schon (1983) and his readers had been engaged in a 
search for a new epistemology of practice and had identified an alternative to the 
model of technical rationality in the form of reflection-in-action. However the 
concluding lines of the chapter suggest that this process is just beginning. Despite 
all of the problems and difficulties attaching to the model of technical rationality -
its failure to accommodate phenomena important to practice and address 
problems of greatest human interest, its inability to account for practical 
competence in divergent situations of practice, even its implication in the flaws 
and limitations of the professions - it will have a place in a new epistemology of 
practice. Granted it will not dominate but then reflection-in-action will be 
fashioned in such a way as to look like the model of technical rationality, with its 
rigour and similarity to scientists' activities. 
	 Reflection-in-action will also 
dominate spatially - 'broader and deeper' - as the technical rational model had done 
heretofore. 
Chapter 2 of Schon's (1983) book provides a textual construction of reflective 
practice. This chapter has analysed how that construction has been accomplished 
by identifying the rhetorical structure and strategies employed in the text. 
Powerful rhetorical devices drawing on ethos, pathos, and logos have been 
deployed in order to destabilise the dominant model and create a space for an 
alternative. However, the dominant model has not been completely removed or 
replaced. It remains implicated in the new epistemology and its remains may be 
shown to complicate the identity of reflective practice. A deconstructive analysis 
148 
of the logic of Schon's (1983) argument for reflective practice as a new 
epistemology is the subject of the following chapter. 
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Chapter 6 Deconstructing Schon's text 2 
The aim of this chapter is to analyse the logic of Schon's (1983) argument as 
presented in Chapter 2 of his text. A deconstructive reading is attentive to any 
contradiction or inconsistency in the argument advanced. As indicated in the 
preceding chapter, Schon (1983) is concerned to elaborate a new epistemology of 
practice that will take account of the realities faced by practitioners of the 
professions in their everyday practice situations. A new epistemology is needed as 
the existing dominant model of professional knowledge, the so-called model of 
technical rationality, is unable to accommodate the uncertain, unique, unstable, 
conflicting aspects of professional practice. Schon (1983) argues that there is a 
kind of knowing inherent in the actions of skilled practitioners that, if articulated, 
may provide a new epistemology, thereby legitimising the knowledge embedded in 
practice. 
Knowing-in-action is posited as a precursor to reflection-in-action. Knowing-in-
action is the tacit, intuitive, spontaneous knowing that is 'surfaced' by reflection-in-
action (Schon, 1983). Reflection-in-action becomes the means to achieving the end 
of identifying knowing-in-action. This knowing-in-action is represented as 
something that goes on all the time without conscious awareness on the part of the 
actor. Schon (1983, 54) describes the characteristics of this kind of knowing as 
follows: 
• There are actions, recognitions, and judgements which we know how 
to carry out spontaneously; we do not have to think about them prior 
to or during their performance. 
• We are often unaware of having learned to do these things; we simply 
find ourselves doing them. 
150 
• In some cases, we were once aware of the understandings which were 
subsequently internalized in our feeling for the stuff of action. In other 
cases, we may never have been aware of them. In both cases, however, 
we are usually unable to describe the knowing which our action 
reveals. 
The only time the actor's attention is drawn to the knowing that is implicit in 
action is when a situation presents as uncertain, unique, unstable or involves a 
conflict of values (Schon, 1983). On those occasions, there is an element of 
surprise which prompts reflection-in-action (Schon, 1983). Otherwise it may be 
assumed that knowing-in-action remains tacit and is the key to skilful, competent 
actions and practice, illustrated by such examples as tightrope walking, baseball 
pitching, face recognition, and solving mathematical problems (Schon, 1983). 
Referring to professional practice, Schon (1983) states: 
As a practitioner experiences many variations of a small number of types of 
cases, he is able to "practice" his practice. He develops a repertoire of 
expectations, images, and techniques. He learns what to look out for and how 
to respond to what he finds. As long as his practice is stable, in the sense that 
it brings him the same types of cases, he becomes less and less subject to 
surprise. His knowing-in-practice tends to become increasingly tacit, 
spontaneous, and automatic, thereby conferring upon him and his clients the 
benefits of specialization (Schon, 1983, 60). 
Practice needs to be stable in order for the practitioner to acquire the knowing-in-
action that is the basis of skilled performance. If practice is unstable, the 
opportunity to develop 'a repertoire of expectations, images and techniques', upon 
which skilled performance relies, does not occur. However, increasing knowing-
in-action through stable practice does not guarantee increasingly skilful 
performance. 
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Further, as a practice becomes more repetitive and routine, and as knowing-
in-practice becomes increasingly tacit and spontaneous, the practitioner may 
miss important opportunities to think about what he is doing. 
...And if he learns, as often happens, to be selectively inattentive to 
phenomena that do not fit the categories of his knowing-in-action, then he 
may suffer from boredom or "burn-out" and afflict his clients with the 
consequences of his narrowness and rigidity (Sch6n, 1983, 61) (My 
emphasis). 
The signifier 'knowing-in-action' appears to signify in two contrasting ways - as 
tacit knowledge that underpins skilled practice and, also, as the basis for rigid 
harmful action. Rather than becoming more skilled and competent as knowing-in-
action becomes more tacit and spontaneous, it appears the practitioner may 
become less skilled. Knowing-in-action was posited as a kind of knowing that 
enabled practitioners to cope well with important phenomena of practice, namely, 
uncertainty, instability, uniqueness, and value conflict. It was the observed 
inability of the dominant model of professional knowledge to deal with such 
phenomena that prompted the search for a new epistemology. However, it seems 
that practitioners of this new epistemology or reflective practitioners may be 
equally capable of ignoring phenomena that do not fit the categories of their 
knowing-in-action. In this respect, they could be said to resemble practitioners of 
the model of technical rationality, who, Schon (1983, 44-45) claims, may respond 
to the dilemma of rigor or relevance by: 
...cutting the practice situation to fit professional knowledge. This they do in 
several ways. They may become selectively inattentive to data that fall 
outside their categories. 
...Or they may try to force the situation into a mold (sic) which lends itself to 
the use of available techniques. 
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...All such strategies carry a danger of misreading situations, or manipulating 
them, to serve the practitioner's interest in maintaining his confidence in his 
standard models and techniques. When people are involved in the situation, 
the practitioner may preserve his sense of expertise at his clients' expense. (My 
emphasis). 
In the case of both models of professional knowledge, the outcome seems to be the 
same: a negative impact on the client. Could the logic of these two models be more 
similar to one another than was suggested by their rhetorical structure? A close 
reading of what Schon (1983, 59) terms 'a beautiful example of reflection-in-action.' 
may help to address this question. The example involves Schon's (1983) 
commentary on a report of a research experiment involving young children's 
attempts at balancing wooden blocks of varying weights on a metal bar. Some of 
the blocks are plain wooden blocks and some are weighted at different ends, 
conspicuously so in some instances, inconspicuously so in others (Schon, 1983). 
The researchers report their observations and describe the children's efforts. 
All of the children initially try to balance the blocks at what the researchers call 
their 'geometric centers,'; referring to this action, one child is quoted as saying: 
'things always balance in the middle-  (Schon, 1983, 57). When this action fails 
with the counterweighted blocks, some of the children persist in trying to balance 
the blocks in the same way with just small adjustments around the centre. When 
those attempts prove unsuccessful, the children abandon all effort declaring the 
task to be impossible (Schon, 1983). Other children, faced with the same problem, 
begin to decentre the blocks, first the conspicuously weighted ones and later the 
inconspicuously weighted ones, leading the researchers to comment that the 
children were now balancing the blocks at their 'centers of gravity' or, in the 
language of the children,: "you have to be careful, sometimes it's just as heavy on 
each side, sometimes it's heavier on one side-  (Schon, 1983, 58). 
The children seem capable of articulating the knowing that is in their actions, not 
of course, in the language of the researcher/observer but in a language sufficiently 
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lucid to enable the researcher/observer to recognise in it theories of physics and 
mathematics. In the latter stages of the experiment, the —children paused before 
each item, roughly assessed the weight distribution of the block by lifting it..., 
inferred the probable point of balance and then placed the object immediately very 
close to it, without making any attempts at first balancing at the geometric center'" 
(Schon, 1983, 58) (Researchers' emphasis). This description of the children's 
actions could be read as a process of thinking and deductive reasoning prior to 
action, which is similar to the model of technical rationality. 
How the knowing implicit in the children's actions becomes expressed in words is 
explained by Schon (1983, 59) in the following way: 
It is interesting to note that as the authors (of the research report) observe 
and describe this process, they are compelled to invent a language. They 
describe theories-in-action which the children themselves cannot describe. 
...Knowing-in-action which the child may represent to himself in terms of a 
'feel for the blocks', the observers redescribe in terms of "theories". I shall say 
that they convert the child's knowing-in-action to knowledge-in-action. 
A conversion of this kind seems inevitable in any attempt to talk about 
reflection-in-action. One must use words to describe a kind of knowing, and a 
change of knowing, which are probably not originally represented in words at 
all. (Schon's emphases). 
Contrary to Schon's (1983) declaration, and as already indicated, the children 
seem quite capable of describing their 'knowing-in-action' and of using words to 
do so, just as the researcher/observers use an already existing lexicon to re-
present the children's utterances in terms of theories. The ordinary language used 
by the children to describe what they are doing is converted by the observers into 
the language of science: 'These are the authors' theories about the children's 
knowing-in-action' (Schon, 1983, 59). How does this example compare to the 
knowing-in-action that is a necessary precondition for reflection-in-action? 
Knowing-in-action, which Schon (1983, 54) describes as 'the characteristic mode of 
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ordinary practical knowledge', is characterised as spontaneous and intuitive, the 
outcome of repeated practice. The children engaged in the research experiment 
have evidently some experience of balancing blocks, but no experience of 
balancing counterweighted blocks. In this sense, their knowing cannot be 
categorised as knowing-in-action. Also, they approach the task with some prior 
knowledge, namely, that 'things always balance in the middle'. In fact, their actions 
could be read in terms of the model of technical rationality, which considers 
'intelligent practice as an application of knowledge to instrumental decisions' 
(Schon, 1983, 50) (Schon's emphasis). The task given to the children is an 
instrumental one: to balance the blocks. The end is clear and unambiguous. And 
they apply their propositional knowledge to the task. If knowing was implicit in 
their actions, they would be unable to offer any verbal description. So, in two key 
aspects, the report of the block balancing experiment differs from SchOn's (1983) 
explication of knowing-in-action. 	 Even in the descriptions offered by the 
researchers, how can someone other than the 'doer' of the action describe 
knowing-in-action? The researcher/observers are unable to have a feel for the 
stuff (Schon, 1983, 49) of action in the way the actors have since the former are 
not engaged in the practical activity. And, in describing the knowing implicit in 
action, even if it were to be done by the actors themselves, is that not separating 
knowing from action, and consequently, distorting a key 'property' or 
characteristic of that knowing? Another key property of knowing-in-action is that 
it is 'ordinarily tacit' (Schon, 1983, 49). There are many references to this feature 
in Schon's (1983) text as indicated below: 
Often we cannot say what it is that we know (Schon, 1983, 49); skilful action 
often reveals a "knowing more than we can say" (Schon, 1983, 51); 
..."thinking processes" (are distinguished) from "non-logical processes" which 
are not capable of being expressed in words or as reasoning (Schon, 1983, 
51); non-logical processes which are omnipresent in effective practice (Schon, 
1983, 52); we are usually unable to describe the knowing which our action 
reveals (Schon, 1983, 54). 
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If that which cannot be expressed in words is expressed in words, is it still the 
same kind of knowing? In the case of the experiment conducted with the children, 
the example chosen to illustrate reflection-in-action involved block-balancing. In 
this example, the knowing is literally in the 'feel for the stuff with which (the 
children) are dealing' (Schein, 1983, 49); 'the stuff (literally) at hand' (Schein, 1983, 
50). Knowledge of how the blocks are weighted and where the weight is 
distributed may be determined by handling the blocks. The literality of the 
example may be indicative of Schon's (perhaps unconscious) desire to ensure that 
knowing and action remain inextricable. In the block-balancing example, the 
identity of reflection-in-action as a new epistemology of practice appears 
complicated or contaminated by the dominant model of technical rationality. 
Schein (1983) presents another illustration of the processes of reflection-in-action. 
A close reading of the text of this second example provides further insight into the 
logical basis of reflective practice. The example is taken from an in-service 
education programme for teachers undertaken by researchers. The education 
programme was 'organised around the idea of on-the-spot reflection and 
experiment' (Schein, 1983, 66), and designed to encourage the teachers taking part 
`to explore their own intuitive thinking about apparently simple tasks...' (Schein, 
1983, 66). What Scholl (1983, 67) describes as 'a critical event' occurred early in 
the research project/in-service programme. The teachers were asked to view a 
video recording of two boys seated on either side of an opaque screen (Schein, 
1983). Each child had a number of different coloured shapes on a table in front of 
him. In the case of one of the boys the shapes were arranged in a pattern, and in 
the case of the other boy, the shapes were scattered. The boy with the patterned 
shapes was requested to instruct the other boy to create a similar pattern. After a 
short time, the boy receiving the instructions appeared to have 'gone astray' 
(Schon, 1983, 67), although neither boy was aware of a problem. The 
teacher/viewers gave their responses to the tape which is quoted in the extract 
which follows: 
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In their initial reactions to the videotape, the teachers spoke of a 
"communications problem". They said that the instruction giver had "well-
developed verbal skills" and that the receiver was "unable to follow 
directions". Then one of the researchers pointed out that, although the blocks 
contained no green squares - all squares were orange and only triangles were 
green - she had heard the first boy tell the second to "take a green square". 
When the teachers watched the videotape again, they were astonished. That 
small mistake had set off a chain of false moves. 
...At this point, the teachers reversed their picture of the situation. They could 
see why the second boy behaved as he did. He no longer seemed stupid; he 
had, indeed, 'followed instructions". As one teacher put it, they were now 
"giving him reason". They saw reasons for his behaviour; and his errors, 
which they had previously seen as an inability to follow directions, they now 
found reasonable (Schon, 1983, 67-68). 
Previously Schon (1983, 50) described the process of reflection-in-action in the 
following way: 
Stimulated by surprise, they (professional practitioners) turn thought back 
on action and on the knowing which is implicit in action. They may ask 
themselves, for example, "What features do I notice when I recognise this 
thing? What are the criteria by which I make this judgement? What 
procedures am I enacting when I perform this skill? How am I framing the 
problem that I am trying to solve?" Usually reflection on knowing-in-action 
goes together with reflection on the stuff at hand. There is some puzzling, or 
troubling, or interesting phenomenon with which the individual is trying to 
deal. As he tries to make sense of it, he also reflects on the understandings 
which have been implicit in his action, understandings which he surfaces, 
criticizes, restructures, and embodies in further action. 
How does the intuitive thinking of the teachers in the videotape incident 
approximate the above description of reflection-in-action? The teachers respond 
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with surprise, but not to their initial interpretation of the meaning of the boys' 
behaviour on first viewing the tape recording. At that stage, they attribute the 
error observed to the 'second' boy's inability to follow clear verbal instructions due 
to some intellectual difficulty on his part. The teachers' surprise comes when an 
alternative explanation is given to account for the second boy's actions. They 'turn 
thought back on action' - but it is not on their own action in failing to listen 
carefully to the tape recording and hear accurately the instructions given by the 
'first' boy. Nor do they turn thought back on their intuitive judgement of the boys 
as verbally skilled in respect of the 'first' boy and intellectually challenged in 
respect of the 'second'. They do not appear to allow themselves to be puzzled or 
troubled by what they have observed. Their intuitive response is to explain their 
observations in terms of cause and effect without referring in any way to 
themselves or their role in this particular construction of meaning. The 'interesting 
phenomenon' that they try to deal with appears to be the 'small mistake that set off 
a chain of false moves', not their mistake in mishearing, but the first boy's mistake 
in the instruction he gave. The 'criteria' by which they made their judgement seem 
to derive from rational principles: behaviour is explained in terms of cause and 
effect. What changed for the teachers was being informed of the reason for the 
second boy's behaviour. Being apprised of the correct cause of boy's behaviour by 
a third party caused the teachers to change their understanding. While it is clear 
from the above example that the teachers involved in the research/in-service 
programme saw and understood the situation differently following reflection on 
their experience, the knowing that was surfaced could be understood as having its 
origins in a technical rational model of professional knowledge. 
Returning to the block balancing experiment, SchOn (1983, 59) concedes that that 
particular example of reflection-in-action is 'very far removed from our usual 
images of professional practice', and he offers the teachers' in-service/research 
programme as one of a number of 'brief examples of the kinds of reflection-in-action 
which I shall illustrate and discuss at greater length later on' (Schon, 1983, 63). 
Psychotherapy is one of the professional practices selected by Schon (1983) for a 
more detailed illustration of reflection-in-action. The chapter that describes 
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reflection-in-action in the context of psychotherapy practice is entitled: 
'Psychotherapy: The Patient as a Universe of One' (SchOn, 1983, 105), and it 
occupies Chapter 4 of Schon's text 'The Reflective Practitioner' That chapter 
appears to fulfil Schon's promise in the preface of his book to offer 'an approach to 
epistemology of practice based on a close examination of what some practitioners... 
actually do' (Schon, 1983, viii). The following deconstructive reading will focus 
once again on the logic of the argument presented. As indicated in the 
methodology chapter, psychotherapy practice was chosen for a deconstructive 
reading because it comes within the general remit of health care disciplines. It also 
shares some similarities with nursing. Both practices involve a helping role. 
Nursing is concerned not only with the physical wellbeing of patients and clients 
but also with their emotional and psychological wellbeing. Psychotherapy and 
nursing are both predicated on the formation and maintenance of therapeutic 
relationships with service users. This is particularly the case in mental health 
nursing. My previous experience as a student of psychological counselling also 
influenced the choice of this piece of text for analysis. 
Schon's (1983, viii) Chapter 4 presents, as anticipated also in the preface of his 
book, one of the 'vignettes of practice, concentrating on episodes in which a senior 
practitioner tries to help a junior one learn to do something'. Excerpts from a 
verbatim transcript of a tape recorded interaction between a psychiatric Resident 
(a student undertaking professional training in psychotherapy) and his Supervisor 
(a qualified experienced psychotherapist) form the focal point for Schon's (1983) 
analysis of reflection-in-action. Several ambiguities and complexities may be noted 
at the outset. The practices of teaching and therapy appear to be conflated in the 
chapter. Psychotherapy practice receives a great deal of attention in the discussion 
and commentary on the transcript even though it is not the practice being engaged 
in at the time of the recording. The actions and interventions of the Supervisor are 
the focus of Schon's (1983) interest, although the Supervisor, in this instance, is 
not the actual practitioner. Some background information regarding the 
supervisory session is provided: 
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The therapist is a third-year Resident in psychiatry. His current Supervisor, a 
psychoanalyst, is one of some sixty supervisors with whom he has met in the 
course of his three-year training program. The Resident sees his current 
Supervisor for one half-hour every week, averaging one supervisory session 
for every seven or eight sessions with the patient. Because the Resident has 
been troubled by his relations with this Supervisor, he has agreed to tape-
record the session and then to discuss the resulting protocol, hoping to learn 
from reflection on the record of the meeting (Schon, 1983, 109). 
Various layers of experience are interwoven in this example: the Resident's 
practice of therapy with his client; the Resident's relationship with his Supervisor; 
the Resident's experience of other supervisors; the supervisor's relationship with 
the Resident; the Supervisor's experience as a therapist; the Supervisor's role as a 
teacher; Schon's relationship with the Resident, the Resident's relationship with 
SchOn; and Schon's interest in illustrating reflection-in-action. The situation might 
be described as complex. However, the contextual factors alluded to above do not 
form any part of Schon's (1983) subsequent analysis and description of reflection-
in-action. This appears paradoxical as reflection-in-action is posited as an 
epistemology that takes account of unique contextual factors that pertain in 
practice situations. Presenting reflection-in-action as an a-contextual, static entity 
appears to mimic the dominant model of professional knowledge and is 
reminiscent of what Derrida (1997) refers to as the 'metaphysics of presence'. 
Scholl justifies his selection of an incident from professional education rather than 
professional practice to illustrate a new epistemology by stating that, in the 
context of professional education, 'a practitioner's reflection-in-action is more likely 
to be made public than it is in ordinary practice' (Schon, 1983, 108). An expectation 
is thereby created that the practitioner's tacit, intuitive knowing-in-action will be 
surfaced by the process of reflection-in-action. The reader may also have an 
expectation that the processes involved in this endeavour, for example, addressing 
such questions as "What are the criteria by which I make this judgement?" and 
— How am I framing the problem I am trying to solve?"' will be made explicit. 
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Schon's (1983) Chapter 4 begins by outlining the history of psychotherapy from its 
origins in medicine and psychiatry and its treatment of the insane to the 
development of various schools of therapy; the entry into the field of new 
professions, such as clinical psychology and social work; and the extension of 
therapy services to the general public. Schon (1983, 108) isolates the issue of 
therapeutic pluralism early on in the chapter and the various responses to the 
`predicament' posed by this phenomenon. 
Some practitioners, for example, share a disposition to regard the patient as a 
unique case - in Erik Erikson's words, "a universe of one". These practitioners, 
however much they may differ from one another in language and technique, 
share an approach to therapy that distinguishes them from those who regard 
patients as examples of standard diagnostic categories. The practitioners of 
the unique case are of special interest from the point of view of the study of 
reflection-in-action. 
Previously, Schon (1983, 41-42) had identified 'conflicting paradigms of 
professional practice, such as we find in the pluralism of psychiatry' as a problem for 
the model of technical rationality in that: 
...there is no clearly established context for the use of technique. There is 
contention over multiple ways of framing the practice role, each of which 
entrains a distinctive approach to problem setting and solving. And when 
practitioners do resolve conflicting role frames, it is through a kind of inquiry 
which falls outside the model of Technical Rationality'. 
Psychotherapy should therefore provide an example of the kind of inquiry that 
falls outside the dominant epistemology of practice, which views professional 
knowledge as the application of scientific theory and technique to real life 
problems of practice. Schon (1983, 108) makes the following comment prior to his 
presentation and analysis of the interaction between the Supervisor and the 
Resident: 
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I have chosen a practitioner who takes a psychoanalytic point of view, while 
recognizing that a protocol drawn from the work of Carl Rogers, Fritz Perls, 
or Salvador Minuchin might have produced a very different set of materials 
for analysis. It seems to me, nevertheless, that therapists, who are in other 
respects very different from one another must still frame the problem of the 
particular patient, construct and test interpretations of his behaviour, and 
design interventions aimed at helping him. The supervisor, in the case that 
follows, goes about his business in a manner peculiar to his underlying model 
of therapy, but the generality of his tasks links his inquiry to other therapies of 
the unique case. 
The above remarks seem to provide an indication of how particular theories and 
theoretical frameworks may be accommodated within a reflective practice 
epistemology. Schon (1983) suggests that there is a process common to all 
therapies that transcends theoretical approaches and may be discerned in the 
actions of the therapist. In the transcribed conversation included in the text, the 
Resident reports on his work with a particular client. As the transcript is 
presented and analysed it becomes clear that the 'generality' of the therapist's 
tasks cannot be separated from, or transcend, his underlying model of therapy. 
The Supervisor frames the client's problem, constructs interpretations, and 
designs interventions in terms consistent with psychoanalytic theory. At one 
point, he asks the Resident: 'How would you characterize her (the client's) 
problems in your own mind, psychodynamically?"' (Schon, 1983, 120). It also 
becomes clear that the Resident does not appreciate or identify with the generality 
of the tasks performed by the Supervisor. Reflecting on the tape recording, SchOn 
(1983, 125) remarks that: 
...he (the Resident) seeks to explain his troubles with the Supervisor in terms 
of conflicting approaches to psychotherapy: "He is more psychoanalytic, while 
I deal more with conscious phenomena". Yet he displays in the protocol an 
eagerness to join, indeed, to compete with, the Supervisor's psychoanalytic 
inquiry. 
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It may be that the Supervisor, when he 'brushes aside' (Schon, 1983, 120) the 
Resident's attempts at an explanation and when he 'refrains from joining the 
Resident's excursion into the patient's history' (Schon, 1983, 114) is being 
selectively inattentive to phenomena that do not fit the psychoanalytic model of 
therapy. The 'repertoire of meanings and psychodynamic patterns accessible to the 
Supervisor, but apparently not to the Resident' (Schon, 1983, 119) may be read 
more as a function of the differing theoretical approaches of the two practitioners 
rather than as a function of the Supervisor's knowing-in-action. 
Immediately following the transcript and prior to its analysis, a section entitled 
`Therapeutic Knowledge-in-Practice' is presented (Schon, 1983, 116). Knowledge-
in-practice, it may be recalled from the block-balancing experiment, is derived 
from converting the 'knowing' that is implicit in action to 'knowledge'. This is 
effected by a process of articulation and theorisation (Schon, 1983). The 
therapeutic knowledge-in-practice that is presented is that of psychotherapist Erik 
Erikson, whom Schon (1983) had previously referenced in respect of the former's 
approach to the predicament of therapeutic pluralism. Erikson's response to the 
pluralism of psychotherapy is to regard the patient as a unique case (Schon, 1983). 
Schon (1983, 116-118) outlines this approach as follows: 
Erik Erikson has described the psychotherapist's task as one of listening to the 
patient's complaint, eliciting its history, and making, testing, and delivering 
interpretations of the patient's data. The main questions of therapy have to 
do with the reliability of interpretation:... 
...to discover the patient's unconscious and refrain from imposing unconscious 
assumptions of his own... 
...The (patient's) material ought not to be subsumed under existing 
categories. The patient is "a 'series of one' who must be understood in terms 
of the unique experiences of his life". 
...In the testing of interpretations and, indeed, in the entire interpretive 
inquiry, Erikson gives a special place to the phenomenon of transference. 
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Schon (1983, 118) adds: 'In the protocol we have examined, the Supervisor lives out 
the main lines of Erikson's description of therapeutic practice'. Using a pre-existing 
theory to map onto and explain the practice situation seems to be at odds with the 
concepts of knowing-in-practice and reflection-in-action. Foregrounding the 
uniqueness and individuality of the patient and her life experiences may be 
understood as a way of obscuring the psychoanalytic theory that is being used to 
describe and explain the person and her difficulties. By sleight of text, as it were, 
the patient's difference from other patients in terms of her history and personal 
circumstances seems to be being used metonymically for the therapeutic approach 
as a whole. 
The above deconstructive reading may help to account for Schon's (1983) remarks 
towards the conclusion of the chapter. Referring to the Supervisor, he states: 
He (the Supervisor) does not reveal the thoughts and feelings which guide 
him in his shifts from one phase of inquiry to the next. He reflects-in-action 
but he does not reflect on his reflection-in-action. 
...Nor has the Supervisor tried to discover what the Resident makes of his 
demonstration. His approach to instruction consists in demonstrating and 
advocating a kind of therapeutic reflection-in-action, but it is also an 
approach of mystery and mastery. (Ref) He demonstrates his mastery of the 
material, but he keeps the sources of his performance mysterious (Scholl, 
1983, 126). 
At the outset, the expectation had been created that analysing an incident from 
education rather than professional practice was more likely to result in reflection-
in-action being made public. It seems clear from the above remarks that this has 
not occurred. Could the lack of publicity be attributable to the absence of 
reflection-in-action as a new epistemology of professional knowledge in this 
example? Schon (1983) does not entertain such a possibility because that would 
undermine his argument. Instead, he asserts that the Supervisor reflected-in-
action but did not share this knowledge with the Resident (Schon, 1983). If that is 
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the case, and the application of Erikson's 'theory of practice' or 'practice of theory' 
as a way of explaining the Supervisor's actions is overlooked, Schon's role could be 
regarded as that of 'analyst' to the interlocutors, with an ability to see and read 
meaning that has been disguised behind surface appearances. This might suggest 
that the application of theory (in this case psychoanalytic theory), which Schein 
(1983) has been attempting to suppress, turns out to dominate not just the 
interaction between the Supervisor and the Resident, but also the way that the 
interaction between the Supervisor and the Resident is interpreted and 
understood by the 'Auditor'. 
Towards the conclusion of Schon's (1983) Chapter 4, there is an account of what 
appears to be 'reflection-on-practice', not the practice of psychotherapy in this 
instance but the practice of teaching. Schein and the Resident listen to the tape 
recording of the supervision session (Schein, 1983). The Resident's thoughts and 
feelings about his experience are reported, for example: 
...he (the Resident) complains that the Supervisor was not telling him what he 
wanted to hear. Then, upon reflection, he adds that he was not asking for 
what he wanted to know. He doubts that the Supervisor is an effective role 
model for him. He wants more help than he is getting, but feels angry when he 
asks for it. He senses that the Supervisor has formed a negative judgement 
about him which has never been expressed, and he seeks to explain his 
troubles with the Supervisor in terms of conflicting approaches to 
psychotherapy:...(SchOn, 1983, 125). 
Schein (1983, 125-126) adds his perspective on the interaction between the 
Resident and the Supervisor: 
It is clear, both from the protocol and from private interviews, that the 
Resident discerns in the Supervisor's performance a knowing-in-practice that 
he values, but he is frustrated in his attempts to grasp it. 
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...The Resident does not know whether the Supervisor would be unwilling, or 
perhaps unable, to make more of his knowing-in-practice explicit. The 
Resident has not asked for this, and the Supervisor has not offered it. 
Schon (1983) then formulates the problem from his analysis of the data of the 
teaching situation. He attributes the difficulty experienced by the Resident to the 
failure of the Supervisor to make his thinking and analytic processes explicit. He 
also identifies the Resident's passivity in his approach to learning as contributing 
to the problem (Scholl, 1983). Rather than seek to clarify what he does not 
understand, the Resident keeps his negative feelings towards the Supervisor to 
himself and simply goes along with the Supervisor's approach (Schon, 1983). In 
the reflection on, and analysis of, the Resident's teaching/learning experience, 
Schon (1983) does not identify his own activity as an instance of reflection-on-
action. The primary reason for making the recording was the Resident's troubled 
relationship with his Supervisor and his wish ` to learn from reflection on the record 
of the meeting' (Schon, 1983, 109). While the main thesis of Schon's (1983) book is 
to elucidate 'reflection-in-action' as a supplement or alternative to the dominant 
model of professional knowledge, he acknowledges that 'reflection-on-action' is 
also possible. 
Practitioners do reflect on their knowing-in-practice. Sometimes, in the 
relative tranquility (sic) of a postmortem, they think back on a project they 
have undertaken, a situation they have lived through, and they explore the 
understandings they have brought to their handling of the case. They may do 
this in a mood of idle speculation, or in a deliberate effort to prepare 
themselves for future cases (Schon, 1983, 61) (Schon's emphasis). 
It seems paradoxical, therefore, that in the case of the supervision session, 
reflection-in-action could be identified even though it was not made explicit, yet in 
the case of the analysis of the supervision session, reflection-on-action is explicit 
yet not identified as such. 
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The knowledge that derives from reflection-on-action for the Resident is quite 
dramatically illustrated in the following quotation: 
It is very striking that the two therapists do not make their own interaction 
into an object of mutual reflection. In one of his interviews (with Schon), the 
Resident discovers this point. Excitedly, he shows how his relationship with 
the Supervisor resembles the patient's relationship to her therapist, especially 
in the matter of control and cooperation. Like his patient, the Resident feels 
stuck in his relationship to the person who is supposed to help him, wanting 
more from him than he feels he is getting, yet angry at himself for wanting 
more. But these issues do not come up for discussion in the clinical 
supervision itself Had they done so, the boundaries of reflection might have 
been stretched to include the meaning of the Supervisor's demonstration, the 
Supervisor might have begun to reflect on his own reflection-in-action, and 
the Resident might have begun to gain access to the mysterious sources of the 
Supervisor's performance (Schon, 1983, 126-127). 
Perhaps the source of the Resident's excitement is the recognition that he has 
learned to see and think psychodynamically. The Supervisor had urged the 
Resident to see in the client's relationship with him (her therapist) a reflection of 
her relationships outside therapy. Now the Resident has learned to see his 
relationship with the Supervisor as a reflection of the client's relationship with him 
(the Resident). And he has learned that he has learned to do this via the process of 
reflection-on-action. It is also paradoxical to note that what would have made the 
process of reflection-in-action explicit - what would have surfaced the Supervisor's 
knowing-in-action - that is, making the two therapists' own interaction into an 
object of mutual reflection, lay outside 'the boundaries of reflection' as represented 
in this vignette. Reflection-in-action seems to be never punctually present in the 
text that strives to demonstrate its identity. Its presence is endlessly deferred. 
167 
Chapter 7 Deconstructing Schon's text 3 
Having identified the limitations of technical rationality as a model of professional 
knowledge and made a case for a new epistemology of practice, SchOn (1983) 
provides an example of the new epistemology, which he names 'refection-in-
action', using an instance from psychotherapy (Schon, 1983). Deconstructing the 
text in which the above argument is presented could be seen to produce the 
following reading. The limitations of the dominant model of professional 
knowledge create a space that enables a new epistemology of practice to be 
articulated. However, the model of technical rationality casts a shadow over that 
space that is difficult to escape. The dominant model remains implicated in the 
new epistemology which making it difficult to separate the latter from the former. 
Every effort to do so seems to result in a reassertion of the dominant model. 
Reflection-in-action, in consequence, acquires a spectral quality; it is never fully 
present in the present. Chapter 5 of Schon's (1983) textbook 'The Reflective 
Practitioner' appears to address this issue of non-presence. The chapter is titled 
'The Structure of Reflection-in-Action' (Schon, 1983, 128), and it is the culmination 
and synthesis of Schon's (1983) investigations of reflection-in-action in both 
psychotherapy and architecture practice. The reader may, therefore, expect to find 
a quite detailed and explicit description of reflection-in-action and, perhaps, a 
clearer understanding of its unique identity. 
This chapter presents a deconstructive reading of Schon's (1983) Chapter 5. It is 
the final chapter of Schon's (1983) work to be considered in the context of this 
thesis. Rhetorically, the word 'structure' in the title of Schon's (1983) Chapter 5 
coming before the word(s) 'reflection-in-action' creates an expectation of the latter 
as a tangible, definable entity. Although mining for a new epistemology in the 
'swampy lowland' (Schein, 1983, 42) of practice, where practitioners must abandon 
technical rigor in order to involve themselves in problems of greatest human 
concern, and where their 'methods of inquiry' consist of 'experience, trial and error, 
intuition, and muddling through' (SchOn, 1983, 43), a structure is proposed which 
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may confer stability on a previously vague and elusive phenomenon. The 
structural metaphor continues as the aim of the chapter is outlined: 'I propose that 
by attending to the practitioner's reflection-in-action in both cases (architecture and 
psychotherapy practice) it is possible to discover a fundamental structure of 
professional inquiry which underlies the many varieties of design or therapy 
advocated by the contending schools of practice' (Schon, 1983, 130). The word 
'fundamental' connotes a ground or base, something that remains constant and 
unchanging in unstable situations of practice. The metaphor of structure is similar 
to that used to describe the model of technical rationality. However, the word 
'inquiry' suggests that the structure in question is a dynamic rather than a static 
entity, which is unlike the hierarchical, dominant model of professional knowledge. 
The process by which competent practitioners surface and articulate the tacit 
intuitive, knowing-in-action that they use to deal with unique and uncertain 
situations of practice will, it seems, be provided with a structure. 
The practices that SchOn (1983) has analysed and synthesised to create the 
structure of reflection-in-action are both instances where an experienced 
practitioner attempts to teach a junior colleague how to do something. As indicted 
in the previous chapter, in the context of psychotherapy, the practice being 
engaged in at the time of Schon's (1983) investigation is the practice of teaching 
rather than the practice of therapy. The same holds for the example of 
architecture. In neither case is the practice selected the actual practice of the 
experienced practitioner. Both are mediated via the students' experiences. 
Although the student therapist has engaged in the practice of therapy as therapist 
to a real client, in the architecture case, the 'practice' in question is an assignment 
given to all students by their teacher at the beginning of a college term. The 
student architects are required to design an elementary school using a given 'set of 
design specifications... and a graphic description of the site on which the school is to 
be built' (Schon, 1983, 80). In neither case is the interaction between the teacher 
and the student intended as a demonstration of reflection-in-action. In the 
architecture case, the interaction occurs in the context of a review of one student's 
progress with the assignment, something that occurs at intervals throughout the 
term (Schon, 1983). At the end of term, the student's completed assignment is 
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presented before a group of critical reviewers (Scholl, 1983). In the case of the 
psychotherapist, as outlined in the preceding chapter, the interaction occurs in the 
context of a supervision session in which the student discusses the work he has 
been engaged in as part of his professional training. In neither case is the author 
himself a witness to, or a participant in, the interactions he analyses. Schon (1983, 
81) develops the structure of reflection-in-action from protocols of the 
interactions, acknowledging, in the architecture case, that while the student can 
interpret the teacher's ` dychtic utterances - "here", "this", "that" ...only by observing 
his (the teacher's) movements', Schon's (1983) interpretation 'must reconstruct 
Quist's (the teacher's) pointing and drawing, referring to the sketches which 
accompany the transcript and, on occasion, making new sketches which clarify 
Quist's meanings'. These several degrees of separation have the effect of distancing 
the author from the object of his study. Reflection-in-action is already an image 
(Schon's reading) of an image (the protocols) of an object (reflection-in-action). 
Schon (1983) asserts that, in the examples he has chosen to fashion a structure of 
reflection-in-action, each senior practitioner reflects-in-action, although neither 
articulates this process in a manner that would be perceptible to other participants 
or onlookers. Of the architect teacher's performance, Schon, (1983, 104) states: 
This underlying process might emerge with greater clarity if Quist's 
demonstration were not so masterful. In his unfailing virtuosity, he gives no 
hint of detecting and correcting errors in his own performance. 
...But Quist reflects very little on his own reflection-in-action, and it would be 
easy for a student or observer to miss the fundamental structure of inquiry 
which underlies his virtuoso performance. 
Such an admission points to yet another layer of obscurity. The object itself 
(reflection-in-action) never appears, as such. 
The structure of reflection-in-action or professional inquiry as articulated by Schon 
(1983) may be summarised in the following way: a problem is presented - the 
problem as presented is unsatisfactory - the problem is reframed - the reframed 
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problem is tested - the processes of reframing and testing conclude when 
satisfactory change is produced or the problem is understood in a new way. 
References to 'knowing-in-action' or 'knowledge-in-practice' do not feature in 
Schon's (1983) account of the structure of reflection-in-action. So how is the issue 
of knowledge accommodated within the structure? 
A reference to professional knowledge occurs in the introduction to Schon's (1983) 
Chapter 5. Schon (1983, 128) begins his elaboration of the structure of reflection-
in-action by drawing attention to the differences between the two professional 
practices under consideration. 
The differences between architecture and psychotherapy are so very striking 
that at first glance there seems to be very little point in searching for 
resemblances. To begin with, the goals of the two professions have almost 
nothing to do with one another. The one aims at designing good buildings on 
a site; the other, at curing mental illness or helping people cope with the 
problems they encounter in their lives. One uses the media of sketchpad, 
delineations, scale models; the other, talk. The architect works in his studio; 
the therapist, in a clinic or office. And the two professions draw on very 
different bodies of professional knowledge. 
The difference contributed by 'bodies of professional knowledge' appears as the last 
item on a 'list' format as evident in the above extract. By the time the reader gets 
to 'professional knowledge', the impact of the very striking difference contributed 
by it is somewhat diluted. 'Goals' are elaborated to some degree in the above 
extract, as are 'media' and 'work locations'. However, there are no explanatory 
examples of professional knowledge. It could be assumed, given the context in 
which the reference occurs and the use of the verb 'draw on' with its 'banking' 
connotations, that the professional knowledge referred to is the scientific theories 
and techniques characteristic of the model of technical rationality. As attention is 
drawn to differences between the professions, differences within are somewhat 
obscured. An example of the latter appears in the extract above but in a way that 
makes it easy to overlook. Among the aims of therapy, Schon (1983, 128) cites 
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'curing mental illness or helping people cope with the problems they encounter in 
their lives'. (My emphasis). Whether a therapist is curing mental illness or helping 
people cope with problems in everyday life points to differences within the field of 
psychotherapy. The former suggests a medical model and medically qualified 
personnel with curative intent, whereas the latter indicates an orientation towards 
non-medically qualified professionals and a clientele who may be described as the 
'worried well'. Differences within the field of psychotherapy are further reinforced 
by reference to the location in which therapy is practiced: 'The architect works in 
his studio; the therapist, in a clinic or office' (Schon, 1983, 128). (My emphasis). A 
'clinic' has medical connotations whereas an 'office' is associated with business 
transactions and the provision of services to the general public. 
The presentation of differences in a list format creates an impression of separate 
entities with little or no connection between them. The spatial separation created 
by placing 'goals' at the beginning of the description of differences and 'bodies of 
knowledge' at the end serves to accentuate the lack of any connection or 
interrelatedness between these two elements. If connections were made or 
allowed to be inferred between the various differences listed, that would inevitably 
involve a reference to different bodies of professional knowledge. In the domain of 
psychotherapy, for example, a psychoanalyst will draw on a body of professional 
knowledge quite different from a therapist who follows an existential model. 
Therapeutic goals and methods will, likewise, be influenced and shaped by the 
specific theoretical approach being adopted. It is not fortuitous, perhaps, that the 
reference to 'different bodies of professional knowledge' in the above extract 
appears as the final item on the list. If the influence of the technical rational model 
of professional knowledge is greater than Schon (1983) might wish to 
acknowledge, where better to place a reference to it than at the end of a list 
prefaced by an 'And', and without additional explanatory remarks? 
Differences between the professions, which might, if analysed in detail, reassert 
the dominance of the technical rational model of professional knowledge, are given 
quite cursory attention. The focus of SchOn's (1983) text moves to a consideration 
of the similarities between the two practices, as these 'create the conditions for 
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reflection-in-action' (Scholl, 1983, 129). Among the similarities identified are that 
both practitioners approach the student's problem as unique, and, because of that, 
they do not try to apply 'standard theories or techniques' (Schon, 1983, 129). As 
similarities are described, the dominant model of professional knowledge appears 
to surface but in a disguised form. 
In both examples, the practitioner approaches the practice problem as a 
unique case. He does not act as though he had no relevant prior experiences; 
on the contrary. But he attends to the peculiarities of the situation at hand 
(Schon, 1983, 129). 
In what does 'relevant prior experience' consist? The reference to it is placed 
between 'a unique case' and 'the peculiarities of the situation', both emphasising 
something that has not happened or been seen before. The reference is brief and 
abruptly terminated: the 'contrary' of acting `as though he had no relevant prior 
experience' is not presented. Some clues to its identity, however, are provided 
when Schon (1983) explains the concept of reframing'. The process of reflection-
in-action begins when the student or junior colleague presents a problem that the 
senior practitioner rejects. Schon (1983, 129) states: 
In the half hour or so that he (the senior practitioner) spends with the 
student, he must construct an understanding of the situation as he finds it. 
And because he finds the situation problematic, he must reframe it. 
Reframing is explained as follows: 
...the practitioner tries nevertheless to set a problem he can solve. If (the 
senior practitioners) failed to do this, they would be stuck as their students 
are stuck. Hence they step into the situation with a framing of the problem for 
which they feel they can find a solution. 
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Quist (the Architect) chooses a geometry of parallels which can be made to 
work slightly with the contours of the slope; at the same time, he sets a 
threshold standard of fit which enables him to say that "slightly" is enough. 
The Supervisor (Psychotherapist) frames the patient's problem in terms of 
the transference which lends itself both to a strategy of inquiry and a strategy 
of intervention. Neither practitioner can know, at the moment of reframing, 
what the solution to the problem will be, nor can he be sure that the new 
problem will be soluble at all. But the frame he has imposed on the situation 
is one that lends itself to a method of inquiry in which he has confidence 
(Schon, 1983, 134). 
The problems presented by the students are rejected, perhaps, because they are 
not framed in a way consistent with the teacher's theoretical framework. In the 
case of the Supervisor, reframing appears to be a matter of converting the 
presented problem into a form consistent with psychoanalytic theory: concepts 
such as `guilt', `conflict' and `transference' are key elements of psychoanalytic 
theory. 
The Supervisor builds gradually from his perception of the patient's dilemma 
toward an interpretive synthesis congruent with his fundamental values and 
theories. He reaches for partial interpretations which stay close to the data of 
the thematic stories he has elicited from the resident. He guides his search for 
explanations by reference to the psychoanalytic themes of "inner conflict" and 
"guilt". By the time he has fully surfaced his interpretive synthesis, he 
has...made it congruent with psychoanalytic theory (Schon, 1983, 136). 
Although Schon (1983, 133) maintains that the senior practitioners ` act as though 
they were judging their reframing of the students' problems in terms of these 
questions (which include): Have I made it (the presented problem) congruent with 
my fundamental values and theories?', he does not, in the context of the discussion 
of the structure of reflection-in-action, elaborate on the meaning of the term 
`fundamental values and theories'. 	 Nor does he explain how the senior 
practitioners come to hold their fundamental values and theories. However, he 
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refers to the Supervisor valuing 'self assertion, independence, and the ability to free 
oneself from dead ends; the story (as relayed by the student), which reveals the 
absence of these qualities in the patient, gives him a direction in which to seek 
interpretive understanding' (Schon, 1983, 135). The values identified above could 
be explained as deriving from a particular theory or model of mental health. It is 
possible to argue that it is the absence of sameness rather than the presence of 
difference in the problem presented by the student that guides the senior 
practitioner's actions, actions that will terminate with the student's adoption of the 
Supervisor's theoretical model which will be applied subsequently in his 
therapeutic work with the patient. 
The issue of prior experience is the subject of a separate section of Schein's (1983) 
Chapter 5 entitled: 'Bringing Past Experience to Bear on a Unique Situation' (Scholl, 
1983, 137). The discussion which follows the above title addresses one of the 
questions posed by Schon (1983, 133) which, he maintains, points 'to a further 
elaboration of reflection-in-action as an epistemology of practice'. Schon (1983, 
132) asks: 
When the practitioner takes seriously the uniqueness of the present situation, 
how does he make use of the experience he has accumulated in his earlier 
practice? When he cannot apply familiar categories of theory or technique, 
how does he bring prior knowledge to bear on the invention of new frames, 
theories, and strategies of action? 
This question seems to bear directly on the issue of how the dominant model of 
professional knowledge relates to the new epistemology of practice. In explaining 
the relationship, Schon (1983, 137) does not refer to the model of technical 
rationality by name. Instead, he acknowledges that: 
Quist (the Architect) recognizes many familiar things in Petra's (the 
Student's) situation, and he places them within familiar, named categories 
such as "parallels", "classrooms", "slope", and "wall". 
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Similarly, the Supervisor recognizes and names examples of "self-assertion", 
"dependence", and "guilt". But when it comes to the situation as a whole, 
each practitioner does not subsume it under a familiar category but treats it 
as a unique entity for which he must invent a uniquely appropriate 
description (Scholl, 1983, 137). 
How familiar parts are made to constitute a unique whole is not explained. It is not 
fortuitous, perhaps, that the professions selected for analysis are those whose 
object of study - building sites and human beings - is likely to vary from one 
instance to the next. It is possible that this inherent variation may be being used 
metonymically for the situation as a whole: 'The notions of guilt and self-frustration 
guide his (the Supervisor's) attempts to discover what is different about this 
patient's experience' (Scholl, 1983, 137) (Schon's emphasis). 
Schon (1983) acknowledges as puzzling how a practitioner can make use of prior 
experience in a situation that he approaches as a unique case. He states in this 
regard: 'It is clear that (both practitioners) use a great deal of their experience and 
knowledge' (Schon, 1983, 138-139), and goes on to propose the following solution 
to the puzzle: 
What I want to propose is this: The practitioner has built up a repertoire of 
examples, images, understandings, and actions. Quist's repertoire ranges 
across the design domains. It includes sites he has seen, buildings he has 
known, design problems he has encountered, and solutions he has devised for 
them. The Supervisor's repertoire includes patients he has seen or read about, 
types of stories he has heard and psychodynamic patterns associated with 
them, interventions he has tried, and patients' responses to them. A 
practitioner's repertoire includes the whole of his experience insofar as it is 
accessible to him for understanding and action. (Schon's emphasis). 
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When a practitioner makes sense of a situation he perceives to be unique, he 
sees it as something already present in his repertoire. (Ref) To see this site as 
that one is not to subsume the first under a familiar category or rule. It is, 
rather, to see the unfamiliar, unique situation as both similar to and different 
from the familiar one, without at first being able to say similar or different 
with respect to what. (Schon's emphases). 
...Seeing this situation as that one, one may also do in this situation as in that 
one. (Schon's emphases). 
...Indeed, the whole process of seeing-as and doing-as may proceed without 
conscious articulation. (Schon's emphases). 
How can something which is taken to be unique, at the same time, be seen as 
something already present in the practitioner's repertoire? Is such an approach 
not an indication that the practitioner is not, in fact, seeing the situation as unique? 
Schon (1983, 138) cites Thomas Kuhn's idea of an `exemplar' in the context of 
scientific problem solving to illustrate the former's case for 'seeing-as'. Schon 
(1983, 139) quotes Kuhn as follows: —confronted with a problem, [one] seeks to see 
it as like one or more of the exemplary problems he has encountered before...his basic 
criterion is a perception of similarity that is both logically and psychologically prior 
to any of the numerous criteria by which that same identification might have been 
made..." . No reference is made, in the more extended quotation from Kuhn, to 
unique features or differences. When Schon (1983, 139-140) applies the argument 
for 'seeing-as' to the practitioners whose reflection-in-action he is analysing, he 
states: 
When Quist immediately calls Petra's site "screwy" and says that she must 
impose a discipline on it, which she can always break open later, I believe he is 
seeing her situation as one or more others with which he is familiar and 
carrying over to her problem variations of strategies he has employed before. 
And when the Supervisor asks how the woman is stuck in her relation with her 
boyfriend as she is stuck in her relation to the therapist, I believe he is doing 
very much the same sort of thing. 
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...It is our capacity to see unfamiliar situations as familiar ones, and to do in 
the former as we have done in the latter, that enables us to bring our past 
experience to bear on the unique case. 
No reference is made in the above extract to any unique features of the situation or 
how these may be accommodated within the familiar. Nor is any reference made 
to how an already existing familiar situation is thereby changed. Difference falls 
away and any unique features are dissolved in an effort, perhaps, to make the 
strange familiar. It appears also that the new epistemology of practice must itself 
be subsumed under existing (Kuhnian) familiar categories in order that its identity 
may be asserted. 
Practitioners' prior knowledge and experience constitutes a 'repertoire' which 
permits them to see the unique case as familiar. A list format is once again used to 
present the sources of the practitioner's prior knowledge and experience. In the 
case of the Supervisor, his repertoire is developed from 'patients he has seen or 
read about, types of stories heard and psychodynamic patterns associated with them, 
interventions he has tried and patients' responses to them' (Schon, 1983, 138). The 
source of these sources is not explored. It may be assumed, however, that before 
the Supervisor began to see patients, he had completed or was undertaking 
concurrently some formal training in psychotherapy, and that the model of 
professional knowledge and education to which he was exposed approximated the 
model of technical rationality. Similarly with patients read about, it is likely that 
the sources of his reading were academic and professional journals reporting on 
research studies or other empirical investigations. Stories heard would be told, as 
the above quotation indicates, from a psychodynamic perspective. Interventions 
and responses would likewise be filtered via the same viewpoint. If the repertoire 
is what enables the practitioner to see unfamiliar situations as familiar ones, and to 
do in the former as he has done in the latter, he may be doing little more than 
applying relevant scientific theory and technique to the practice situation. Such an 
interpretation is supported by the lack of any reference to tacit, intuitive, knowing-
in-action in the account of how a practitioner's repertoire is developed. All sources 
may be explained as consciously acquired and cognitively mediated. 
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The section of Schon's (1983) Chapter 5 that follows the account of past 
experience as an element of the structure of reflection-in-action is entitled: 'Rigor 
in On-the-Spot Experiment' (Schon, 1983, 141). It begins: 
Seeing-as is not enough, however. When a practitioner sees a new situation as 
some element of his repertoire, he gets a new way of seeing it and a new 
possibility for action in it, but the adequacy and utility of his new view must 
still be discovered in action. Reflection-in-action necessarily involves 
experiment (Schon, 1983, 141). 
The limitations of the practitioner's repertoire are signalled in the opening 
sentence of the above extract. Repertoire alone does not describe adequately the 
structure of reflection-in-action. In the title of this section of Schon's (1983) text, 
the words 'rigor' and 'experiment' have connotations of scientific endeavour. At the 
same time, describing experiment as 'on-the-spot', which connotes urgency and 
immediate action, serves to distinguish the experimenting of reflection-in-action 
from the more planned and controlled experiments that characterise scientific 
method. 	 By exploring the 'experimenting' of reflection-in-action, and by 
comparing and contrasting it with experiments conducted as part of scientific 
method, the structure of reflection-in-action as a new epistemology of practice is 
likely to be further clarified. An unstated assumption of Schon's (1983) account of 
the experimenting involved in reflection-in-action is that it yields knowledge-in-
practice, just as scientific experiments yield scientific knowledge. Scientific 
experiment serves as the point of reference or norm of experimenting against 
which the 'on-the-spot' experimenting of reflection-in-action will be described 
(Schon, 1983, 141). The dominant model of professional knowledge, with its basic 
science component, could, therefore, be regarded as a condition of possibility of 
reflection-in-action. In the absence of the model of technical rationality, is it 
possible that the identity of reflection-in-action could be asserted? Several pages 
of text are devoted to outlining the method of hypotheses-testing in traditional 
scientific experiments (Schon, 1983). The drawbacks and limitations of this kind 
of experimenting in practice situations are then outlined by Schon (1983, 144) as 
follows: 
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Under conditions of everyday professional practice the norms of controlled 
experiment are achievable only in a very limited way. The practitioner is 
usually unable to shield his experiments from the effects of confounding 
changes in the environment. The practice situation often changes rapidly, and 
may change out from under the experiment. Variables are often locked into 
one another, so that the inquirer cannot separate them. The practice 
situation is often uncertain, in the sense that one doesn't know what the 
variables are. And the very act of experimenting is often risky. 
The differences between hypothesis-testing in the practice context and the context 
of research are also outlined. 
...hypothesis-testing experiment has a more limited function in practice than 
in research. And because of this, constraints on controlled experiment in the 
practice situation are less disruptive of inquiry than they would otherwise be. 
... the practice context places demands on hypothesis testing which are not 
present in the context of research (Schon, 1983, 152). 
Throughout SchOn's (1983) description of the experimenting that is characteristic 
of reflection-in-action, there is constant reference to practice: 'In practice, the 
hypothesis subjected to experiment may be one that has been implicit in the pattern 
of one's moves...' (Schon, 1983, 147); 'What is it, then, that is distinctive about the 
experimenting that goes on in practice?' (Schon, 1983, 147); 'And from this fact 
follows the distinctive character of experimenting in practice' (Scholl, 1983, 147); 
'But in practice situations...hypothesis testing is bounded by appreciations' (Schon, 
1983, 151) (My emphases). 
Practice is contrasted with research as illustrated in the following quotation: 
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Hence, according to the model of Technical Rationality, emphasis is placed on 
the separation of research from practice. On this view, practice should be 
based on scientific theory achievable only through controlled experiment, 
which cannot be conducted rigorously in practice (Schon, 1983, 144). 
The rigour that is an essential part of scientific research cannot be identical with 
the rigour of 'on-the-spot' experimenting in practice situations that is 
characteristic of reflection-in-action. 
However, it becomes clear in the part of Schon's (1983) chapter that follows the 
account of on-the-spot experimenting that it is not practice per se that is being 
discussed but rather 'a virtual world' of practice. Schon (1983, 157-158) remarks: 
The situations of Quist (the Architect) and the Supervisor are, in important 
ways, not the real thing. Quist is not moving dirt on the site. The Supervisor is 
not talking to the patient. Each is operating in a virtual world, a constructed 
representation of the real world of practice. 
This fact is significant for the question of rigor in experimenting. In his virtual 
world, the practitioner can manage some of the constraints to hypothesis-
testing experiment which are inherent in the world of his practice. Hence his 
ability to construct and manipulate virtual worlds is a crucial component of 
his ability not only to perform artistically but to experiment rigorously. 
...Constraints which would prevent or inhibit experiment in the built world 
(referring to the architect's practice) are greatly reduced in the virtual world 
of the drawing. 
...The pace of action can be varied at will. The designer can slow down, to 
think about what he is doing. On the other hand, events that would take a 
long time in the built world - the carving of a slope, the shaving of the trees -
can be made to "happen" immediately in the drawing. 
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No move is irreversible. The designer can try, look, and by shifting to another 
sheet of paper, try again...Moves that would be costly in the built world can be 
tried at little or no risk in the world of the drawing. 
It is possible to eliminate changes in the environment which would disrupt or 
confound experiment. In the drawing, there are no work stoppages, 
breakdowns of equipment, or soil conditions which would make it impossible 
to sink a foundation. 
Some variables which are interlocking in the built world can be separated 
from one another in the world of the drawing. 
It is not just the worlds of research and practice that are distinguished in the above 
account. The world of practice is itself divided into a 'virtual' and a 'real' one. 
However, from the description given of the virtual world, it appears more similar 
to the world of research than the real world of practice. The issue of rigour would 
seem to necessitate the construction of a virtual world of practice: 'Virtual worlds 
are contexts for experiment within which practitioners can suspend or control some 
of the everyday impediments to rigorous reflection-in-action' (Schon, 1983, 162). 
Just as controlled experiments, which yield scientific knowledge, 'cannot be 
conducted rigorously in practice' (Scholl, 1983, 144), neither, it seems, can the 'on-
the-spot' experimenting of reflection-in-action. The desire that the experimenting 
of reflection-in-action be rigorous, a value closely associated with scientific 
investigation, could be understood as necessitating the creation of a world more 
similar to the world of research than the real world of practice. The phrase 'on-the-
spot' appears to be redundant as a description of the kind of experimenting 
characteristic of reflection-in-action. In addition, it could be argued that other 
kinds of research, in particular, non-quantitative methodologies, might be closer to 
the real world of practice than is the virtual world as envisioned by SchOn (1983). 
Bearing in mind that the purpose of developing a new epistemology of practice is 
to accommodate phenomena important to 'actual practice' (Schon, 1983, 39), for 
example, uniqueness, instability, uncertainty and value conflict, it seems 
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paradoxical to detour via a virtual world. Given the manipulations imposed 
therein, there is no guarantee that knowledge derived by experimenting in a 
virtual world will transfer successfully to the real world of practice. Relevance 
may again be sacrificed on the altar of rigour. Referring to the architect's practice, 
Schon (1983, 159) acknowledges the issue of the transfer of knowledge but not the 
paradox upon which his account is founded: 
But the virtual world of the drawing can function reliably as a context for 
experiment only insofar as the results of experiment can be transferred to the 
built world. The validity of the transfer depends on the reliability with which 
the drawn world represents the built one. 
...Drawing functions as a context for experiment precisely because it enables 
the designer to eliminate features of the real world situation which might 
confound or disrupt his experiments, but when he comes to interpret the 
results of his experiments, he must remember the factors that have been 
eliminated. (My emphasis). 
Reflection-in-action was presented as an epistemology of practice that would 
surface and articulate knowing-in-practice. For that reason, the issue of the 
'application' of knowledge to practice did not arise. How knowledge derived from 
experimenting in a virtual world will transfer to the situations of instability, 
uniqueness, uncertainty and value conflict that a practitioner must deal with in the 
real world of practice is not addressed beyond the final cursory remark in the 
above extract. But the above account could be read as requiring that knowledge 
created in one domain be utilised in another that differs from the former 'in 
important ways' (Schon, 1983, 157). This would impose limits on reflection-in-
action as a model of professional knowledge not unlike those that apply to, and 
have been criticised in, the model of technical rationality. 
Experimenting in reflection-in-action is described as 'exploratory', 'move-testing', 
and 'hypothesis testing' (Schon, 1983, 145-146). Exploratory experiment involves 
taking action 'only to see what follows, without accompanying predictions or 
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expectations' (Schon, 1983, 145); move-testing experiments describe 'Any 
deliberate action undertaken with an end in mind' (Scholl, 1983, 146); and 
hypothesis testing experiments are designed to confirm or refute particular 
hypotheses that are proposed to explain particular observations. Schon (1983, 
151) explains the relationship between the different kinds of experiment in the 
following way: 
...the action by which he (the practitioner) tests his hypothesis is also a move 
by which he tries to effect a desired change in the situation, and a probe by 
which he explores it. 
Various outcomes may follow experimenting in reflection-in-action (Schon, 1983). 
The discussion of outcomes sheds light on the relationship between theory and 
action in the new epistemology of practice. Schon (1983, 153) describes the 
following outcome as 'a typical case for reflection-in-action': 
When a move fails to do what is intended and produces consequences 
considered on the whole to be undesirable, the inquirer surfaces the theory 
implicit in the move, criticizes it, restructures it, and tests the new theory by 
inventing a move consistent with it (Scholl, 1983, 155). 
While reflection-in-action typically attends unexpected and undesirable results, 
there are other outcomes which do not prompt a similar response. In such cases, 
'the inquirer's expectation is disappointed but the consequences (of the action) taken 
as a whole are considered desirable. The associated theory is refuted but the move is 
affirmed' (Schon, 1983, 155). Referring to the architecture student, Schon (1983, 
156) states: 
Petra need not reflect on the theory which underlay her move. According to 
the logic of affirmation, the move has succeeded. Petra may wonder why her 
gallery failed to work as expected. But she need not reflect on it unless she 
wishes to consider the present case as a preparation for future cases where 
problems of circulation are also likely to arise. 
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It might be imagined that the above outcome should also be a typical case of 
reflection-in-action. As the theory associated with the move has been refuted, it is 
probable that there is some other theory implicit in the successful move. Would 
the practitioner not wish to identify the theory implicit in the move which led to its 
being successful? Could the above situation not be read as an instance of the tacit 
intuitive knowing that is revealed in the skilful actions of competent practitioners 
as they deal with complexity and uncertainty in practice situations? Is it not the 
purpose of reflection-in-action to surface and articulate such knowledge so that it 
may be used in future similar cases as indicated in the final remark of the above 
quotation? By remaining equivocal about the necessity for reflection in the above 
situation, Schon (1983) may be attempting to protect reflection-in-action as an 
alternative epistemology of practice. If theory can be isolated and separated from 
action in the process of reflecting-in-action, and if the theory that is thereby 
identified can be used in future similar situations of practice, it might become 
difficult to distinguish the new epistemology from the dominant model of 
professional knowledge. 
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Chapter 8 Deconstructing reflective practice in nursing 
texts 1 
As indicated in the historical overview presented in Chapter 3, reflective practice, 
as it relates to nursing education and practice, has been debated, theorised and 
researched in a range of academic and professional nursing journals. Publications 
were particularly numerous during the period when pre-registration nursing 
education was making the transition from hospital-based apprenticeship-style 
training to a tertiary education model. This occurred in the UK in the late 
1980s/early 1990s, and in Ireland, in two stages, from the mid-1990s to the early 
2000s. A number of nursing texts from this period have been chosen for a 
deconstructive reading in this chapter. The complete text of 3 journal articles as 
well as fragments from a further two forms the material for analysis. The criteria 
for text selection have been outlined in Chapter 4 (Section 4.10.1, p149). In 
addition to the criteria enumerated there, all of the texts that will be analysed in 
the following pages are ones that I have read before, in another context and for 
another purpose. They are resources that I have looked to in order to gain a 
greater understanding and appreciation of reflective practice, and its role and 
potential in nursing education and practice. The appreciations gained via my 
encounter with these texts provided a source of guidance in facilitating learning 
about reflection. All of the texts included in this chapter provoked questions and 
deliberations on my part, and lively discussion with learners in the classroom 
context. In that sense, they are texts that have made a difference to a particular 
aspect of my life. As indicated in the methodology chapter, Johnson (1987, xvii) 
recommends that such texts be re-read in a deconstructive way so that they may 
be viewed in 'a more complex, more constructed, less idealised light'. The following 
table contains full reference details of the papers selected for analysis in this 
chapter: 
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Title of Paper Title of Publication Author Year of 
Publication 
The Reflective Practitioner in 
Nursing 
Journal of Advanced 
Nursing 
Jean H. Powell 1989 
Tacit nursing knowledge: an 
untapped resource of a 
methodological headache? 
Journal of Advanced 
Nursing 
Liz Meerabeau 1992 
Reflective Practice: where 
now? 
Nurse Education in 
Practice 
Gary Rolfe 2002 
Table 8.1 Details of journal articles A 
Shorter extracts are drawn from the following two sources: 
Title of Paper Title of Publication Author(s) Year of 
Publication 
Reflective Practice: 
reviewing the issues and 
refocusing the debate 
International Journal of 
Nursing Studies 
Brenda Clarke 
Chris James 
Jan Kelly 
1996 
Reflection and nursing 
education 
Journal of Advanced 
Nursing 
Wanda Pierson 1998 
Table 8.2 Details of journal fragments 
The two shorter extracts outlined above are considered first. These fragments are 
included as I consider them illustrative of the tensions involved in attempting to 
identify reflective practice knowledge and to distinguish reflective practice from 
technical rationality. In an article that covers a wide range of issues bearing on 
reflective practice and nursing, Clarke, James, & Kelly (1996, 177) argue 'for 
separating out two kinds of reflection' which they term 'deliberative reflection and 
deep reflection'. Deliberative reflection is described in the following way: 
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Deliberative reflection allows professionals to practice thoughtfully, 
intelligently and carefully. This kind of reflection involves higher order 
processes of reflection such as planning, preparing, analysing, synthesizing, 
predicting and evaluating. These important reflective processes require 
practitioners to draw on both their knowledge of the context in which they 
are working and their non-contextualised professional knowledge. They do 
this in order to make decisions about appropriate courses of action and to 
solve the myriad of problems that confront them in their professional work. 
The outcome is the professional judgement, and such judgements take place 
before, during and after practice (Clarke et al., 1996, 177 ). 
The authors appear to sense the possibility that their description of deliberative 
reflection could be (mis)read as a description of technical problem solving. The 
word 'reflection' or 'reflective' appears in each of the first three sentences that 
describe the process, and twice in the second sentence. What might be 
(mis)interpreted as a rational linear process is countered, to some extent, by the 
description given of the context in which deliberative reflection is used. Reference 
to 'the myriad of problems that confront (practitioners) in their professional work' 
connotes a sense of the unpredictability and pressures that characterise the real 
life world of clinical practice. Clarke et al. (1996) explicitly acknowledge the 
problem of (mis)interpretation. They follow their explication of deliberative 
reflection above with the commentary below: 
The process of arriving at a professional judgement in this way may appear to 
be grounded in a positivist form of logic, but the nature of the form of 
knowledge on which the practitioner draws means that it cannot be truly 
positivist in nature. The knowledge of the practitioner is grounded in 
interpretive judgements of a dialectical form, constructed by the reflections of 
the practitioner, rather than in 'facts" that can be externally verified. The 
process may appear positivist because in the practical life of the professional, 
the true complexity must go unnoticed... (Clarke et al., 1996, 177). 
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In the above extract, the identity of deliberative reflection is further divided 
between its truth or 'reality' and how it appears. This state of affairs is reminiscent 
of SchOn's (1983) comments regarding practitioner expertise which tends to 
mystify the process of reflection-in-action. This aspect of Schon's (1983) argument 
has been outlined in a previous chapter in the context of psychotherapy and 
architecture practice. Deep reflection, on the other hand, as described by Clarke et 
al. (1996), does not attract any clarifying statements. It is presented as a more 
overarching concept which includes the ...processes of deliberative reflection' 
(Clarke et al., 1996, 177), and is oriented to a consideration of how knowledge is 
acquired. 
In a similarly wide ranging article entitled simply 'Reflection and nursing 
education', Pierson (1998,169) proposes that reflection requires 'the employment 
of both calculative and contemplative thinking'. The former is directed towards 
analysis and problem-solving while the latter involves exploring meanings. 
Calculative thought is encompassed within contemplative reflection. These 
descriptions are not unlike Clarke et al.'s (1996) 'deliberative' and 'deep' reflection. 
However, unlike Clarke et al. (1996), there is no attempt to suppress the 
association between calculative thinking and positivism. 
Calculative thinking represents the spirit of positivistic thinking. 
...Within this perspective, the substance of reflection resides in instrumental 
problem-solving directed by the strict application of theory and technique... 
It is a superficial level of reflection ...(that)... primarily serves to reinforce 
positivistic and behaviourist educational traditions (Pierson, 1998, 166). 
The technique of reflection may be taught as a discrete skill. Students may be 
encouraged to examine their thoughts, feelings and understanding of 
situations via written and verbal reflective processes. As educators, however, 
we must be aware that some of the techniques and strategies implemented to 
facilitate reflection, may actually strengthen calculative thinking (Pierson, 
1998, 169). 
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If calculative thinking, which is a kind of reflection, is strengthened, so Pierson's 
(1998) description above would suggest, then this kind of reflection becomes more 
like, and perhaps indistinguishable from, the model of technical rationality. Clarke 
et al.'s (1996) concern to distinguish their 'deliberative' reflection from any 
positivist connotations may be understood as an attempt to ensure that the 
boundary between reflection and technical rationality is sharply drawn, and that 
no inadvertent blurring occurs. Both of the above fragments appear to illustrate 
the difficulty involved in attempting to disentangle reflective practice from the 
dominant model of professional knowledge. The authors' desire to create distance 
and difference between reflective practice and technical rationality appears, 
paradoxically, to produce an effect of sameness. 
The first full text article that is the subject of a deconstructive reading is a report of 
a research study. Entitled 'The reflective practitioner in nursing', by Jean Powell, it 
was published in the 'Journal of Advanced Nursing' in 1989. I chose this paper as it 
was one of the first published on reflective practice in nursing and its publication 
coincided with a period of enormous change and transition in nursing education 
referred to earlier in the introduction to this chapter. The title of the paper 
conveys a confident assertion that the reflective practitioner is (locatable) in 
nursing. Powell (1989, 824), identified in the text as a Principal Lecturer in 
Nursing in a School of Humanities, Education and Social Science, describes her 
research as 'a study of eight practising registered nurses and their use of reflection-
in-action in their everyday work'. Given its relative novelty at the time the paper 
was published, the language of Schon's (1983) new epistemology seems to have 
been easily adopted in the context of Powell's (1989) study. The aim of the 
research was to investigate the kind of knowledge used by experienced nurses in 
practice, and to establish if this knowledge included reflection-in-action (Powell, 
1989). Motivated by the anticipated 'radical change' (Powell, 1989, 824) in 
nursing education in the United Kingdom with the introduction of Project 2000 at 
that time, and, also, by reductions in funding for post-registration nursing 
education that would result in fewer formal education programmes, learning from 
reflection on experience was identified as a possible means of providing a less 
costly approach to continuing professional development. However, reflection 
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should not, in Powell's (1989, 824-825) view, replace formal education courses but 
rather complement them as explained below: 
The development of reflective techniques, particularly of reflection-in-action, 
seems possibly to provide a partial solution to this problem, although it is not 
suggested here that they could or should replace current formal programmes 
of study, at either basic or post-basic level, merely that they would be 
complementary to these As the time spent on courses is very short in relation 
to an entire nursing career, it would also be ofgreat benefit if reflective 
techniques were used to deliberately promote learning from experience 
throughout the nursing career 
SchOn's (1983) work is credited with giving a new dimension to the role of 
reflection in learning (Powell, 1989). Reflection-in-action is recognised as having a 
sound conceptual basis, providing `the foundation of reflective practice' (Powell, 
1989, 825). In the above introductory remarks, Powell (1989) appears to view 
reflection-in-action from the perspective of the dominant model of professional 
knowledge. Schon (1989) may be understood as having developed a conceptual 
framework or theory from which `techniques' can be derived to be applied to the 
process of learning in practice contexts. Reflection-in-action cannot, and, even if it 
could, it should not replace the formal learning approach of technical rationality. 
Reflection-in-action is to be `complementary' to the dominant model. The use of 
the adverb 'merely' in the above extract serves to reinforce the diminished role of 
reflection-in-action in professional education relative to formal programmes of 
study. At the same time, it seems paradoxical to attribute such a limited role to 
reflection-in-action given that Powell (1989) recognises its potential to contribute 
to learning over a professional career lifetime, while formal programmes occupy 
relatively brief episodes within that same career lifetime. 
Powell (1989) speculates that reflection-in-action and reflective practice may 
explain the difference in clinical effectiveness that exists between ward sisters -
some being highly effective and others ineffective - despite similar years of 
professional experience. If this were shown to be the case, then learning derived 
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from reflection-in-action might be understood as being of far greater significance 
than any formal learning programme. One of the reasons, Powell (1989, 826) 
suggests, that learning from experience may not occur is that such learning may 
not be regarded as valuable by nurses and others: 
A reason for not learning from practice may be that they (experienced 
nurses) believe the technical-rationality type of knowledge is of the greatest, 
or only, importance, and therefore they do not attempt to learn from 
experience because this is not valued by them as knowledge The emphasis 
during initial training and in post-basic courses is on a technical-rationality 
approach, as can be seen in such reports as that of Briggs (1972), and the 
multiplicity of references in nursing literature to the nursing process, which, 
with its emphasis on measurable goals, promotes this type of knowledge 
generation 
As indicated in Chapter 2, the nursing process was a dominant theme in nursing 
education at the time of Powell's (1989) study. To recapitulate, the nursing 
process describes a systematic approach to care provision, consisting of a number 
of sequential steps. A comprehensive assessment of the patient is the first step, 
followed by analysis of the information gathered, the identification of actual and 
potential patient problems, the setting of goals, the design and implementation of 
appropriate nursing interventions, and evaluation of care outcomes against 
predetermined goals (Aggleton & Chalmers, 1986). The nursing process was 
introduced as a way of making nursing practice more scientific, replacing the 
rituals and routines upon which practice had been based, hence its affinity with the 
model of technical rationality. This rational linear model of care may be contrasted 
with the concept of Model II learning (Schon, 1983), which Powell (1989, 825) 
identifies 'as the foundation of reflective practice'. 
Model II learning...promotes a view of the professional as one with specialized 
knowledge and experience, who may be helpful and who will work with the 
client/patient towards finding an individual solution or amelioration for his 
individual problem 
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...the type of problem most requiring of professional help is usually so complex 
as to be totally individual, with little in espoused theory of use in the solving of 
it 
...Several features emerge to define reflection-in-action and give direction to 
its application and development The first is flexibility and experimentation in 
problem solving in order that a solution may be found, although accepting 
fully that it may not 
`Espoused theory' refers to formal, propositional, codified knowledge that is 
recognised as forming the knowledge base of a discipline. It is contrasted with 
`theories-in-use' which refers to theories implicit in the practitioner's action, or 
tacit knowledge. Powell (1989, 825) identifies the relevance of 'tacit knowledge' 
for professional practice as follows: 
These theories-in-use are important as they are rarely, if ever, explicated yet 
these guide practice in a more significant way than the explicated espoused 
theory 
...many practitioners not only have theories-in-use different to their professed 
theories but also are often unaware of these and therefore unable to describe 
them This is why observation of behaviour is important, it is the major way in 
which theories-in-use can be recognized. 
Observing the behaviour of competent practitioners is proposed as a way of 
identifying tacit knowledge or knowing-in-action. Similar to Schon's (1989) 
method, the observer seems able to reveal what appears to be imperceptible to the 
practitioner. The research method used by Powell (1989) to explore reflection-in-
action consisted in observing a small number of experienced nurses as they 
engaged in patient care. These care episodes were followed by open-ended, one-
to-one interviews with the aim of trying to determine the thinking behind the 
observed nurses' actions and decisions. Interview data were analysed and 
categorised in terms of levels of reflectivity using a modified form of Mezirow's 
(1981) seven levels of reflectivity, as explained in Chapters 2 and 3 of this thesis. 
193 
An additional framework that sought to distinguish the basis for nurses' actions 
and decisions was also used in the analysis of Powell's (1989) research data. 
Included in this framework were categories such as 'Law', 'Norm', 'Belief, and so on 
(Powell, 1989, 827). So, for example, if nurses based their decisions or actions on 
scientific knowledge, such a decision would come under the category of law'. 
Powell (1989, 829) explains the 'belief' category as follows: 
The use of the belief category enables an identification to be made of the times 
the nurse uses her own judgement, expressing her feelings and opinions The 
judgement here may be based on experience, in which case he or she may be 
acting as a researcher in action, using Schein's view of practice and research, 
or alternatively it may simply reflect a lack of knowledge of nursing practice, 
research and theory from nursing and other disciplines. 
From the description given above, it appears that the 'belief' category is an 
ambiguous one. Nursing judgements encompassed within the belief category, it 
seems, may be based either on knowledge derived from reflecting in and on the 
experiences of practice or they may have no basis in any kind of knowledge, either 
practical or theoretical. In the interviews conducted with the research participants 
following the period of observation, Powell (1989) attempts to distinguish 
between nursing judgements based on experiential knowledge and those based on 
lack of knowledge. The aim of the interviews was, as stated previously, to try to 
determine the thinking and reasoning behind the nurses' observed behaviours. 
Powell (1989, 829) reports: 
The (interview) questions produced many answers which seem to support the 
latter explanation (that is, nursing judgements based on a lack of knowledge 
of nursing practice, research and theory from nursing and other disciplines), 
with a resulting 'hit or miss' type of nursing care 
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The nurse would try various methods of assisting the patient, often producing 
a helpful result, but in a time-consuming and essentially unthinking way A 
careful assessment of the problem, and relating of the theoretical knowledge 
from a variety of disciplines to this, would in several instances have led to 
effective solutions being produced more quickly 
When Powell's (1989) description of the observed behaviour of the nurse in the 
above extract is examined closely, it appears very similar to her description of 
Model II learning which she previously identified as the foundation of reflective 
practice. The textual evidence supports a reading of the nurse's behaviour as an 
example of reflection-in-action. The nurse's actions could be explained as helping 
the patient to find a solution to an individual problem. Reflection-in-action 
involves on-the-spot experimentation (Schon, 1983), which may account for the 
nurse trying different ways of helping the patient. Nor is such a reading 
contradicted by the interview data. What Powell (1989) interprets as a lack of 
knowledge may instead be an indication of the difficulty involved in surfacing and 
articulating the knowledge generated by reflecting-in-action. The nurse may have 
been unable at interview to articulate the knowledge revealed in her actions. That 
Powell (1989) does not interpret the nurse's behaviour as an example of 
reflection-in-action could be explained by her unacknowledged, and perhaps 
unconscious, bias toward the model of technical rationality. This bias is evident in 
her early remarks regarding the role of reflection-in-action in nursing education. 
Despite her assertions to the contrary, Powell's (1989) analysis of the research 
data seems to indicate not just a devaluing of reflection-in-action as an 
epistemology of practice but a clear suppression of this kind of knowledge. When 
Powell (1989) suggests, in the above extract, that the nurse might have made a 
`careful assessment of the problem' and applied relevant disciplinary knowledge to 
it, she is articulating a technical rational approach to professional knowledge. The 
desired outcomes of effectiveness and efficiency, indicated in the final line of the 
above quotation, reflect a rational, linear approach to care which is exemplified by 
the nursing process, a process whose dominance the researcher herself formerly 
criticised as contributing to a devaluation of reflective practice knowledge. 
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Powell (1989, 826) expresses admiration for Benner's (1984) research into 
nursing expertise, describing the latter's book 'From Novice to Expert' as an 
`excellent study' and identifying her own research interests as similar to those of 
Benner. It may be recalled, from the discussion of Benner's (1984) work presented 
in Chapter 2, that nurses who participated in her study were unable to articulate 
the tacit intuitive knowledge upon which their expertise depended. However, it 
seems that, in Powell's (1989) study, if nursing judgement cannot be articulated in 
terms of disciplinary knowledge, then it is likely to be categorised as lack of 
knowledge. 
While Powell's (1989) espoused theory appears to value reflective practice as a 
model of professional knowledge, her theories-in-use, which may be read in the 
account of her research study, seem to illustrate more affinity with the model of 
technical rationality. Powell (1989) argues for an in-depth knowledge base for 
effective nursing practice which is focused on the application of theory to practice. 
A higher and deeper understanding of nursing and its contributing disciplines 
is necessary in nurse education, but it also seems to be apparent that the 
applications of this knowledge should be given more emphasis, and monitored 
more closely, throughout nurse training and education, rather than left to the 
individual nurse (Powell, 1989, 830). 
As a Principal Lecturer in Nursing in a tertiary education setting, Powell's (1989) 
theories-in-use may be shaped more by the values prevalent in that setting at that 
time rather than by the values pertaining in nursing practice. Schon (1983) 
identified the model of technical rationality as the dominant model of professional 
knowledge in higher education. The model determines how professional 
knowledge is conceptualised and taught. Its dominance is such that it is difficult 
even for those critical of it to escape its influence. While Powell (1989) 
acknowledges that higher education may predispose professionals towards a 
technical rational approach to practice, she also contends that reflective practice 
and the development of 'new knowledge' are unlikely to occur in the absence of a 
196 
sound knowledge base such as that which the model of technical rationality 
provides (Powell, 1989, 830). 
The role of higher education in the generation of practice knowledge is more 
overtly referenced in the second full paper chosen for a deconstructive reading in 
this chapter (Meerabeau, 1992). Writing also at a time when reflective practice in 
nursing education was relatively new, the author is, like Powell (1989), a senior 
lecturer in a higher education setting. Meerabeau (1992) focuses her discussion 
specifically on the role of the university in the generation of tacit knowledge in 
nursing. This focus continues a theme identified by SchOn (1983), who argued that 
the kind of knowledge produced by universities was of limited relevance to 
practitioners of the professions in their everyday work situations. Schon (1983), 
however, did not suggest that the university become involved in the generation of 
knowledge from practice. Instead, he argued for a new epistemology of practice: 
one that would articulate and legitimise the knowing-in-action of skilled 
practitioners. Meerabeau's (1992, 108) paper is entitled 'Tacit nursing knowledge: 
an untapped resource or a methodological headache?' A binary opposition seems 
implied in the title: either tacit nursing knowledge is an untapped resource or it is 
a methodological headache. Indecision as to which pole of the opposition such 
knowledge belongs is designated by the question mark which completes the title. 
The geological metaphor used - an untapped resource - is more reminiscent of 
Schon's (1983) high hard ground of technical rationality than of the swampy 
lowland of practice where tacit knowledge is required and deployed. Meerabeau 
(1992, 108) does acknowledge the work of Schon (1983) and Benner (1984), 
claiming that "expert knowledge or 'artistry"' is an important yet 'neglected resource 
in nursing education', a claim which seems tacitly to acknowledge the dominance of 
the model of technical rationality in nursing education. The difficulty involved in 
articulating the expert knowledge of practitioners is conceded. Summarising 
extracts from the literature on expert knowledge or artistry, Meerabeau (1992, 
110) states: 
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The consensus is that practitioners' knowledge is a largely untapped resource, 
and that research has been too narrowly defined by the academic community, 
who question why practitioners do not use research-based knowledge. If a 
broader framework is used, it is seen that practitioners also create new 
knowledge, but it is often not codified or published, nor is reflection and 
discussion often possible in the work environment 
The dominance of the academic community in matters relating to professional 
knowledge is readable in the above extract. The academic community defines 
what counts as research and, thereby, also, what counts as knowledge. It is within 
the gift of that same community to redefine/extend the scope of what may be 
called knowledge. And it is also within their gift to contribute the literary skills 
and knowledge needed to shape the practitioners' creation into something more 
refined. It is not fortuitous, perhaps, that a geological metaphor is used to describe 
practitioners' knowledge. The academic community could be viewed as bringing 
their sophisticated and advanced knowledge-producing skills to the 'primitive' 
arena of practice. Cultural differences between the academic community and the 
community of practitioners are evident in Meerabeau's (1992, 110) discussion of 
the methods appropriate to researching tacit knowledge. 
The technique of observing participants and then interviewing them about 
their perceptions of the observed event is proving fruitful (Redfern et al 1991, 
Lawler 1991) Lawler argues that this requires an 'insider' to appreciate the 
nuances of what is being discussed, although paradoxically tacit knowledge 
may also mean that there are many features of our practice which may 
require an outsider to research, since we are unable to make them 
'anthropologically strange' (Dingwall 1977) 
It is, of course, one of the perennial pitfalls of anthropologists that if they stay 
too long in one setting they may acquire tacit knowledge of the society, and 
therefore 'go native' and be unable to continue their analysis of the culture 
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Since identifying the tacit knowledge of practitioners is the goal of research, it 
might be assumed that to 'go native' would, in such circumstances, be not only 
advantageous, but obligatory. However, the researcher is required to distance 
themselves from the practitioner so that the knowledge identified can be rendered 
different from itself. The university may be perceived as 'colonising' the life world 
of the practitioner, not, however, with the goal of creating knowledge that 
advantages practice. Referring to the different ways that professional knowledge 
is used by practitioners and academics, Meerabeau (1992, 109) explains: 
...the way that knowledge is used by an academic, who may wish to explore its 
problematic nature, will be different from the way it is used by the practising 
professional, who as a pragmatist wishes to find some sort of pointer for 
practice 
Power dynamics may be detected in Meerabeau's (1992, 111) account of how 
'collaborative research projects' between higher education and the professions 
could be enacted. Such projects are proposed as one of several ways of accessing 
professional knowledge. Change is required of higher education. 
Higher education needs to extend its role from being the creator and 
transmitter ofgeneralizable knowledge, to that of enhancing the knowledge-
creating capacities of individuals and professional communities (Meerabeau, 
1992, 111) 
The university, therefore, rather than ceding the power of knowledge creation to 
the professionals, becomes influential in yet more areas of knowledge creation. No 
longer limited to creating and transmitting scientific knowledge, knowledge that 
Schon (1983) identified as associated with the highest status for its producers, the 
university's role in knowledge creation now lays claim to partial ownership of the 
knowledge generated by practitioners. It is for the researcher to resolve the 
'methodological headache' (Meerabeau, 1992, 110) of researching tacit knowledge 
while practitioners become 'partners' (Meerabeau, 1992, 111) in the research 
endeavour. The issue of whether and to what degree the methodology employed 
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shapes the knowledge created is not commented upon by Meerabeau (1992). It 
could be argued that, as in Powell's (1989) study, the theories-in-use of the 
academic researcher may have a substantial yet unacknowledged impact on the 
knowledge-creation process. While Meerabeau (1992) suggests collaborative 
roles for practitioner and researcher, they remain separate roles. This is contrary 
to Schon's (1983) vision of a practitioner who reflects-in-action on their tacit 
knowing thereby becoming researchers of their own practice: 'When someone 
reflects-in-action, he becomes a researcher in the practice context' (Schon, 1983, 68). 
The hierarchical relationship of theory and practice, researcher and practitioner, 
which Schon (1983) identified and criticised as contributing to the problem of 
legitimacy of practitioner knowledge, appears to be retained in Meerabeau's 
(1992) account of knowledge creation. Constituting a role for the academic in the 
creation of professional knowledge could be read as a way of legitimising, not the 
knowledge thereby created, but the continuing involvement of the university in 
professional education. 
While both Powell (1989) and Meerabeau (1992) declare their approval of 
reflective practice as a model of professional knowledge for nursing, the texts that 
encode that message also permit a reading in which the model of technical 
rationality remains dominant. 
In the third and final paper that is subject to a deconstructive reading in this 
chapter, the dominance of the model of technical rationality in nursing is conceded 
(Rolfe, 2002). However, an argument is advanced which illustrates how the 
dominance of the technical rational model may be reduced and reflective practice 
given precedence as a model of professional knowledge in nursing. The title of the 
paper: 'Reflective practice: where now?' (Rolfe, 2002, 21) has a resonance with the 
'journey' metaphor employed by Schon (1983) in his exposition of reflective 
practice as a new epistemology of practice. As discussed previously in the analysis 
of Schon's (1983) text in Chapter 5, the search for a new epistemology was 
prompted by recognition of the limitations of the model of technical rationality as a 
model of professional knowledge. The journey involved moving across a high hard 
ground where little of significance in professional work occurred to a swampy 
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lowland where professionals engaged in problems of greatest human concern 
(Schon, 1983). Rolfe's (2002) title 'Reflective practice: where now?' might be an 
indication that, although a new epistemology has been arrived at, that is not the 
end of the journey. The question in the title is suggestive of a crossroads having 
been reached. Having achieved the goal or destination of a new epistemology, 
'now', a choice must be made as to the direction in which to take this new model of 
professional knowledge. One option is to disregard or underplay the radical 
origins and potential of reflective practice for the generation of nursing knowledge 
and to treat it as 'just another technical tool' (Rolfe, 2002, 24). The alternative is to 
effect a paradigm change wherein current conceptualisations of the knowledge 
base for nursing are completely overturned (Rolfe, 2002). While the former option 
appears to be the road taken during the decade or so that reflective practice has 
been part of nursing education, Rolfe (2002) presents an argument for a change of 
direction which will have the effect of restoring the true identity and potential of 
reflective practice as a model of professional knowledge in nursing. 
Rhetorically, Rolfe's (2002) paper could be regarded as an enactment of the 
metaphorical journey of reflective practice in nursing. 
	 Reflective practice 
...entered the discipline of nursing as a radical alternative to technical rationality, 
with the promise of revolutionizing the way in which nursing knowledge was 
conceptualized, generated, taught and applied to practice' (Rolfe, 2002, 24). Due to 
the dominance of the model of technical rationality, however, reflective practice 
'...has gradually become immersed into mainstream practice', and '...become just 
another technical tool'..., 'The radical promise of reflective practice therefore became 
neutralized...' (Rolfe, 2002, 24). In order to restore the potential of reflective 
practice as a model of professional knowledge for nursing, it is necessary to step 
outside the dominant paradigm of technical rationality. Rolfe (2002, 21), in the 
introduction to his paper, attempts to step outside the dominant conventions that 
apply when writing for publication in an academic peer review journal; he states: 
in keeping with its subject matter, this paper is written in a reflective style rather 
than in a 'traditional' academic form' The strictures involved in following 'the 
usual academic format' of 'Introduction', 'Literature review', balanced arguments 
and conclusions (Rolfe, 2002, 21) are not conducive to the subject matter which is 
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about valuing personal experience as a source of knowledge. However, it is not 
easy to step outside dominant conventions and the difficulties involved are 
reflected in peer reviewers' comments on Rolfe's (2002) paper, which criticise the 
departure from customary procedures. Rolfe (2002, 21-22) continues to resist the 
pressure, and in another departure from convention but quite characteristic of 
reflective practice, shares his dilemmatic experience with the reader. 
I feel that it would be plainly contradictory to the spirit in which this paper is 
written to add an up-to-date and critical review of the literature, to rewrite 
the paper as a 'balanced' argument for and against reflection, and to support 
my arguments with 'objective' research-based evidence. 
It is obvious that Rolfe's (2002) paper was obliged to conform to certain rules of 
the genre of academic publications. The title of the paper is followed by the 
author's name and an abstract. And it is also clear from the author's remarks that 
he was obliged to include an introduction in the paper which was not originally 
intended (Rolfe, 2002). However, the text of the introduction may be read as an 
attempt to resist or subvert the usual academic format for introductions. The title 
'A reluctant introduction' (Rolfe, 2002, 21) signals something new and different. As 
if to emphasise the reluctance with which the introduction is written, the first line 
of it reads: 'This introduction is written reluctantly....' the unfinished sentence 
perhaps signifying hesitancy and delay in complying with the rules of the genre 
(Rolfe, 2002, 21). The first line above is written in italics, which, when used 
throughout the remainder of the paper, signal emphasis. Reluctance is therefore 
signified by all possible literary and lexical means. Although the obligatory 
introduction is written, rather than being an introduction in the conventional 
sense, it is instead a commentary on the requirement of writing a conventional 
introduction. In complying with the academic norm of writing an introduction, the 
author has, at the same time, undermined that same norm. However, the 
dominance of the norm may still be detected in the final sentence of the 
introduction which is quoted below: 
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I have reluctantly written this introduction to explain why the paper does not 
conform to certain academic norms, which in an ideal world would be no 
more necessary than writing an introduction to justify conformity to those 
same norms (Rolfe, 2002, 22). (Rolfe's emphasis). 
Even in an ideal world, academic norms still appear to constitute the point of 
reference or centre from which textual conformity or non-conformity is to be 
recognised and judged. 
Rolfe (2002) violates another canon of academic writing in the introduction to his 
article by relating a personal anecdote. The experience described could serve as a 
microcosm of the larger debate: the dominance of the model of technical 
rationality and the concomitant marginalisation of reflective practice. Recounting 
a recent experience, Rolfe (2002, 21) states: 
I recently attended a meeting where, as often happens, the discussion turned 
to evidence-based practice. When I (rather timidly) suggested that perhaps it 
is not always wise to base our decisions on the evidence from research, I was 
challenged to produce the evidence for my suggestion. The irony of the 
situation seemed to be lost on my colleagues: that in order to argue against 
evidence it is still necessary to produce evidence in support of your argument. 
As discussed in Chapter 2, in the context of evidence-based practice, the most 
acknowledged and accepted form of evidence is that derived from scientific 
research, in particular large scale randomised controlled trials and meta-analyses 
of the results of smaller scale studies. The model of technical rationality is 
concerned with the application of such evidence to professional practice problems. 
Rhetorically, in the above extract, the author seems to personify reflective practice 
- attempting to get a look in, as it were, but rebuffed by the dominant model of 
technical rationality, personified by his colleagues. The language used by the 
author to present his argument to colleagues contains a number of hedges and 
qualifications, for example, 'rather timidly', 'suggested', and 'perhaps', which 
connote hesitancy and a lack of certainty. This contrasts with terms such as 
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`challenge' and 'produce', attributed to colleagues, which convey authority and 
strength. The author's predicament as illustrated in this account of his experience 
with colleagues could serve as a metaphor for reflective practice in a nursing world 
dominated by the model of technical rationality. 
What began as something radical, a step outside the dominant paradigm, appears, 
however, to be quickly subdued and neutralized. Just as reflective practice has had 
to submit to the model of technical rationality, so also, the author's writing style 
soon reverts to a more conventional academic format. The 'introduction' is 
followed by an account of the main ideas of eminent theorists of reflection and 
reflective practice, such as Dewey, Mezirow and SchOn (Rolfe, 2002). Arguments 
for and against the model of technical rationality in nursing are presented, 
supported by evidence from research studies and other publications (Rolfe, 2002). 
The 'I' of the introduction disappears and the author refers to himself and his 
previous publications using the recognised format for citations. When Rolfe (2002, 
24) argues that 'even advocates of reflective practice feel the need to apologise for its 
lack of compliance to the paradigm of technical rationality', he does not refer back 
to his own experience with colleagues which he recounted in the introduction to 
the paper. Instead, he supports his assertion by citing the publications of other 
authors from the academic literature. 
In terms of the logic of Rolfe's (2002) argument for paradigm change in nursing, 
and the re-institution of reflective practice as an alternative model of professional 
knowledge, the argument appears to hinge on what constitutes an appropriate 
knowledge base for the discipline. Although technical rationality is dominant, as a 
model of professional knowledge for nursing, its limitations are identified as 
follows: 
...the negative aspect of technical rationality is that propositional knowledge 
derived from research findings tends to overshadow what has traditionally 
been seen as the practitioners' own knowledge, derived from experience and 
from their therapeutic relationships with their patients (Rolfe, 2002, 23). 
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Not only has the model of technical rationality not recognised the experiential and 
personal knowledge generated by practitioners, neither has it enabled the creation 
of a body of disciplinary nursing knowledge nor addressed the gap between 
nursing theory and nursing practice. 
...nursing appeared to make little headway as a research-based discipline and 
concerns were beginning to be expressed about the so-called theory-practice 
gap between what researchers believed ought to be happening in practice and 
what nurses were actually doing (see, for example, Hunt, 1981 and numerous 
papers since). Despite a concerted effort to close the gap through technical 
rationality, it proved to be intransigent, leading some theorists (e.g. Rolfe, 
1993, Clarke et al. 1996) to question whether scientific research really does 
provide the most appropriate knowledge-base for nursing, or whether 
reflection might offer a better source of knowledge for practice (Rolfe, 2002, 
23). 
Reflection offers '...an alternative paradigm for nursing' (Rolfe, 2002, 24). A 
paradigm determines, among other things, 'how the knowledge-base of a discipline 
is built and maintained, what is to count as knowledge, and importantly, what are to 
count as valid ways of generating knowledge' (Rolfe, 2002, 24). Citing Kuhn's 
theory of how paradigms function, Rolfe (2002, 24) remarks: 
...they (paradigms) are founded on incompatible principles and cannot exist 
side-by-side without coming into conflict. One paradigm has to dominate, and 
furthermore, 'because it is a transition between incommensurables, the 
transition between competing paradigms cannot be made a step at a time...it 
must occur all at one or not at all' (Kuhn, 1996, my (Rolfe's) italics). And 
most often the status quo prevails and it occurs not at all. Rather than 
overthrowing the dominant nursing paradigm of technical rationality in what 
Kuhn referred to as a scientific revolution, reflective practice has gradually 
become immersed into mainstream practice. 
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If reflection is established as a new paradigm for nursing, then reflection in and on 
nurses' clinical experiences and interactions with patients becomes a valid way of 
generating knowledge. However, when Rolfe (2002, 25) comes to outline the 
knowledge base needed for expert nursing practice, it seems that both paradigms -
reflective practice and the model of technical rationality - are relevant. 
...expert practitioners employ at least three distinct kinds of knowledge in 
their practice. Firstly, propositional or scientific knowledge, which is acquired 
mainly from research, informs us about what generally happens in the 
majority of cases. Secondly, experiential knowledge, gained from reflecting on 
past cases from our own practice, informs us about how this particular case 
might differ from the general. And thirdly, personal knowledge, gained from 
therapeutic relationships with individual patients, informs us about the 
specific needs of this specific person, and just as important, about ourselves 
and our needs. 
Scientific knowledge is ranked first among the knowledge bases, which suggests 
that it comes first and forms the base upon which the other two kinds of 
knowledge depend. Since each base is described as distinct, it is unclear how one 
relates to the other but it is reasonable to assume that the influence of technical 
rationality would be detectable on detailed exposition and analysis of both 
experiential and personal knowledge. This calls into question the possibility of 
experiential and personal knowledge forming distinct knowledge bases. Rolfe 
(2002) isolates one particular context where propositional knowledge must 
predominate since it is the only source of knowledge available for practice. In the 
case of a nurse who is beginning practice experience in an unfamiliar setting, Rolfe 
(2002, 25) states: 
Basing practice solely on research findings might be the only option for the 
novice practitioner with little previous experience who is nursing a patient 
with whom she has no prior relationship (Benner, 1984), but research-based 
knowledge only tells her what generally happens in most cases (Rolfe's 
emphasis). 
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When there is no other source of knowledge, the nurse draws upon propositional 
knowledge to inform her practice. Given that the novice practitioner gains 
experience in the course of basing her practice on research findings, it seems 
inevitable that propositional knowledge will be implicated in the acquisition of 
both experiential and personal knowledge, and influence both the form and 
content of these latter two knowledge bases. Reflective practice, therefore, cannot 
function 'strictly' as an alternative paradigm. It must, to a certain extent, co-exist 
with the dominant scientific paradigm. It is, perhaps, not possible to go fully 
`Beyond technical rationality' (Rolfe, 2002, 25) in nursing practice. As Johnson 
(1980, xi) remarks: 'The very impulse to "go beyond" is an impulse structured by a 
binary opposition between oneself and what one attempts to leave behind'. 
In the context of nursing education, Rolfe (2002) contrasts a reflective curriculum 
with a curriculum which follows a technical rational model. In the latter approach, 
which is acknowledged as dominant in current nursing education and likely to be 
more so as nursing education is university-based, the student is exposed initially to 
propositional knowledge, presented largely by didactic methods of instruction 
(Rolfe, 2002). This is followed by learning how to apply such knowledge to 
practice by way of models and frameworks of practice (Rolfe, 2002). The student 
is then exposed to a period of supervised clinical experience during which time 
previously learned knowledge is applied (Rolfe, 2002). A reflective nursing 
curriculum, by contrast, would take the following form: 
...the first phase of a reflective course must be to immerse the student in 
practice so that she might acquire concrete experience of the messy 
complexities of nursing. In the second phase she should be facilitated to 
reflect on her practice and begin the difficult task of turning experience into 
concrete knowledge and theory; that is, knowledge and theory specific to that 
student in that situation. And thirdly, she should be helped to see her specific 
experiential knowledge in relation to general propositional knowledge and 
theory (Rolfe, 2002, 27-28) (Rolfe's emphases). 
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The reflective curriculum, whose outline is proposed in the above extract, does not 
constitute a replacement for the dominant technical rational model in nursing 
education. Even if the student were to be immersed in practice without any prior 
exposure to propositional or applied scientific knowledge, she would still have to 
acquire that knowledge in order to see how her experiences in practice related to 
it. This she is required to do in the third phase of the reflective curriculum. And if 
the student's experiential knowledge is specific to her and the particular clinical 
situation in which the student finds herself, as emphasised above, then there is 
little possibility of a shared body of experiential knowledge that could form the 
basis for teaching and learning nursing practice. 
In the first phase of the education programme, as the student is immersed in 
practice, she must be considered a novice as she has no experience of the practice 
situation. Since a novice depends upon propositional knowledge, and since the 
student does not have any by virtue of the structure of the reflective curriculum, it 
is unclear what knowledge will guide the student initially. Were there no 
propositional knowledge to draw upon in the practice setting, and if nurses' 
reflections, even those of experienced nurses, were specific to each individual 
practitioner, it follows that the practice the student is being immersed in is 
practice guided by the experiential and personal knowledge of the individual nurse 
providing supervision at that particular time in that particular clinical situation. It 
would also follow that this knowledge 'base' would change, potentially, with each 
subsequent supervising nurse. The implications of a reflective curriculum for 
teaching, learning, and assessment would, therefore, be considerable. 
Knowledge generation under a new reflective paradigm would involve changes to 
the current roles of practitioner, researcher, and educator (Rolfe, 2002). In the 
context of the existing dominant paradigm which determines what counts as 
knowledge for practice and authorises how such knowledge is to be generated, 
Rolfe (2002, 27) asserts: 
208 
...the ownership and control of the knowledge-base of nursing rests with 
researchers and academics, who have the power to define, generate and 
disseminate nursing knowledge, whereas the practising nurse is supposed 
merely to read and apply it. In the new paradigm, this power and authority 
would be invested in practitioners, who become researchers into their own 
practice. 
In the new paradigm, the practitioner becomes '...the originator of her own context-
specific practice-based knowledge', and the role of the researcher is to facilitate 
'...the practitioner to research her own practice through small-scale case study and 
action research' (Rolfe, 2002, 27). This suggests that practitioners, while they may 
become researchers into their own practice, are not vested with full or sole 
authority to do so. Rolfe (2002, 27) remarks: '...the practitioner and the academic 
become equal partners in enabling the nurse to explore and discover her own 
knowledge predominantly from her own practice' (My emphasis). The extent to 
which the practising nurse is truly 'the originator of her own context-specific 
practice-based knowledge' may, therefore, be debated (My emphasis). The idea of 
equal partners implies equal influence in terms of the process of knowledge 
generation, and, potentially, joint ownership of the knowledge so created. Nor 
does the researcher abandon completely their traditional role in 'producing 
generalizable scientific knowledge'; they are now merely 'less concerned' with it 
(Rolfe, 2002, 27). 
While the roles of practitioner and researcher in the generation of discipline-
specific knowledge within a new reflective paradigm are fairly well defined, the 
role of the nurse educator in this process appears ambiguous. Rolfe (2002, 27) 
identifies the existing nurse educator role as concerned mainly with 'disseminating 
knowledge'. Neither a producer nor a user of professional knowledge, the educator 
occupies a vague space in the arena of nursing knowledge as defined by the 
dominant paradigm. The role of the educator in a reflective paradigm is envisaged 
as follows: 
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..facilitating the practitioner to explore her own practice through reflection-
on-action. This applies not just to post-registration nurse education, where 
the nurse brings with her a vast store of practitioner knowledge and usually a 
number of issues and problems she wishes to explore, but also to pre-
registration courses where the student might have little or no prior 
experience to draw on (Rolfe, 2002, 27). 
From the above description, it might be assumed that the educator's role is pivotal 
to generating nursing knowledge. The educator facilitates the process of 
reflection-on-action, and reflecting-on-action is one of the ways of accessing the 
practitioner's 'vast store' of experiential and personal knowledge. Furthermore, it 
is not unreasonable to assume that the issues and problems the practitioner 
wishes to explore emanate from the practice situation and, as such, are recognised 
as stimulating reflective inquiry (Schon, 1983). The practitioner's vast store of 
knowledge is quite likely to have a role in formulating solutions to the issues and 
problems being reflected upon, although such a connection is not made in the text 
above. The educator, therefore, seems to be ideally positioned to facilitate 
knowledge generation. Why is it, then, that the description of the educator role 
does not make specific reference to knowledge generation? Why does the 
facilitation provided by the academic and the researcher result in knowledge 
whilst the facilitation provided by the nurse educator does not? Is it because 
knowledge generated by reflecting on practice is not recognised as 'knowledge'? Is 
it only when approved research methodologies such as case studies and action 
research are used that something is produced that may warrant the designation 
`knowledge'? That no connection is made between the educator's role and 
knowledge generation could be read as an example of a 'theory-practice' gap. 
Practitioner and educator together address what might be described as the 'messy' 
issues and problems of practice, without apparent reference to any kind of 
knowledge base, either practitioner or research knowledge, whilst academic and 
practitioner, together, engage in the generation of knowledge. 
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As indicated at the beginning of this deconstructive reading, Rolfe (2002) has 
acknowledged the dominance of the model of technical rationality as a model of 
professional knowledge in nursing and the difficulty of displacing it. Nothing less 
than a paradigm change is required to do so (Rolfe, 2002). Rolfe (2002) has 
attempted, both in the form and content of his writing, to step consciously outside 
the dominant paradigm and reveal an alternative. The implications of paradigm 
change in the form of reflective practice for nursing practice, nursing education, 
and nursing research have been outlined (Rolfe, 2002). However, the dominant 
model remains detectable in the text that describes its demise. A deconstructive 
reading reveals a suppressed message which renders problematic the identity of 
reflective practice. Its identity is constituted by its difference from technical 
rationality but that difference may be seen 'as an uncertainty over separability and 
as a drifting apart within identity' (Johnson, 1980, x). 
Some of the paradoxes readable in Schon's (1983) account of reflective practice as 
a new epistemology of practice and as outlined in earlier analysis chapters, are 
replicated in the nursing texts that have been analysed in this chapter. Tensions 
between technical and reflective forms of knowledge are apparent. Although 
proposed as an epistemology of practice that makes up for the limitations of the 
model of technical rationality, it is difficult to disentangle reflective practice from 
the dominant model of professional knowledge in the textual constructions that 
seek to elaborate the identity of the former. The attempt to distinguish reflective 
practice from technical rationality can sometimes lead to reflection becoming 
divided from itself. 
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Chapter 9 Deconstructing reflective practice in nursing 
texts 2 
The purpose of this chapter is to analyse a number of texts that address the issue 
of the knowledge base appropriate for nursing. Justification for the inclusion of 
these texts is provided in Chapter 4 (Section 4.10.1, p149). Of particular interest in 
the deconstructive reading is how reflective practice is positioned within the 
knowledge base. Details of the texts in question are provided in Table 9.1 below. 
Title of Paper Publication Author(s) Year of 
Publication 
Critical reflective inquiry for 
knowledge development in 
nursing practice 
Journal of 
Advanced Nursing 
Hesook S. Kim 1999 
What counts as evidence in 
evidence-based practice? 
Journal of 
Advanced Nursing 
Jo Rycroft-Malone 
Kate Seers 
Angie Titchen 
Gill Harvey 
Alison Kitson 
Brendan 
McCormack 
2004 
Towards a nursing science of 
the unique. 
Evidence, reflexivity and the 
study of persons 
Journal of Research 
in Nursing 
Gary Rolfe 
Lyn Gardner 
2005 
Table 9.1 Details of journal articles B 
The following introductory paragraph from one of the texts included in the 
analysis provides a sense of the evolution of a knowledge base for nursing: 
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During the last three decades, nursing knowledge has been developed mostly 
applying the accepted empirical methods of inquiry with the primary aim of 
establishing a systematic, generalized knowledge-base for practice. In the 
recent years, however, this orientation has been modified by an increased 
interest in and acceptance of various interpretive methods such as 
phenomenological, hermeneutic and critical approaches to advance nursing 
knowledge. The discipline of nursing certainly needs to apply both of these 
methods (i.e. the empirical and interpretive) in order to address the complex 
nature of its subject matter and for the development of its science. 
Additionally, nursing needs to develop and apply methods that draw from the 
situated, individual instances of nursing practice in order to develop and 
augment the knowledge necessary to improve its practice. This is based on 
the recognition that nursing knowledge production must also be viewed in 
conjunction with practice itself as practice involves not only the use of 
knowledge but gaining of new knowledge as well (Kim, 1999, 1205). 
The creation of a systematic knowledge base for nursing by the use of accepted 
empirical research methods comes first chronologically and in the above extract. 
Interpretive methods of inquiry and the knowledge produced by them come next 
in the chronologic and textual order. They also seem to come second to accepted 
empirical methods and systematic generalised knowledge in terms of legitimacy; 
they have yet to be accepted in the same way. While interpretive methods have 
reoriented the discipline away from an exclusive focus on systematic generalised 
knowledge, the latter is still required to advance nursing knowledge and science. 
And while interpretive methods may not have the same legitimacy as empirical 
inquiry, there is no question of their relevance to the development of nursing's 
knowledge base. The status of a proposed third method of inquiry and its role in 
generating knowledge is less certain. Textually, it follows the definitive statement 
regarding the role of empirical and interpretive methods in the advancement of 
nursing knowledge and science which places a third method outside that 
reference. The word 'Additionally' prefaces the introduction of a third approach in 
the text which suggests something added on rather than something integral. The 
contribution made by the, as yet unnamed, method is to 'draw from the situated, 
213 
individual instances of nursing practice in order to develop and augment the 
knowledge necessary to improve its practice' (Kim, 1999, 1205). The lack of any 
syntactic or grammatical connection between the words 'nursing practice' and 
'knowledge', together with the ambiguity of the word 'develop' as used in this 
context - creating something new versus adding to something already existing -
enables a reading that separates knowledge and practice. Further textual evidence 
for such an interpretation is provided in the final sentence of the extract: `...the 
recognition that nursing knowledge production must also be viewed in conjunction 
with practice itself as practice involves not only the use of knowledge but gaining of 
new knowledge as well' (Kim, 1999, 1205). The connection between knowledge 
and practice appears to be contingent or accidental rather than necessary. 
Knowledge production and nursing practice are presented as parallel tracks that 
may or may not intersect. Practice involves using knowledge and gaining new 
knowledge. Gaining cannot be taken to be synonymous with producing. 
Although knowledge and practice appear somewhat distanced in the introduction 
section of the paper, Kim's (1999, 1206) later elaboration of the third inquiry 
method provides some clarity on the relationship of knowledge to practice: 
The complexity of practice in terms of knowledge use and knowledge 
production suggests the need for nursing as a human science and a practice 
discipline to develop a method of inquiry that involves practitioners in the 
inquiry. This proposed method of inquiry therefore involves critical 
examination of what is actually going on in situations of practice through a 
systematic self-reflection, reflective discourse, and critically oriented change. 
...Hence, we can say that some form of nursing knowledge is produced in 
everyday settings of practice and that there are theories of application being 
used to co-ordinate and package new and old knowledge and experiences in 
practice. 
A distinction is drawn between knowledge produced in practice and knowledge 
derived from empirical methods of science. 
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...the knowledge produced in situations of practice differs from that produced 
in the scientific arena in three senses: (a) knowledge produced in practice is 
the knowledge of application that is tailored to specific situations, so the 
question ofgeneralizability does not enter into its production; (b) it is the 
practitioners who are intimately and directly involved in production as well as 
in judging the validity claims about that knowledge insofar as such knowledge 
is not exposed to specific processes of validation beyond practice itself; and (c) 
knowledge produced in practice is likely to remain as personal knowledge. 
Although scientific knowledge forms the point of reference, it appears that practice 
knowledge does not have to submit to its norms. Practitioners are not only the 
producers of knowledge in practice; only they can make a judgement as to its 
validity. Critical reflective inquiry provides the method of accessing knowledge 
that would otherwise remain personal to the individual practitioner. However, 
what are presented as strengths and positive attributes of practice-produced 
knowledge may also be undesirable. 
This means that knowledge production through nursing practice may be done 
poorly or expertly and result in knowledge that is good or bad, or that is 
innovative or redundant. Hence, an inquiry into the nature of knowledge 
production and processes of application needs to involve practitioners in a 
reflective and critical mode (Kim, 1999, 1206). 
The knowledge that Kim (1999, 1206) refers to in the above context is 
practitioners' "theories-in-use which tend to be oriented to routinization and self-
interest and are often quite different from their espoused theories. This suggests that 
what nurses do in practice may not be as good as what the nurses believe they are 
doing. Hence, it is necessary to assume actual practice as being 'good' or 'effective' as 
well as being 'inadequate' or 'poor'. What the method of critical reflective inquiry 
offers, therefore, is not access to practitioner knowledge per se but a means of 
determining whether the practitioners' theories-in-use tend towards effective or 
inadequate practice, and to what extent their theories-in-use match their espoused 
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theories. It will be for the practitioners themselves to judge the outcome of the 
critical reflective inquiry method (Kim, 1999). 
At the same time, a sense persists in the text that there is a great deal of good 
knowledge produced in practice that cannot be explained in terms of espoused 
theory and needs to be made publicly known through reflective practice, for 
example: 
...knowledge regarding how practitioners produce positive outcomes in 
clients. Nurses are confronted with multiple sets of theories regarding human 
conditions and nursing therapeutics which sometimes provide competing, 
conflicting or mutually supportive knowledge as well as a deficiency in 
providing comprehensive explanations and/or definitive approaches to 
solving nursing problems. Still, nurses are able to provide good care and often 
have effective outcomes most of the time (Kim, 1999, 1206). 
The critical inquiry method "...begins with Schein's notion of reflection-on-action but 
extends it further to be used not only as a way to add to professional's personal 
knowledge but also as a method to be used to develop knowledge in the public 
domain, that is, 'shared knowledge — (Kim, 1999, 1206). It must be assumed that 
personal knowledge derived from the practitioner's reflection-on-action, even if it 
is not shared, is good knowledge that enables effective practice, and not poorly 
done resulting in bad knowledge. Critical reflective inquiry consists of three 
phases - a descriptive phase in which instances of practice are related in the form 
of narrative accounts which are analysed for completeness (Kim, 1999). This is 
followed by a reflective phase during which narratives are analysed in light of, 
among other things, 'The scientific aspect of practice (which) refers to the use and 
application of empirical knowledge that is drawn either from a general scientific 
knowledge-base or from personal knowledge' (Kim, 1999, 1208). The distinction 
drawn earlier between scientific and personal knowledge appears to be dissolved 
and practice knowledge is judged in terms of the scientific knowledge base. The 
final phase is the 'Critical/emancipatory phase' which involves changing ineffective 
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or inadequate practice or 'moving forward to future assimilation of new innovations 
emerging from practice' (Kim, 1999, 1209). 
The practitioner is not the sole producer of practice knowledge. Kim (1999, 1209) 
identifies a role for the researcher during each of the three phases of critical 
reflective inquiry which is delineated as follows: 
The researcher's role is essential in that the researcher needs to help 
practitioners not only in the reflecting act but also in constructing the frames 
with which the reflection must be carried out. 
...Through the researcher's questioning and probing, practitioners can engage 
in self-dialogue and argumentation with themselves in order to clarify validity 
claims embedded in their actions, bringing forth the hidden meanings and 
disguises that systematically result in self-oriented and unilateral actions or 
ineffective habitual forms of practice. 
...Practitioners and the researcher can develop a process of practice that 
incorporates self-emancipation from routinized practice. In addition to self-
emancipation, this phase (the critical/emancipatory phase of critical 
reflective inquiry) can also be used to bring about an emancipatory culture in 
clinical settings, through some form of change process involving staff of a unit 
(or a hospital) as a group (Kim, 1999, 1209). 
This description of the critical reflective inquiry method suggests that the 
researcher has a quite significant part to play in the production of knowledge from 
practice and the validation of that knowledge, despite earlier claims about the 
practitioner's role in this endeavour. 'Helping' includes not just helping in terms of 
the activity of reflecting but also in terms of constructing the 'frames' with which 
reflection must be carried out. If frames, in this context, designate a viewpoint or 
perspective through which an aspect of practice is viewed, it is possible that the 
researcher's frame is likely to differ, perhaps quite considerably, from the 
practitioner's. Differences in perspective and the relative influence of different 
frames are not mentioned in the text, but it is not inconceivable that, since critical 
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reflective inquiry is a research method, the researcher's frame is likely to 
predominate. 
Kim (1999) seeks to mitigate or suppress the influence of the researcher in the 
critical reflective process, although there is an irony in describing practitioners as 
engaged in 'self-dialogue and argumentation with themselves', while the other party 
to the interaction, namely, the researcher, questions and probes. The extent to 
which the researcher's questions and probes shape self-dialogue and influence 
clarification of validity claims and the bringing forth of hidden meanings may not 
be inconsiderable. A certain paradox is detectable in the reference to 'self-
emancipation' in the final paragraph of the above extract. It presupposes that 
practitioners need and wish to free themselves from routinized practice. It also 
presupposes that someone other than the individual who needs and wishes to free 
themselves will play a role in determining how that process is to occur. A potential 
coercive effect may be read in the above account of the critical/emancipatory 
phase of critical reflective inquiry. It seems to go unrecognised by the author, who, 
as a researcher, may espouse a value system more akin to scientific method than 
reflective inquiry. The text does not appear to be fully under the control of its 
author. Authorial intention seems undermined by the autonomy and 
disseminative capacity of language. 
An example of the method of critical reflective inquiry is included in the paper. 
Kim (1999, 1209) explains the background to the example presented in the 
following way: 
Because the major goal (of the project) was to introduce the critical reflective 
model of practice to nursing at the hospital, the researcher and the nurse 
administrative leaders decided on a project that would first introduce and 
prepare nurse leaders to become familiar with this method of inquiry and also 
to internalize the philosophy of critical reflective culture of nursing practice. 
A 2-day retreat was instituted in which 75 nurse leaders of the hospital, 
composed of nurse managers, supervisors and head nurses, participated. 
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For an approach that is oriented to self-emancipation and an emancipatory culture, 
it is ironic that it is a researcher and a group of nurse leaders who are deciding 
how change is to be effected. Neither party is likely to be engaged primarily in 
clinical practice; therefore, neither is in a position to generate knowledge in 
practice. 	 Furthermore, it is not unreasonable to suppose that the nurse 
administrative leaders involved in the project have considerable positional power 
which calls into question the possibility of a genuinely emancipatory culture. The 
researcher has already displayed considerable force and influence in the process of 
critical reflective inquiry and it seems unlikely that that will diminish in the 
context of the project described above. A further irony is evident in the way the 
method is introduced - by way of a 'retreat' (presumably away from the clinical 
setting of the hospital) and beginning with the 'theory' of the approach. The 
medium is potentially at risk of undermining the message of critical reflective 
inquiry. 
Articulating the knowledge derived from nursing practice by processes similar to 
Kim's (1999) critical reflective inquiry method is proposed by Rycroft-Malone et al. 
(2004). The proposal arises in the context of a discussion regarding potential 
sources of evidence that may be used to inform nursing practice (Rycroft-Malone 
et al., 2004). Knowledge originating in practice becomes a source of evidence for 
practice through a process of public scrutiny (Rycroft-Malone et al., 2004). 
However, the authors argue that, in the context of health care, the only source of 
knowledge that is accepted as evidence is that derived from empirical inquiry, in 
particular, research that demonstrates the effectiveness of interventions, such as 
the randomised controlled clinical trial (Rycroft-Malone et al., 2004). To attain the 
status of evidence, other sources of knowledge must be subjected to robust and 
rigorous processes of verification (Rycroft-Malone et al., 2004). This is necessary 
because if non-research sources of knowledge do not attain the status of evidence, 
they are likely to be marginalised or disregarded in the context of 'evidence-based' 
healthcare as described below (Rycroft-Malone et al., 2004, 83): 
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The prominence ascribed to research evidence has meant the relative neglect 
of other forms of evidence in the delivery of health care, in terms of making 
them available for critical scrutiny and public review. 
The authors identify a number of different sources of knowledge that are used to 
inform practice and argue that evidence from each source is necessary if patient-
centred, evidence- based care is to be provided (Rycroft-Malone et al., 2004). 
Nursing, in particular, is oriented towards patient-centred care (Rycroft-Malone et 
al., 2004). The nurse-patient relationship is recognised as a central component of 
caring (Rycroft-Malone et at., 2004). Two broad categories of knowledge for 
practice are identified: propositional and non-propositional knowledge (Rycroft-
Malone et al., 2004). These categories are explained as follows: 
Propositional knowledge is formal, explicit, derived from research and 
scholarship and concerned with generalisability. Non-propositional 
knowledge is informal, implicit and derived primarily through practice. It 
forms part of professional craft knowledge (the tacit knowledge of 
professionals) and personal knowledge linked to the life experience and 
cognitive resources that a person brings to the situation to enable them to 
think and perform (Higgs & Titchen 1995, 2000, Eraut 2000). Unlike 
research-based knowledge, professional craft knowledge is not usually 
concerned with transferability beyond the case or particular setting. 
However, this non-propositional knowledge has the potential to become 
propositional knowledge once it has been articulated by individual 
practitioners, then debated, contested and verified through wider 
communities of practice in the critical social science tradition of theory 
generation (see Titchen & Ersser 2001) (Rycroft-Malone et al., 2004, 83). 
It seems clear from the above description that propositional knowledge forms the 
benchmark or standard to which non-propositional knowledge aspires. The 
differences between propositional and non-propositional knowledge are described 
in terms of binary oppositions as illustrated below: 
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Propositional knowledge 	 Non-propositional knowledge 
Formal 	 Informal 
Explicit 	
 Implicit 
Derived from research and scholarship 
	 Derived primarily through practice 
Concerned with generalisability 	 Not usually concerned with transferability 
Propositional knowledge represents the norm or standard, while its binary 
opposite represents a deviation. Propositional knowledge is temporally and 
qualitatively prior to non-propositional knowledge. It is not necessary to overturn 
or subvert the binary oppositions that have been presented. By textual 'sleight of 
hand', as it were, non-propositional becomes propositional knowledge. If the 
former is to function as an evidence base for nursing practice, it appears it must 
assume the identity of propositional knowledge. The dominance of the latter 
seems, once again, to be asserted. 
A more overt challenge to the dominance of research knowledge as the evidence 
base for nursing practice is discernible in Rycroft-Malone et al.'s (2004) 
identification of four distinct sources of knowledge from which evidence for 
practice may be produced. These sources are presented in the text in the following 
way: 
• research 
• clinical experience 
• patients, clients and carers 
• local context and environment (Rycroft-Malone et al., 2004, 83) 
Research is identified first, and in the section of the paper that describes this 
evidence source, its priority in health care is acknowledged (Rycroft-Malone et al., 
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2004). However, the description that follows seems oriented to undermining or 
calling into question the dominance of research as an evidence base. For example, 
certain limitations of research knowledge are cited: 
...research evidence tends to be perceived as providing watertight answers to 
the questions posed. However, such evidence rarely attains absolute certainty 
and may be changed as new research emerges. Upshur (2001) suggests that 
to conflate research evidence with the concept of truth will lead to serious 
misunderstandings because definitive studies are comparatively rare 
(Rycroft-Malone et al., 2004, 83-84). 
The question of 'objectivity' of research findings is also alluded to in the description 
of research evidence, as well as the impact of social processes on the production of 
research. It is the authors' contention that these factors testify to the tentative 
status of research knowledge (Rycroft-Malone et al., 2004). Arguing that 'there is 
no such thing as the evidence', the authors cite a research study consisting of 'a 
cross-case comparison and synthesis of seven evidence-into-practice studies, 
including 49 cases (involving 1400 interviews)' in support of their assertion 
(Rycroft-Malone et al., 2004, 84). (Rycroft-Malone et al.'s emphasis). 	 In 
highlighting the paradox of attempting "to attain a level of 'objectivity— in a process 
that is 'social as well as scientific' (Rycroft-Malone et al., 2004, 84), the paradox of 
using research evidence to undermine research knowledge as the dominant 
evidence base for practice appears to go unrecognised. The authors conclude that 
evidence from research: 
...is not certain, acontextual and static, but dynamic and eclectic. 
This indicates that, whilst research evidence is important to delivering 
evidence-based care, it is less certain and less value free than is sometimes 
acknowledged (Rycroft-Malone et al., 2004, 84). 
The problems that have been identified with research knowledge are used to 
justify the need for other sources of knowledge in evidence-based nursing practice 
(Rycroft-Malone et al., 2004). However, the limitations that the authors have 
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chosen to highlight and the conclusions they reach have the effect of making 
research knowledge appear more like non-propositional knowledge. The 
description given for propositional knowledge in the above extract could apply 
equally as a description of non-propositional knowledge. 
	 If propositional 
knowledge may be recognised as non-propositional knowledge, then any 
difference between these two evidence bases is dissolved which undermines the 
argument for two distinct types of knowledge. Such an alternative reading, which 
the text affords, could be viewed as extending rather than reducing the dominance 
of research knowledge. 
Knowledge from clinical experience is another source of knowledge that may form 
an evidence base for evidence-based health care (Rycroft-Malone et al., 2004). 
This kind of knowledge is described as 'expressed and embedded in practice and is 
often tacit and intuitive' (Rycroft-Malone et al., 2004, 84). Research knowledge is 
also cited, in the context of the discussion of knowledge from clinical experience, as 
evidence that nurses produce and use practical knowledge. 
Not only do practitioners act on their own practical knowledge, but recent 
research has verified that nurses also draw on the expertise of others to 
inform their practice (Thompson et al. 2001a, 2001b, McCaughan et al. 2001), 
which of course could itself be research-based (Rycroft-Malone et al., 2004, 
84). 
Using the terms 'Not only...but...also...' in the above extract tends to create an effect 
of sameness, as if practitioners' own practical knowledge and the expertise of 
others belong in the same category. Acknowledging that the expertise of others 
could 'of course' be research-based allows for the possibility that practitioners' 
own knowledge could, likewise, be research-based. This has the effect of breaking 
down any distinction between research knowledge and practical knowledge with 
research knowledge once again dominating. However, the problem that such an 
interpretation would create for the argument being advanced appears to be 
overlooked. Attention turns instead to describing how knowledge from clinical 
experience can become an evidence base for nursing practice. 
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...in order for an individual practitioner's experience and knowledge to be 
considered credible as a source of evidence, it needs to be explicated, analysed 
and critiqued. Stetler et al. (1998) call this 'affirmed experience, which 
means that experiential observations or information have been reflected 
upon, externalized, or exposed to explorations of truth and verification from 
various sources of data (Rycroft-Malone et al., 2004, 84). (Rycroft-Malone et 
al.'s emphasis). 
The sources of data that might be used to explore the truth and verification of 
practitioners' practical knowledge are not identified. The word 'data' tends to be 
associated with scientific research, which could imply that one of the ways of 
verifying practical knowledge is by reference to research evidence. While the 
word 'explorations' connotes uncertainty as to a final destination, the word 'truth' 
connotes certain knowledge comparable to propositional knowledge. Indeed, the 
word 'truth' was referenced in the context of Rycroft-Malone et al.'s (2004) 
discussion of research evidence, with a tendency to conflate research evidence 
with the concept of truth recognised as problematic (Rycroft-Malone et al., 2004). 
A variety of signifiers are used in the context of describing 'Knowledge accrued 
through professional practice and life experiences' (Rycroft-Malone et al., 2004, 84), 
for example, "'practical knowledge"', "professional craft knowledge"', "practical 
know-how", 'Knowledge from clinical experience', 'clinical common sense', 'tacit 
knowledge' (Rycroft-Malone et al., 2004, 84), and 'Professional Knowledge/clinical 
experience'(Rycroft-Malone et al., 2004, 87). Such variety, perhaps, points to an 
absence of stable meaning. Rycroft-Malone et al. (2004, 84) explain the reason for 
the inclusion of this source of knowledge in the evidence base for nursing practice 
as follows: 
A number of scholars have explored the nature of different ways of knowing 
and producing knowledge and have substantiated the contribution of 
different sources of knowledge to practice beyond the technical or 
propositional (e.g. Carper 1978, Benner 1984, Reason & Heron 1986, Edwards 
2002, Hunt et al. 2003, Titchen & McGinley 2003). 
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The nature of knowledge from clinical experience is such that, unlike research 
evidence, substantiation by scholars is not sufficient to warrant it as evidence in an 
evidence base. 
Despite this, we argue here that there is still an underlying assumption in the 
field and practice of evidence-based health care that such sources of 
knowledge are idiosyncratic, subject to bias and, as a result, lack credibility. 
However, we propose that the delivery of individualized evidence-based health 
care not only requires professional craft knowledge and reasoning, but 
requires such knowledge and reasoning to integrate the four different types of 
knowledge discussed here within the contextual boundaries of the clinical 
environment. In order to do this, however, it is essential that clinical 
experience or tacit knowledge is made explicit in order for it to be 
disseminated, critiqued and developed (Rycroft-Malone et al., 2004, 84). 
(Rycroft-Malone et al.'s emphasis). 
Not only does professional craft knowledge form a distinct evidence base for 
nursing practice but it is also the evidence base that integrates evidence from all 
four knowledge sources. This gives it an added significance relative to the three 
other evidence bases. The authors also note that when knowledge from practice 
accords with scientific knowledge, practitioners are more inclined to use research 
findings and vice versa (Rycroft-Malone et al., 2004), which attests to the power of 
knowledge from practice over research knowledge. While the discussion of 
research knowledge is oriented to 'talking down' its significance as evidence for 
practice, the discussion of knowledge from practice appears oriented to 'talking up' 
its importance in practice. Support for the assertion that clinical experience 
knowledge impacts on the utilisation of research knowledge in practice, and that if 
the former is at variance with the latter then research evidence may not always be 
utilised, is provided by citing a case study which investigated the use of a 
particular drug by orthopaedic surgeons (Rycroft-Malone et al., 2004). Referring 
to the drug, the authors state: 
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Its use in orthopaedic surgery is controversial because the research base 
about its effectiveness is variable. (In the case study)...use of the drug was 
influenced by the beliefs of a core group of orthopaedic surgeons, whose views 
were based on experiential knowledge. There was dissonance between the 
research evidence and clinical experience and as a result the uptake of the 
new drug was described as 'patchy' (Rycroft-Malone et al., 2004, 85). 
The example of the case study supports a reading 'otherwise', that is, as research 
evidence being consonant with clinical experience and, perhaps, even determining 
clinical practice. If the research evidence of the effectiveness of the drug in 
question is variable, and if research evidence is being used to inform practice, one 
might be unsurprised to find that the uptake of the drug in practice is also variable, 
or 'patchy' as described above. 
The need to ensure that care is individualised is offered as justification for the non-
use of evidence from research in clinical practice situations as indicated below: 
In addition, practitioners, taking the particularity of patient and context into 
account, may be making the right decision for a particular patient (Rycroft-
Malone et al., 2004, 85). 
Knowledge of the particular patient and the particular care situation provides the 
evidence upon which practitioners base their practice, and that evidence takes 
priority over research evidence. However, when the authors add: 'Conversely, 
where particularity accords with the research evidence, practitioners may still not 
use the research evidence' (Rycroft-Malone et al., 2004, 85), it appears to contradict 
their earlier assertion, that is, where clinical experience knowledge is consistent 
with research knowledge, the latter is more likely to be utilised in practice. While 
privileging evidence from clinical experience over evidence from research, and 
using the former to justify the non-use of research evidence in practice, seems 
acceptable when the evidence from each source is at variance, it is unclear on what 
basis the non-use of research evidence can be justified in situations where it is in 
accord with practice knowledge. In the above scenario, if evidence from research 
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is not used even though it is consistent with evidence from clinical experience, 
then it must be assumed that practice is based on neither knowledge source which 
begs the question of what evidence base, if any, is being used to inform practice. 
Knowledge from clinical experience or professional craft knowledge, as indicated 
earlier, appears to have at least two meanings: it constitutes a distinct evidence 
base and it is required to integrate the evidence from all four evidence bases in 
practice (Rycroft-Malone et al., 2004). In terms of the first meaning - constituting 
a distinct evidence base - the process of ensuring robustness of knowledge from 
practice is described as follows: 
...for clinical experience, a systematic and documented process of gathering 
evidence of the different types of knowledge used in everyday practice, and 
their impact on patients, colleagues and the organisation, in combination 
with reflection and cross-checking, may be appropriate. Cross-checking could 
occur in ever-widening ripples from individual practitioners' clinical 
supervision, 360° feedback or action learning, progressing to, for example, 
colloquia, seminars, debates, consensus workshops within their immediate, 
then regional, national and international communities of practice. This 
critical social science approach to generating potentially transferable 
knowledge would provide systematically collected bodies of knowledge whose 
credibility have been tested, which other practitioners can draw on (Rycroft-
Malone et al., 2004, 87). 
The second meaning of professional knowledge as an evidence base - the 
integration of evidence from the four distinct knowledge sources - appears to 
follow immediately on the first as indicated in the extract below: 
However, this suggestion does not exclude the need to exercise clinical 
judgement when caring for individuals during clinical encounters. There will 
always be a need to particularize and tailor these evidence sources to 
individual circumstances (Rycroft-Malone et al., 2004, 87). 
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The two meanings seem to be not only different but quite opposing. The first 
meaning is oriented to making the particular general and the second to making the 
general particular. It is difficult to envisage how the enormous volume of diverse 
information that must be collated, and the ever-widening ripples which take that 
knowledge further and further from its source, can subsequently be particularised 
and tailored to individual circumstances. And in becoming particularised again, 
could it not be assumed that professional craft knowledge in the first meaning of 
the term is a redundant evidence base. However, it is not professional craft 
knowledge in the first meaning of the term that is vulnerable to becoming 
redundant. 
Rycroft-Malone et al. (2004, 85), in another reference to the verification of 
professional craft knowledge, describe the process as helping practitioners: 
...to surface, articulate and then reflect on their practical knowledge and its 
melding with other forms of evidence. The aim is to make this knowledge and 
its blending available for dissemination to a range of other practitioners for 
comparison, debate and critique; consensual validation and verification could 
then be sought. 
Blending knowledge from various sources is part of practical or professional craft 
knowledge in the sense of the second meaning of the term, that is, in the sense of 
exercising clinical judgement, particularising and tailoring evidence sources to 
individual circumstances, and so on. 
	 If this element of professional craft 
knowledge is also generalised, as suggested above, that has the effect of 
eliminating professional craft knowledge in the second meaning of the term, and, 
with it, the goal of individualised care. Professional craft knowledge could be 
considered an example of an `undecidable' in the context of this deconstructive 
reading. Its meaning is never anywhere punctually present. It is sustained by 
what it is not; its identity constituted by its difference from itself. 
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Rycroft-Malone et al. (2004) present a framework which represents the four 
evidence bases and how they interact with each other in terms of practice 
knowledge. The framework is reproduced in Figure 9.1 below. 
Figure 9.1: A framework for evidence-based practice (Source: Rycroft-
Malone et al., 2004, 87) 
The four sources of evidence for patient-centred, evidence-based practice are 
depicted as four equally large intersecting circles. The circles are contained within 
two large squares, the outer square representing 'Context of care/practice', and the 
inner one 'Practitioner-patient interaction and relationship - knowing the patient, 
empathy and trust' (Rycroft-Malone et al., 2004, 87). At the centre of the 
framework is a small area where all four circles overlap; this area represents 
'Person/patient-centred, evidence based care' (Rycroft-Malone et al., 2004, 87). It is 
reasonable to assume that this small area represents the melding of evidence from 
all four bases, where knowledge is particularized and tailored to meet individual 
needs and circumstances, and clinical judgement is exercised. The portion of 
evidence included from each base to provide person centred, evidence-based care 
is extremely small relative to the amount of evidence contained in each base or 
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circle. This suggests that the practitioner is required to be conversant with quite 
substantial quantities of diverse knowledge and to possess quite sophisticated 
powers of selection. Not only is the practitioner required to meld evidence from all 
four bases in a practice encounter but they are also required to meld evidence 
from different bases in the following way: 
• Research and professional knowledge/clinical experience; 
• Research and local data and information; 
• Local data and information and patient experience and preferences; 
• Patient experience and preferences and professional knowledge/clinical 
experience; 
In terms of size, each of these overlapping areas represents quite significant 
amounts of evidence. 
Evidence is also required to be melded from the following bases, represented by 
the areas where three of the four circles overlap: 
• Research, local data and information, and patient experience and 
preferences 
• Research, professional knowledge/clinical experience, and patient 
experience and preferences 
• Professional knowledge/clinical experience, patient experience and 
preferences, and local data and information 
• Research, professional knowledge/clinical experience, and local data and 
information, 
As outlined above, the framework could be interpreted as consisting of twelve 
distinct bases of evidence rather than four. Melding evidence from twelve distinct 
bases would present considerable challenges to an individual practitioner. 
The central argument of the paper is that the concept of evidence in the context of 
evidence-based practice must be broadened to include more than just 
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propositional or research knowledge. Having identified the various sources of 
knowledge that are used in practice, the authors suggest certain processes by 
which such sources, in particular, non-propositional knowledge sources may 
become evidence (Rycroft-Malone et al., 2004). Professional craft knowledge is an 
evidence base and also a source of knowledge for integrating evidence from all 
sources. If the processes suggested are followed, this will enable patient-centred, 
evidence-based practice. Since it is being argued that all knowledge used in 
practice can be based on evidence with the addition of clinical judgement to 
determine which evidence from what bases is appropriate in a particular care 
situation, it begs the question of the purpose of the two outer square areas in the 
framework figure above. It might be imagined that both 'Context of care/practice' 
and 'Practitioner - patient interaction and relationship - knowing the patient, 
empathy and trust' would be accommodated within an evidence base, or indeed be 
positioned at the centre of the framework where all four evidence bases intersect. 
Is the purpose of the framework not to enable the practitioner to draw on 
appropriate evidence bases and tailor them to the individual patient and the 
particular context of care? Positioning 'context of care' and 'practitioner-patient 
interaction' so far from the centre of the framework may be an unconscious 
acknowledgement that, contrary to the overt argument advanced in the paper, 
some elements of caring cannot be contained within the categories of evidence. 
The elements that have escaped the categories might be considered those that are 
most resistant to evidence as it has been presented in the text. Their position 
seems also to belie the inclusion of clinical judgement within an evidence base. 
Ironically, the authors' final statement is a call for testing the 'framework for 
patient-centred, evidence-based care...through rigorous empirical research' (Rycroft-
Malone et al., 2004, 88). Evidence from research is once again dominant in 
determining the validity and utility of the proposed framework, although the 
complexity of the latter might indicate that more than empirical methods are 
required. 
While Rycroft-Malone et al. (2004) claim that knowledge from practice may 
become a source of evidence for practice by processes which include critical 
reflection, Rolfe & Gardner (2005) argue that reflection provides the only source 
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of what may properly be called evidence, if this word is used in its correct and 
original sense. Practice may be truly evidence-based if reflective practice is at the 
centre of the process, rather than, as it is currently positioned, on the margins of 
evidence-based practice (Rolfe & Gardner, 2005). Changing how evidence-based 
practice is understood is all the more important for nursing since, in its current 
construction, it is at odds with nursing's fundamental values and philosophy (Rolfe 
& Gardner, 2005). With reflection at the centre of evidence-based practice, a new 
science of nursing may be developed, which reflects nursing values and 
distinguishes nursing from medical science (Rolfe & Gardner, 2005). The authors 
explain why evidence-based practice, as it is currently conceived, is not 
appropriate for nursing practice and research. The evidence upon which practice 
is based is arranged in a hierarchy, with findings from large scale quantitative 
research studies, in particular randomised controlled trials, at the apex and other 
forms of evidence arranged in descending order of importance (Rolfe & Gardner, 
2005). Evidence from qualitative research studies, reflective practice, expert 
opinion, and so on, tends to be positioned at the base of the hierarchy and thus 
rank as least important in terms of evidence-based practice (Rolfe & Gardner, 
2005). This has led to such sources of knowledge being devalued or disregarded 
(Rolfe & Gardner, 2005). The most highly regarded forms of evidence are research 
studies that produce findings that are generalisable to a population which shares 
the same characteristics as the sample used in the research study (Rolfe & 
Gardner, 2005). Nursing is concerned with unique individuals in unique 
circumstances and, as such, is a person- or patient-centred activity (Rolfe & 
Gardner, 2005). Evidence-based practice, as it is commonly understood, is biased 
towards the evidence produced by quantitative research approaches (Rolfe & 
Gardner, 2005). As an 'evidence-based' practice, nursing is compelled to adopt this 
same view of evidence, and accord quantitative research findings the highest 
status. Such an approach is in conflict with nursing as a patient-centred practice 
providing individualised care to persons (Rolfe & Gardner, 2005). Nursing, as a 
science, is concerned not with populations or large numbers of people but with 
individuals (Rolfe & Gardner, 2005). Therefore, quantitative research approaches 
should not set the standard for knowledge generation in nursing (Rolfe & Gardner, 
2005). 
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The authors explain how generalisable research findings, which are applicable to 
many people, are not appropriate in a practice that is concerned with the 
individual person: 
The RCT (randomised controlled trial) is often justified in nursing research 
by comparing the testing of new drugs with the testing of new nursing 
interventions. It might be argued, for example, that since we would be 
reluctant to accept a drug that has not been fully tested by a clinical trial, we 
should also be reluctant to accept a nursing intervention that has not been 
tested in the same way. However, our discussion of people and persons would 
suggest that this is a mistaken comparison, since whilst drugs generally 
produce very similar effects on all people, nursing interventions operate on 
the level of the individual person. 
Of course, it is sometimes useful for nurses to see the bigger, more general 
picture, for example when planning for future bed occupancy or when making 
decisions about overall ward policy. And as we have seen, the bigger picture is 
also required when prescribing and administering medication or when 
carrying out other technical procedures. However, we are arguing that there 
is a serious discrepancy when a discipline which is defined by its focus on 
unique interpersonal interactions has as its gold standard a research 
methodology which can offer little or no insight into those interactions (Rolfe 
& Gardner, 2005, 303). (Rolfe & Gardner's emphases). 
In the course of arguing for the inappropriateness of generalisable research 
findings in nursing practice, the authors concede that such findings are sometimes 
useful. The emphasis on the word 'sometimes' seems designed to convey a sense of 
the infrequency of such occasions. And the words 'It goes without saying' could be 
substituted paradigmatically for the intensifier 'Of course', with which the sentence 
begins, indicating that the point is so obvious it does not need to be stated. The 
authors probably wished they could avoid saying what follows the 'Of course', as it 
seems to undermine their argument for the inappropriateness of generalisable 
research findings in nursing. Generalisable research findings are identified with 
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technical aspects of nursing practice. Linking quantitative research findings with 
technical aspects of nursing could be regarded as an attempt to diminish or 
marginalise those aspects of nursing practice, as if to say, 'Of course nursing 
practice sometimes consists of technical aspects but we can disregard that as far as 
creating a new science of nursing is concerned'. Why might the authors seek to 
diminish or marginalise the technical aspects of nursing practice? Is it because, in 
acknowledging that nursing has a technical dimension that requires technical 
knowledge, it must be conceded that the randomised controlled trial may be the 
best way of producing such knowledge? And in conceding that, it goes without 
saying that any new science of nursing must include knowledge generated by 
randomised controlled trials. Diminishing the technical aspects of nursing may be 
interpreted as a way of maintaining a binary opposition between the technical and 
the interpersonal, so that the latter is not contaminated by the former. At the same 
time, and using the example given above once again, it could be argued that all 
technical procedures, including prescribing and administering medication, are 
nursing interventions that occur at the level of an individual person and take the 
form of an interaction between a nurse and a patient. Such an interpretation has 
the effect of connecting the technical and the interpersonal. That such a 
connection is not identified or acknowledged by the authors may again reflect their 
efforts to maintain these two approaches in opposition to one another. If the 
technical and the interpersonal are imbricated in nursing practice, then a science 
of nursing must, it would seem, include both. 
The difficulty of maintaining generalisable research as something separate from 
and incompatible with the doctrine of individualised care becomes evident again in 
the following extracts: 
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If research has demonstrated that a particular intervention is most effective 
for a general condition then, depending on the validity of the research study, 
the practitioner is obliged to apply that intervention to any patient suffering 
from the condition in the population described by the study. There may be 
exceptions, such as cases when the patient refuses to accept the 
treatment, or when the nurse decides that the patient is too frail or 
otherwise unsuited to the treatment (DiCenso et al., 1998), but as a general 
rule, generalisable findings from research are applied to individual cases 
which fall within the scope of the generalisation (Rolfe & Gardner, 2005, 
304). (My emphasis). 
This model is based on a science of people which regards patients as members 
of a collective group, each of whom is likely to respond in a similar way to the 
same intervention (Rolfe & Gardner's emphasis). Although clearly there are 
ethical implications to this position of nursing people as though they were all 
the same, it is not simply a moral issue. Our intention is not to condemn 
nurses working under the traditional EBP model as not caring for or about 
their individual patients; rather, we are pointing out the logical 
impossibility of truly individualised care. The logic ofgeneralising from a 
population to individuals within that population depends upon the 
assumption that each and every one of those individuals is fundamentally 
alike (Rolfe & Gardner, 2005, 304). (My emphasis). 
The authors appear to describe what they do not wish to convey. 'Exceptions' to 
the general application of research findings listed above would suggest that 
generalisable research findings may be `individualised' to the particular patient. 
Contrary to the argument that practice based on quantitative research evidence 
regards all patients as the same and all nurses as simply applying research findings 
to eligible people, and consistent with the description given in the first paragraph 
of the above quotation, it is clear that the `evidence' in evidence-based practice 
may be mediated by nursing judgement and individual patient preferences. 
Evidence-based practice, as so described, is not antithetical to individualised care. 
Once again the authors eschew an opportunity to mark a connection between the 
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general and the particular. If truly individualised care is logically impossible under 
the traditional EBP model, then how are the 'exceptions' to the model to be 
explained? What I wish to suggest is that the concluding statement of the second 
paragraph above could be rewritten, without contradicting what preceded it in the 
first paragraph, in the following way: 'we are pointing out the logical possibility of 
truly individualised care using the EBP model. The logic of particularising from a 
population to individuals within that population depends on the assumption that 
each and every individual is fundamentally different'. (My emphasis). 
As well as arguing, inadvertently perhaps, for the possibility of generalisable 
research findings being particularised in light of nursing judgement and patient 
preference, the authors also acknowledge the possibility of 'generalising the 
particular' as evident in the following quotation: 
Of course, whilst all therapeutic encounters are unique, they also share 
similarities, and so it is always possible to generalise to some extent. 
However, the inexorable logic of our position that each and every clinical 
encounter is unique is that the traditional and usually accepted model of 
evidence-based practice is only of limited use to the nurse (Rolfe & Gardner, 
2005, 305). 
The words 'Of course' again precede a statement (it is always possible to 
generalise...) that could be seen to be at variance with the argument against 
generalisation in a nursing science of the unique person. The 'always' possibility of 
generalising from the particular is tempered by the addition of the qualifier `to 
some extent'. The limited use that evidence from randomised controlled trials 
(RCTs) and the traditional model of evidence-based practice has in a new nursing 
science is outlined as follows: 
If we are serious about promoting nursing as a science of unique persons 
rather than a science of people in general, then we need to reconsider the 
methods and methodologies the discipline authorises and promotes for the 
generation of nursing knowledge. 
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We wish to argue that this reconceptualisation extends well beyond simply 
replacing the RCT with some other research methodology as the gold 
standard for generating evidence. It even extends beyond the view expressed 
by some writers that there is no gold standard. Rather, it questions the 
fundamental concept of evidence-based practice as simply the application of 
evidence of any kind to practice. We wish to argue that, if nursing is truly a 
science of the unique, then this is merely the first stage of the process of 
evidence-based practice, which must then generate further evidence from the 
nursing encounter itself in an ongoing reflective/reflexive cycle of action and 
evaluation (Rolfe & Gardner, 2005, 303-304). 
Although the authors assert that they are not substituting one gold standard for 
another in their concept of a new science of nursing, they acknowledge that 
qualitative research and reflective practice `...do address questions of individual 
nursing encounters...' (Rolfe & Gardner, 2005, 303). (Rolfe & Gardner's emphasis). 
They describe the new nursing science as a 'wet' science, arguing that knowledge 
relevant to practice must be discovered in the messy world of practice, using 
Schon's (1983) metaphor of a 'swampy lowland' to describe the practice setting 
(Rolfe & Gardner, 2005, 300). Of this science and its method of knowledge 
generation, they add: 
We must refrain from regarding qualitative and reflective research as an 
inferior 'soft' cousin to the 'hard' sciences. Rather, we must rise to the 
challenge of developing a complementary 'wet' science, in no way inferior to 
'dry' biomedical science, but rather a science attuned to the practice of 
nursing which can stand side-by-side with medical science without apology or 
concession (Rolfe & Gardner, 2005, 300-301). 
Even though the above extracts could be read as privileging knowledge generated 
by qualitative research and reflective practice in a nursing science of unique 
persons, this proves not to be the case. In terms of evidence upon which to base 
practice, it seems that knowledge generated in the practice context is limited in the 
same way as research findings generated by randomised controlled trials. This is 
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so, the authors argue, because the word 'evidence', as used in 'evidence-based 
practice', is used incorrectly. Rolfe & Gardner (2005, 305) assert that the original 
meaning of the word 'evidence' is 'the outwardly visible sign of an event, an 
indication that the event has taken place'. Therefore, evidence cannot precede an 
event; it can only follow it. Correctly used, then, the word evidence means 
'evidence from or evidence of (Rolfe & Gardner, 2005, 305). (Rolfe & Gardner's 
emphases), and not evidence for, as it is used to signify in the context of evidence-
based practice. That being the case, no source of knowledge, however compatible 
and consistent it may be with a nursing science of the unique person, qualifies as 
evidence for practice. Among the potential sources of knowledge listed are: 
findings from qualitative or quantitative research, findings from reflection on our 
practice, knowledge that we have about this particular patient, our 'gut feelings' 
(intuition), or the accumulated experience of colleagues and other professionals' 
(Rolfe & Gardner, 2005, 306), the latter sources constituting what the authors refer 
to as a 'rich accumulation of experiential knowledge' (Rolfe & Gardner, 2005, 306). 
All are to be regarded equally, not as evidence for practice but, rather, as 
motivating certain actions and behaviours in unique practice situations. The 
practitioner is not compelled to act on research findings, or knowledge from any 
other source, because there is no 'logical' connection between such sources and 
unique practice situations (Rolfe & Gardner, 2005, 306). This lack of any logical 
connection between sources of knowledge and the unique situations of practice is 
elaborated as follows: 
...if each and every therapeutic encounter is unique, then we simply have no 
way of predicting its outcome in advance and hence no way of deciding what 
might be the most effective intervention. Statistical generalisations such as 
those produced by RCTs are of little use because the laws of probability do not 
apply in individual cases. 
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But, by the same logic, the naturalistic generalisations of fittingness' 
(Sandelowski, 1986) or 'transferability' (Guba and Lincoln, 1989) from one 
case to another as advocated by qualitative researchers and reflective 
practitioners also do not apply if every case really is unique. An ethnographic 
study of a particular ward culture will only have limited application to a 
different ward; a phenomenological study of the lived experiences of 10 nurses 
will not necessarily apply to an eleventh nurse; a reflection on my experiences 
with a particular patient will not necessarily tell me very much about even my 
next encounter with the same patient (Rolfe & Gardner, 2005, 304-305). 
All sources of knowledge, or what may otherwise be regarded as evidence, serve as 
'clues' to the interventions appropriate in each 'unique clinical situation' (Rolfe & 
Gardner, 2005, 307). This is merely a first step in evidence-based practice in 
nursing as a science of the unique person (Rolfe & Gardner, 2005). 'Evidence' in 
the true meaning of the term comes from reflecting in and on the unique clinical 
situation. 
Our initial nursing intervention is therefore motivated by some or all of these 
sources of knowledge, but as we have seen, they can only give clues to the 
unique clinical situation we find ourselves in. Importantly, then, we must seek 
feedback on the effects of our action and modify it accordingly. This initial 
feedback is, according to our definition, the first firm evidence that we have 
specifically about this unique situation, and is then used to affirm or 
disconfirm our initial motivation, which in turn directs our subsequent actions 
(Rolfe & Gardner, 2005, 307). 
The authors represent their conceptualisation of evidence-based practice in a 
model which is reproduced in Figure 9.2 below. 
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Action 
reflection-in-action 
Evaluation 
Evidence 
(from research, 
reflection, 'gut 
feelings', 
experiences of 
self and 
colleagues, etc.) 
Figure 9.2: A reflective/reflexive model of evidence-based practice (Source: 
Rolfe & Gardner, 2005, 307). 
In the list of evidences on the left hand side of the model, research features first. 
The arrow which directs 'Evidence' towards 'Action' and is labelled 'initial 
motivation' overlaps slightly with the curved arrow labelled 'evidence' (Rolfe & 
Gardner, 2005, 307). This 'evidence', if the logic of Rolfe & Gardner's (2005) 
argument is followed closely, becomes part of the initial motivation for a 
subsequent action or nursing intervention, so an overlap is appropriate although it 
could perhaps be of a greater magnitude than represented in the model. 'Evidence' 
functions as evidence only in the context of a unique clinical encounter or 
situation. Even in a subsequent encounter between the same nurse and the same 
patient, the evidence from the first episode of care can provide no stronger 
motivation for action than any of the other sources of knowledge because the next 
episode of care is also to be regarded as unique. Since no knowledge source is 
privileged in the reflexive model of evidence-based care, and since evidence is 
generated in, and limited to, each unique clinical situation, it appears that multiple 
research methodologies that generate multiple sources of knowledge are required 
for nursing practice. 
Rolfe & Gardner's (2005) insistence on using the word 'evidence' in its correct and 
original meaning is accompanied by relatively loose use of other terminology. For 
example, the terms 'nursing intervention' and 'interpersonal interaction' are used 
synonymously in the context of the argument for the inappropriateness of 
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generalisable knowledge in person-centred nursing practice. The word 
'intervention' connotes a deliberate action which is planned in advance and could 
apply to many patients in similar circumstances, whereas the term 'interpersonal 
interaction' suggests a more immediate reciprocal activity which cannot be 
planned fully in advance but must evolve over the duration of the encounter. If a 
distinction is drawn between a nursing intervention and an interpersonal 
interaction, then it could be argued that generalisable knowledge is appropriate as 
a basis for a nursing intervention whereas it may be of more limited use in 
informing an interpersonal interaction. The other instance where terminology is 
conflated is in relation to qualitative research and reflection. These terms are 
frequently co-located in the text, for example, 'reflective practice and even 
qualitative research are barely tolerated' (Rolfe & Gardner, 2005, 299); 'refrain 
from regarding qualitative and reflective research as inferior' (Rolfe & Gardner, 
2005, 300); 'qualitative and reflective methodologies which do address questions' 
(Rolfe & Gardner, 2005, 303) (Rolfe & Gardner's emphasis); and, 'advocated by 
qualitative researchers and reflective practitioners' (Rolfe & Gardner, 2005, 304), 
which creates an effect of sameness or similarity between the two terms. When it 
comes to explaining how 'evidence' is generated from practice, the terms 
'reflection' and 'qualitative research' are used synonymously as indicated in the 
extracts below: 
Evidence-based practice is therefore a reflective/reflexive cycle in which we 
are gradually modifying our responses in the light of immediate feedback 
(Figure 1). This process has been variously referred to as reflection-in-action 
(Schein, 1983), nursing praxis (Rolfe, 1996) and action research (McNiff 1993; 
Rolfe, 1998). 
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Although some writers have described such a process as the artistry of nursing 
(Picard, 1995; Johns, 2001), our view is that it is part of a long scientific 
tradition of single-case experimentation which involves forming and testing 
hypotheses and theory-generation. Indeed, Schein (1983) refers to this process 
as 'experimenting-in-action, adding that 'when someone reflects-in-action, he 
becomes a researcher in the practice context' Such research 'in the practice 
context' that is also a component of practice itself is, for us, the most valid and 
important form of research for the generation of evidence from practice. 
...'small scale' research projects can be the personal reflective evaluations of 
practitioners of the consequences of their own interventions as part of an 
ongoing sequence of actions and evaluation of those actions. Evidence-based 
practice is therefore elevated from a dry, dispassionate judgement about 
research validity prior to and remote from the practice setting, to a series of 
on-the-spot reflective clinical judgements made in the midst of an evolving 
practice situation (Rolfe & Gardner, 2005, 307-308). 
A preference for viewing reflection-in-action as 'part of a long scientific tradition' 
rather than as 'the artistry of nursing' would indicate that a choice is possible 
between two different meanings of the term, as art and science are generally 
opposed to each other. Artistry might be more readily identified with what 
happens in evolving situations of practice. That the authors opt to align reflection-
in-action with the scientific tradition and make it indistinguishable from case study 
method may be indicative of a concern that, as artistry, the claim that reflection-in-
action is the most valid and important form of research for the generation of 
evidence from practice might be more easily dismissed. Earlier in the article, the 
authors expressed criticism of the Editor of 'Qualitative Health Research' journal 
for dismissing 'invention, imagination and 'alternative' forms of representation such 
as narrative' in qualitative inquiry (Rolfe & Gardner, 2005, 299). In an opinion 
attributed to the Editor, such approaches tended to make qualitative research less 
acceptable to the scientific community. Although critical of this narrow view of 
qualitative inquiry, Rolfe & Gardner's (2005) own argument is presented in a 
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language of which the Editor of 'Qualitative Health Research' journal would 
undoubtedly approve. 
In the conclusion to the article, the authors describe reflection as 'at the heart' of 
evidence-based practice (Rolfe & Gardner, 2005, 308); they add: 'In particular, we 
have asserted that it makes as little sense to demand RCT evidence for the 
effectiveness of reflection as it does to demand reflective evidence for the 
effectiveness of RCT'. However, if the reflective/reflexive model of evidence-based 
practice is consulted, it seems clear that reflective evidence is demanded for the 
effectiveness of RCT. In the unique patient encounter, evidence from RCT may be 
used as initial motivation for action. The process of reflection-in-action then 
determines whether that initial motivation was appropriate. Therefore it seems 
reasonable to suggest that it is via the reflective process that evidence of RCT 
effectiveness is established. 
As in the previous chapter, it seems difficult to maintain the distinction between 
propositional and reflective knowledge in nursing texts. While separation is being 
asserted, the texts appear to describe something other. 
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Chapter 10 Conclusion 
This study set out to examine the textual construction of reflective practice as a 
model of professional knowledge in nursing education. Reflective practice 
originated as a new epistemology of practice, one that sought to legitimise 
practical knowledge and to challenge the hegemony of the dominant model of 
professional knowledge in practice disciplines. Deconstruction was chosen as the 
research methodology for the study. This approach involves a close, patient, fine-
grained reading of selected texts; a reading that is attentive to all possible 
meaning-creating textual and linguistic resources. As indicated in Chapter 4, the 
aim of a deconstructive reading is not to arrive at some new theory or set of 
themes. However, certain threads appear to run through and connect the readings 
undertaken in previous chapters. An attempt is now made to describe this reading 
'otherwise' and to identify the potential implications for nursing knowledge and 
nursing education. 
All of the texts analysed suggest that reflective practice as a model of professional 
knowledge in nursing education does not escape the shadow of the dominant 
epistemology of practice. In the writings of Schon (1983), which so influenced 
nursing education's subsequent espousal of reflective practice, the model of 
technical rationality appears implicated in the new epistemology of practice. 
Although insisting on differences between these two epistemologies, the texts 
appear to rebel against their author's stated intention. Just as the writer endorses 
reflective practice as distinct from the model of technical rationality, the signifier 
betrays another meaning. Johnson (1994, 86) remarks: '...there is not really an 
outside to the discourse...we are all in it...some of the discourses that would like to 
oppose dominant discourse from the outside don't recognize the ways in which their 
formulations of the issues are drawing massively on concepts that themselves are 
central to the tradition'. 
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Likewise, in the texts drawn from the nursing literature, the binary oppositions, 
upon which the unique identity of reflective practice as a model of professional 
knowledge in nursing education depends, are shown to be characterised by 
instability. Referring to Derrida's reading of Rousseau's text, Johnson remarks: 
'...Rousseau's text functions against its own explicit (metaphysical) assertions, not 
just by creating ambiguity, but by inscribing a systematic "other message" behind or 
through what is being said' (Derrida, 2004a, xiii-xiv, Translator's Introduction) 
(Johnson's emphases). All of the authors whose work has been analysed in the 
final two chapters of the thesis declare that reflective practice, unlike the model of 
technical rationality, is an epistemology congruent with nursing philosophy and 
capable of creating knowledge from, and for, nursing practice. However, it 
becomes clear in a deconstructive reading that their descriptions do not always 
match their declarations. The model of technical rationality remains detectable, 
and implicated, in textual constructions of reflective practice, creating effects of 
which the authors seem, at least consciously, unaware. 
In terms of nursing knowledge, reflective practice, so this reading `otherwise' 
would suggest, does not appear anywhere punctually present, as a self-identical 
entity, in the texts that strive to construct its identity. Its identity is complicated by 
that which it seeks to exclude, that which is posited as its `other'. The distinction 
between the two epistemologies - reflective practice and the model of technical 
rationality - does not hold. What is thereby created could be said to be more than 
the opposition allows. 
The implications of this reading for nursing education would appear to dictate a 
cautious stance in the face of any theory that is presented as self-enclosed and 
definitive. This does not however mandate inaction. Johnson (1994, 82) refers to 
undecidability and deconstruction as not 'the unmistakable sign of the privilege of 
those who can afford not to know'. She adds that undecidability 'won't tell us what 
to do...But just saying that won't either. Theoretical statements, whether about 
decision or about undecidability, are all equally detached from any particular 
intervention' (Johnson, 1994, 84) (Johnson's emphases). Classes must still be given 
and nurses must still function in the service of their patients, clients, families and 
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wider society. What a deconstructive reading does offer nursing knowledge and 
nursing education, I should contend, is another way of examining concepts and 
theories, permitting searching questions to be asked, and presuppositions and 
assumptions to be revealed. As indicated already in earlier chapters, a 
deconstructive reading "sounds" a lot like reflective practice. 
From my own personal perspective as a nurse, a midwife, and a teacher, I have 
learned from doing this research to what extent, in my interaction with textual 
material, I read for meaning. I am also very aware now of the extent to which I 
pass over, ignore or otherwise edit out textual features that I take to be 
insignificant, and how I reconcile what appear to be quite obvious discordant 
elements with what I take to be the main theme of the writing. I am also very 
aware now of how I may have too hastily dismissed constructions of reflective 
practice that differed from my own, and the extent to which those constructions 
and conceptualisations have validity had I the openness and curiosity to pursue 
them further. Commenting on how social change may be accomplished, Johnson 
(1994, 86) states: 'if intellectual patterns have any determining effect on the way 
people live...then working on how the reflexes of thinking are inculcated might have 
an impact'. Derrida's ideas and writings, and the writings of those who have 
rendered his original texts accessible to the average reader, among whom I include 
myself, have opened up new, exciting, and productive avenues of inquiry for me. 
The sense of possibilities created - other ways of seeing and doing - is, in my 
opinion, most liberating, democratic, and consistent with what is best in any 
educational endeavour. 
I cannot conclude finally without drawing attention to the contradiction at the 
heart of the study itself. The text is a blending of two styles: an earlier part which 
consists of propositions, assertions and other performative statements, and a later 
part which attempts to unsettle assertions and declarations. It might perhaps have 
been more consistent to include only deconstructive readings of texts. However, I 
invite readers to read this writing deconstructively, both the earlier chapters and, 
indeed, the later ones. As Sturrock (2003, 140) points out: 'the necessary work of 
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confusion and misapprehension will be done by language, in all its glorious 
autonomy.' 
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